State v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 14 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-K-0792.,2002-K-0792.
• Citation: 838 So.2d 778
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph L. BROOKS.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

838 So.2d 778

STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph L. BROOKS.

No. 2002-K-0792.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

February 14, 2003.

Rehearing Denied March 21, 2003.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Douglas P. Moreau, District Attorney, Richard C. Nevils, Dana K. Jones, Assistant District Attorneys, for Applicant.

Kathryn Flynn Simino, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The charges in this case arose from an altercation that occurred outside a birthday party held at the American Legion Hall in Baton Rouge which resulted in respondent shooting and killing the victim. Respondent stood trial for second degree murder and a jury returned the responsive verdict of manslaughter. He was represented at trial, and in his subsequent appeal, by Jesse Hearin. The First Circuit reversed, finding the trial court erroneously excluded evidence which would have corroborated respondent's testimony concerning a prior threat made by the victim. State v. Brooks, 98-1151 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/15/99), 734 So.2d 1232. The court of appeal remanded the case with instructions directing the trial court to conduct a hearing as to the admissibility of evidence proffered by respondent during a pre-trial hearing in support of his claim of self-defense. Brooks, 98-1151 at 17-18, 734 So.2d at 1241. The state sought review in this Court, which denied writs. State v. Brooks, 99-1462 (La.11/12/99), 749 So.2d 651. The state thereafter had one year in which to bring respondent to trial again. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 582 ("When a defendant obtains a new trial or there is a mistrial, the state must commence the second trial within one year from the date the new trial is granted, or the mistrial is ordered, or within the period established by Article 578, whichever is longer."). We granted the present application to consider whether the state carried its heavy burden of justifying a delay in the prosecution of several months beyond the expiration of the original one-year time limit. State v. Joseph, 93-2734, p. 1 (La.6/3/94), 637 So.2d 1032; State v. Rome, 630 So.2d 1284, 1286 (La.1984). For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court correctly denied respondent's motion to quash and that the court of appeal erred in overturning that ruling and in ordering respondent discharged from prosecution.

At the hearing conducted on respondent's motion to quash, Dana Cummings, the assistant district attorney who tried the case against Hearin and was responsible for retrial, detailed the events following reversal of the case by the First Circuit. After this Court denied the state's application for review on November 12, 1999, Cummings had the case placed on the status docket for purposes of "touch[ing] base with whoever was representing the defendant at that time and also for plea negotiation." The victim's family had prompted Cummings's interest in a plea by urging her to resolve the case without subjecting them to a second trial. See R.S. 46:1844(D)(2)(a)(requiring a prosecutor to obtain the advice of the victim or a designated family member regarding "[t]he disposition of the criminal case by dismissal, plea, or trial."). Hearin remained respondent's attorney of record; he had last appeared in the case on August 31, 1999, at a hearing for purposes of setting post-conviction bond following reversal of respondent's conviction and sentence by the First Circuit. Shortly thereafter, respondent secured his release from jail and remained free on bond throughout the subsequent proceedings.

Cummings testified that Hearin had then contacted her personally on November 30, 1999, the date set for a status conference, and told her that "he had not yet been retained by Mr. Brooks [for the second trial] and would like to continue the matter." Hearin repeated that statement in open court and the matter was reset for another status conference on January 27, 2000. On that date, in response to Cummings's offer to begin plea negotiations, Hearin again stated that he had not yet been retained by respondent and his family and that plea negotiations were not appropriate because he did not formally represent respondent. Hearin also informed Cummings that "after he was retained he did want to entertain and speak to his ... client about a plea."

The status conference was reset for March 22, 2000. On that date, Hearin appeared in court and formally enrolled as counsel for respondent. At that time, Cummings again spoke with Hearin and proposed a plea bargain in which respondent would plead to manslaughter in return for a specific sentence. However, Cummings was uncertain whether she would need to file a superceding bill of information charging respondent with manslaughter or whether she could proceed under the original and unamended grand jury indictment charging second degree murder.¹ Given the assistant district attorney's uncertainty, the arraignment and status conference set for that date were continued by mistake until May 1, 2000, Law Day in the district court, which required rolling over the conference date to June 21, 2000. At this point in the case, no trial date had been set, and the case began to run on parallel tracks after Cummings filed a new bill of information on May 3, 2000, charging respondent with manslaughter.

At some point after March 22, 2000, it became clear to Cummings that Jesse Hearin would not be responding to her plea offer and that "there was a problem with representation in the case." In fact, Hearin had failed to appear on behalf of several of his clients and Cummings had learned from someone who shared office space with the attorney that Hearin "had in fact disappeared, for lack of a better word." On June 21, 2000, respondent appeared in proper person for arraignment set on the superceding bill and confirmed on the record that he had retained new counsel, Mr. Tommy Damico, who was busy in another court and could not attend the proceedings. Damico had previously called both Cummings and the trial judge to convey the same information. Damico also requested Cummings to reset the case for the following week. However, because of a conflict with Cummings's schedule, the trial court reset the status conference and arraignment for July 26, 2000. On that day, Damico appeared in court and respondent was formally arraigned on the superceding bill. Plea negotiations began immediately but broke down when Damico informed Cummings at a status conference on August 10, 2000, that respondent had rejected her plea offer. A trial date of November 13, 2000 was then set. The state ultimately continued the trial on that date because another trial was still in progress.

On January 5, 2001, or well over one year from this Court's denial of review in the appeal, respondent filed a pro se motion to quash the indictment, claiming that the time limit under La.C.Cr.P. art. 582 for commencing a new trial had expired. On February 2, 2001, respondent, accompanied by Damico, appeared in court on his pro se motion. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion without giving reasons. The court then accepted respondent's guilty plea, under the original indictment for second degree murder after Cummings dismissed its superceding bill. As part of his guilty plea respondent reserved the right to appeal from the court's adverse ruling on his motion to quash. See State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 586 (La.1976)

. The court sentenced respondent to 10 years imprisonment at hard labor.

In a split decision, the First Circuit reversed and vacated respondent's conviction and sentence, finding that "for one year prior to the filing of the motion to quash on January 5, 2001, no interruption or suspension of the time period for institution of prosecution occurred, and the trial court erred in denying respondent's motion to quash." State v. Brooks, 01-0640, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/28/01), 807 So.2d 325, 328 (Whipple, J., dissenting). The court of appeal acknowledged that the minute entry of March 22, 2000, indicated that the matter was continued on a joint motion, but based on its own examination of the transcript concluded otherwise. Specifically, the majority concluded that defense counsel's reference to the lack of a formal bill charging respondent with manslaughter did not constitute his acquiescence to a continuance and thus could not be chargeable to respondent for purposes of suspending the prescriptive period.² Accordingly, it found that no suspension of the time period for institution of prosecution had occurred and thus that the trial court had erred in concluding otherwise. Brooks, 01-0640 at 3-4, 807 So.2d at 327-28.

The controlling provision for suspension of the applicable time limits appears in La.C.Cr.P. art. 580, which states:

When a respondent files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea, the running of the periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but in no case shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to commence trial.

The grounds for suspension under La.C.Cr.P. art. 580 also apply to the time limits specified by La.C.Cr.P. art. 582 after a new trial or a mistrial has been granted. State v. Falkins, 395 So.2d 740, 741 (La.1981). For purposes of art. 580, a preliminary plea is any pleading or motion filed by the defense which has the effect of delaying trial. State v. Cranmer, 306 So.2d 698, 700 (La.1975); State v. Elfert, 247 La. 1047, 175 So.2d 826, 828 (1965). These pleadings include properly filed motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for a continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars. State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714, 725 (La.1987); State v. Fabacher, 362 So.2d 555, 556 (La.1978). Joint motions for a continuance fall under the same rule. State v. Jones, 620 So.2d 341, 342 (La.App. 5th Cir.1993) (citing State v. Simpson, 506 So.2d 837 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987),

writ denied,

512 So.2d 433 (La.1987)); see also State v. Rome, 93-1221 (La.1/14/94), 630...