State v. Broussard
| Decision Date | 21 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-K-3175,81-K-3175 |
| Citation | 416 So.2d 109 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry Paul BROUSSARD. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Larry C. Dupuis, Edwards, Stefanski & Barousse, Crowley, for relator.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Nathan Stansbury, Dist. Atty., Glenn Foreman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for respondent.
Jerry Paul Broussard was charged by bill of information with simple burglary in violation of La.R.S. 14:62. At arraignment, defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, on January 29, 1980, defendant withdrew his former plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty as charged. After ascertaining that defendant understood his constitutional rights and the terms of his plea bargain with the state, the trial judge accepted the guilty plea and sentenced defendant to serve four years at hard labor in conformity with the plea bargain.
Thirteen months later, on February 20, 1981, pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1 (Habitual Offender Law), the district attorney filed an information accusing defendant of three prior felony convictions. On February 24, 1981, defendant was brought before the court at which time he denied the allegations of the information. Thereafter, on April 21, 1981, the board of parole "granted" defendant's parole. Defendant's parole eligibility date was May 29, 1981. The habitual offender hearing was set by the state for May 27 (two days before defendant was eligible for parole). Before commencement of the hearing, defendant moved for a continuance on the grounds that he had not been served with a notice of the hearing and that he desired to retain counsel. The motion for continuance was denied; however, while defendant was allowed to retain counsel, the court would not release appointed counsel from representing defendant at that time. The hearing commenced and evidence was received. Later, the hearing was recessed until the next day at which time defendant's retained counsel moved for a recess on the ground that the lack of notice of the hearing had prevented defendant from retaining counsel who could prepare his defense. The trial judge granted a recess and set bond at $10,000 in the event defendant was released from custody. The hearing was reset for July 22, 1981. Defendant was released on parole on June 4, 1981. 1 On July 20, 1981, defendant filed a motion to quash the habitual offender information on the ground that the delay of thirteen months in filing the information after sentence was unreasonable.
On July 22, 1981, a hearing was held on the motion to quash at the beginning of the resumed habitual offender hearing. It was stipulated by the parties that all prior felony convictions were in Acadia Parish (same parish as the present proceeding) and that the current district attorney for Acadia Parish is the same district attorney who was in office at the time of defendant's prior felony convictions. After argument, the matter was taken under advisement. On October 15, 1981, the trial judge denied the motion to quash. On defendant's application, we granted a writ under our supervisory jurisdiction to review the correctness of that ruling. 2
La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides:
If, at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States; or any foreign government or country of a crime, which, if committed in this state would be a felony, the district attorney of the parish in which subsequent conviction was had may file an information accusing the person of a previous conviction....
Although the above statute does not impose a specific prescriptive period in which the district attorney must file an habitual offender information, we have held that it does not allow an indefinite time for filing the information once the necessary information is available. State v. Wilson, 360 So.2d 166 (La.1978); State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752 (La.1975)...
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State of La. v. QUINN
...first hearing. The Defendant notes the State may not file a habitual offender bill after an unreasonable time. He cites State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109 (La.1982), in support of his argument. In Broussard, the supreme court found that a habitual offender bill of information filed thirteen ......
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96-0084 La.App. 4 Cir. 5/21/97, State v. Langlois
...must be filed "within a reasonable time" after the prosecution becomes aware of the defendant's prior felony record. State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109, 110-11 (La.1982). The District Attorney filed the habitual offender bill thirteen months after sentencing the defendant and three months be......
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State v. Fisher
... ... The Habitual Offender Law does not impose a prescriptive period for filing a bill of information. However, jurisprudence holds that the State must file it "within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a Defendant has a prior felony record." State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109, 110 (La.1982) ... See also, State v. Perkins, 01-1092, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 997, 999, writ denied, 02-0929 852 So.2d 1084 (La.11/15/02), 829 So.2d 422; State v. Anderson, 01-158, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/01), 788 So.2d 561, 563 ... This rationale is based ... ...
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Buckley v. Butler
...requires these enhancement proceedings to be brought within a reasonable time following conviction for the second offense. State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109 (La.1982).3 As noted, the Sixth Amendment does not so require. McMillan; Spaziano. The right to a jury in recidivist proceedings is le......