State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 07 January 1888 |
| Citation | 38 Kan. 390,16 P. 259 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF KANSAS v. JOHN BROWN |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chase District Court.
PROSECUTION for drunkenness. From a conviction and sentence at the June Term, 1887, the defendant John Brown appeals. The opinion contains a sufficient statement of the facts.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.
T. H Grisham, and J. V. Sanders, for appellant.
John Madden, county attorney, for The State.
OPINION
This was a criminal prosecution, brought in the district court of Chase county, wherein the defendant, John Brown, is charged with a violation of the provisions of chapter 104 of the Laws of 1883. (Comp. Laws of 1885, ch. 31, § 362.) The statute reads as follows:
The information contains two counts, in the first of which the defendant is charged with the offense of being drunk in a street in the city of Cottonwood Falls. In the second he is charged with the offense of being drunk in the court house in said city. A trial was had before the court and a jury, and the defendant was found guilty "as charged in the information," and was sentenced to pay a fine of $ 10 and the costs of suit, and to stand committed to the county jail until such fine and costs were paid. From this sentence he now appeals to this court.
Before the trial in the court below the defendant filed a motion to quash the information, upon the ground that it did not set forth facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, which motion was overruled by the court; and this ruling is alleged for error. It is claimed that the information is insufficient, and should have been quashed for the following reasons: (1.) It does not state that the defendant was at any time disturbing his family or others. (2.) It does not describe or give the name of the street in which the defendant was drunk. (3.) The act itself under which the defendant is prosecuted is void for the reason that it contravenes § 16, article 2 of the constitution. (4.) The act is also void if construed as the prosecution construes it, for the reason that with such a construction it would inflict a cruel and unusual punishment. (5.) Both the act and the information are void because of the indefiniteness of the word "drunk." We think the act is valid, and the information sufficient.
The next question is a more difficult one. It is whether a person may be guilty of the offense forbidden by the statute, where he innocently drinks the liquor which intoxicates him, without having any knowledge of its intoxicating qualities, and without having any idea that it would make him drunk. The court below, over his objections and exceptions, excluded nearly all the evidence offered by him to show his ignorance of the intoxicating character of the liquor, and its possible power to produce drunkenness; and the court also gave, among others, the following instruction to the jury, to wit:
"The defendant's ignorance of the intoxicating character of liquors drunk by him, if he did drink any such, is no excuse for any drunkenness resulting therefrom, if any did so result."
It has always been a rule of law that ignorance or mistake of law never excuses, and this with a kindred rule, that all men are conclusively presumed to know the law, is founded upon public policy and grounded in necessity; but no such rule is invoked in this case. The question in this case is simply whether ignorance or mistake of fact will excuse. It is claimed by the prosecution that it will not, and this on account of the express terms of the statute. The statute provides in express terms, and without any exception, that "if any person shall be drunk," etc., he shall be punished. And it would seem to be contended that there can be no exceptions. But are idiots, insane persons, children under seven years of age, babes, and persons who have been made drunk by force or fraud, and carried into a public place, to be punished under the statute? And if not, why not? And if these are not to be punished, then no sufficient reason can be given for punishing those who have become drunk through unavoidable accident, or through an honest mistake? Of course the legislature has the power to provide for the punishment of "any person" who may be found drunk in a public place, whatever may be his age or mental condition, or in whatever manner he may have become drunk; and it is also for the legislature to determine whether the public exigencies are such as to require that injustice shall be done to innocent individuals by inflicting upon them unmerited punishment. But we should never suppose that the legislature intended to punish the innocent unless particular words are used that will bear no other construction. General terms inflicting punishment upon "any person" who might do any particular act should be construed to mean only such persons as act voluntarily and intelligently in the performance of the interdicted act. We should not suppose, in the absence of specific words saying so, that the legislature intended to make accidents and mistakes crimes. Human actions can hardly be considered as culpable either in law or in morals, unless an intelligent consent of the mind goes with the actions; and to punish where there is no culpability would be the most reprehensible tyranny. The legislature usually in enacting criminal statutes, enacts them in general terms so as to make them by their terms include all persons; and yet it is always understood that some persons, as idiots, insane persons, young children, etc., are not to be considered as coming within the provisions of the statute. It is always understood that the courts will construe the statute in accordance with the general rules of statutory construction, and apply the act only to such persons as the legislature really intended to apply it; that is, to apply the act to such persons only as should intelligently and voluntarily commit the acts prohibited by the legislature. And it is generally better that the exceptions to the operation of the statute should not be stated in the statute itself, for if they are, then it becomes necessary for the public prosecution to also state them in the complaint. If idiots, insane persons, children, etc., are in terms excepted from the provisions of the statute, then it would be necessary for the public prosecutor to see that all informations or indictments, charging the particular offense, should substantially follow the language of the statute, and should also state the exceptions as a part of the description of the offense. He should allege that the case did not come within any of the exceptions. And he would also have to prove the same. But where the exceptions are not stated in the statute, the complaint may charge the offense substantially in the language of the statute, and without mentioning any of the exceptions, and then, if the defendant claims that the case comes within any of the exceptions, he must prove the same as a part of his defense.
With respect to punishment notwithstanding ignorance or honest mistake of fact, Mr. Joel Prentiss Bishop, one of the ablest and most philosophical law-writers of this country, uses the following language:
(Bish. Stat. Cr., § 131.)
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State v. Genson, No. 121,014
...is no constitutional objection to such legislation, the necessity for which the Legislature is authorized to determine. State v. Brown , 38 Kan. 390, 393, 16 P. 259 [1888] ; 16 C. J. 76-78." 111 Kan. at 590, 207 P. 838.See Logan , 198 Kan. at 215-16, 424 P.2d 565 (upholding strict liability......
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Chapman v. Boynton
...had been committed. Citations applicable thereto: Intoxication through mistake of fact proper defense, section held valid, State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 P. 259; section does not limit authority of city to punish for drunkenness, City of Minneola v. Naylor, 84 Kan. 147, 113 P. 309. See, al......
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State v. Gardner
...owing allegiance to the United States, though the words in themselves are broad enough to comprehend every human being. In State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 Pac. 260, there was construed a statute punishing any person who was drunk in any highway, public place, or in his own house, etc., and ......
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Salzman v. United States, 21172
...for operating motor vehicle while intoxicated reversed because intoxicating substance was taken for medicinal purposes); State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 P. 259 (1888) (public drunkenness excused by ignorance of intoxicating potentiality of beverage). 12 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 9......