State v. Brown

• Citation: 377 P.3d 1098,160 Idaho 635
• Decision Date: 15 June 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 42905
• Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Keith A. BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.

160 Idaho 635
377 P.3d 1098

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,
v.
Keith A. BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.

Docket No. 42905

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: June 15, 2016
Review Denied July 13, 2016

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Judge

160 Idaho 636

Keith A. Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction for voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand theft entered following a conditional guilty plea. Brown challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brown and his wife were arrested in Florida on March 20, 2007.¹ Brown was arrested on a fugitive warrant from Idaho and his wife on a fugitive warrant from Montana. Brown's warrant stemmed from a grand theft charge for his use of a missing man's debit card. Florida law enforcement officials interviewed both Brown and his wife about the alleged grand theft, as well as the man's disappearance. Brown was first interviewed on March 20, wherein he denied any involvement in the man's disappearance. Later, on March 21, police identified a discovered body as belonging to the missing man. During the interview of Brown's wife, she confessed to shooting the man and hiding his body because he had raped her.

Police interviewed Brown for a second time on March 22. At the beginning of the interview, the officer advised Brown of his Miranda² rights. Throughout the interview, the officer made various statements to Brown indicating that Brown's wife had already confessed to everything during her interview and that Brown needed to tell his side of the story. At times, the officer suggested Brown was justified in his actions because he was defending his wife from her rapist. Eventually Brown confessed to killing the man.

Brown was charged with first degree murder, Idaho Code §§ 18–4001, 18–4003(a) ; being a felon in possession of a firearm, I.C. § 18–3316 ; and grand theft, I.C. §§ 18–2403, 18–2407(1)(b). Brown filed a number of motions to suppress, each of which were denied by the district court. Brown eventually entered a conditional Alford³ plea to voluntary manslaughter, I.C. § 18–4006(1), and accessory to grand theft, I.C. §§ 18–205, 18–2403(1), and 18–2407(1), retaining the right to appeal any prior adverse ruling of the district court.

Brown appealed his conviction to this Court, and we affirmed the district court on all issues except for the court's denial of Brown's motion to suppress. State v. Brown , 155 Idaho 423, 437, 313 P.3d 751, 765 (Ct.App.2013). On that issue, we remanded the case for a new hearing to determine the voluntariness of Brown's statements to the interrogating officer. Id. At the suppression hearing, the district court heard testimony from the officer who questioned Brown and

377 P.3d 1100

160 Idaho 637

his wife in March 2007, the psychologist who performed a competency evaluation on Brown in July 2008, and Brown. The court was also presented with video recordings of the police interviews with Brown and Brown's wife.

After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Brown's interrogation, the district court found that the State carried its burden of proof establishing that Brown's statements were voluntary. The district court denied his motion to suppress. Brown timely appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

Brown maintains that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements to police. Specifically, he contends that his statements were the result of police coercion and thus involuntary. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina , 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).

To determine whether a confession is voluntary, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances and ask whether the defendant's will was overborne by police conduct. Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 287–88, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252–53, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 316–17 (1991) ; State v. Troy , 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (1993) ; State v. Valero , 153 Idaho 910, 912, 285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct.App.2012). In determining the voluntariness of a confession, a court should consider the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, including whether Miranda warnings were given, the youth of the accused, the accused's level of education or low intelligence, the length of the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973) ; Troy , 124 Idaho at 214, 858 P.2d at 753 ; Valero , 153 Idaho at 912, 285 P.3d at 1016....