State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 11 January 2023
• Docket Number: I.D. No. 2105013317
• Parties: STATE of Delaware, v. Montrez BROWN, Defendant.
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

287 A.3d 1222

STATE of Delaware,

v.Montrez BROWN, Defendant.

I.D. No. 2105013317

Superior Court of Delaware.

Submitted: November 30, 2022

Decided: January 11, 2023

Kevin B. Smith, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Zachary A. George, Esquire, Hudson, Jones, Jaywork & Fisher, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.

OPINION

Primos, J.

This is the Court's decision regarding the Motion to Suppress Evidence of Defendant Montrez Brown (hereinafter "Mr. Brown"). This case involves the warrantless stop and subsequent search of Mr. Brown's vehicle. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of a violation of the traffic code and the search of the vehicle was justified by probable cause that the vehicle contained either contraband (specifically, marijuana) or evidence of related crimes. Accordingly, Mr. Brown's motion to suppress is DENIED .

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts cited herein are those presented during the suppression hearing held on October 19, 2022. The State presented testimony from Sergeant Lloyd McCann (hereinafter "Sergeant McCann"), a Delaware state trooper, and video footage from the mobile video recorder ("MVR") device on the front of Sergeant McCann's state vehicle.¹

On May 25, 2021, shortly after 11 p.m., Sergeant McCann was on patrol in an unmarked police car, and turned into the Capital Park neighborhood, which he testified to be a high-crime area.² A dark sedan driven by Mr. Brown passed Sergeant McCann's vehicle, travelling in the opposite direction, and exited the Capital Park neighborhood.³ Out of his sideview mirror, it looked to Sergeant McCann as though the sedan's rear license plate was not illuminated as it passed,⁴ in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4334(c).⁵ He made a U-turn and followed the sedan.⁶ After confirming his suspicion, he activated his emergency lights, initiating a traffic stop as Mr. Brown's vehicle turned into a hotel parking lot.⁷ Mr. Brown's vehicle pulled into a parking space and Sergeant McCann stopped his vehicle behind the sedan.⁸ He then exited and approached the driver's side of the sedan. He asked Mr. Brown about the unilluminated registration plate light, which Mr. Brown attributed to mechanical or electrical issues with his vehicle.

While speaking with Mr. Brown, Sergeant McCann detected the odor of marijuana coming from the sedan.⁹ He returned to his police car and ran routine inquiries on his computer, checking whether Mr. Brown's license and registration were valid and whether there were any outstanding warrants for his arrest. While he ran his inquiries, he observed that Mr. Brown had previously been charged with disregarding a police officer's signal.¹⁰ Based on this name and the charge, Sergeant McCann realized that Montrez Brown was the same individual who had, several months earlier, led another police officer in a vehicular pursuit (rather than submitting to a routine traffic stop) and ultimately escaped.¹¹ Sergeant McCann also testified that he was aware of anonymous but uncorroborated tips that Mr. Brown might have been involved in "drug dealing and/or possession of a firearm."¹²

After completing his routine inquiries, Sergeant McCann returned and asked Mr. Brown to step out of the vehicle. His stated reason for asking Mr. Brown out of the vehicle was the odor of marijuana.¹³ When Sergeant McCanna asked "do you smoke any marijuana," Mr. Brown answered that he did.¹⁴ When asked if he smoked marijuana in the car, Mr. Brown answered "sometimes" and admitted to having done so "a long time ago."¹⁵ Upon further questioning, he also admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day while wearing the same clothes.¹⁶ However, when asked directly, he denied that there was any marijuana in the vehicle at the time of the stop.¹⁷

At that point, Sergeant McCann told Mr. Brown that he planned to search the vehicle and that he would then let him go.¹⁸ He asked Mr. Brown to turn around and attempted to place handcuffs on him. He told Mr. Brown that he was detained (as opposed to under arrest) and that he was going to have Mr. Brown sit in the back of the police car while the search was conducted.¹⁹ When asked why, Sergeant McCann responded "because it smells like marijuana."²⁰ Mr. Brown started resisting at that point, lifting his arms over his head to make it difficult to place the handcuffs on him. He eventually broke free and fled on foot, with Sergeant McCann in pursuit. Mr. Brown escaped Sergeant McCann but was later apprehended by other state troopers.²¹ Meanwhile, Sergeant McCann searched the vehicle Mr. Brown had left behind.²² Inside, he found a handgun, an extra magazine and ammunition, and suspected crack cocaine.²³ Mr. Brown has since been charged with multiple offenses related to the possession of drugs, a firearm, and ammunition.

Mr. Brown submitted a motion on September 8, 2022, moving to suppress "all illegally obtained evidence in this case including a firearm, ammunition, controlled substances, paraphernalia, identification, scales, currency, and Defendant statements including those on a civil asset forfeiture form."²⁴ Mr. Brown argued in his motion 1) that the initial stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion²⁵ and 2) that even if the stop was justified, the subsequent arrest and search of the vehicle were not supported by probable cause.²⁶ The State argued in its response, filed September 21, 2022, that 1) the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation²⁷ and 2) that there was probable cause to search the car based on the odor of marijuana, Mr. Brown's admissions, and Sergeant McCann's knowledge of Mr. Brown's criminal history.²⁸ The Court held a suppression hearing on October 19, 2022, at which additional issues were raised, including whether the scope of the stop exceeded its initial justification and whether the amount of force employed turned the stop into an arrest requiring probable cause.²⁹

STANDARD

In order to justify a warrantless search and seizure, the State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer's actions complied "with the requirements of the United States Constitution, the Delaware Constitution, and any applicable statutes."³⁰ At a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses.³¹

DISCUSSION

Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.³² On occasion, the Delaware Supreme Court has interpreted state constitutional protections to extend beyond their federal counterparts, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.³³ However, Delaware courts will "conduct separate analyses for parallel state constitutional provisions only when a party produces particular and detailed explanations of why a separate analysis is appropriate."³⁴

The events leading to the search of Mr. Brown's vehicle can be broken into four distinct phases. First, there was the initial traffic stop to investigate an equipment violation. Second, the stop was extended to investigate the odor of marijuana, and Mr. Brown was required to step out of his vehicle. Third, Sergeant McCann attempted to handcuff Mr. Brown and announced his intent to search the vehicle (prompting Mr. Brown's immediate resistance and flight). Fourth and finally, Sergeant McCann searched the vehicle that Mr. Brown had left behind. The Court will address each in turn.

I. Initial Stop of the Vehicle

Mr. Brown first argues that the initial stop of his vehicle was unsupported by reasonable suspicion and that it was a pretextual stop, i.e., that Sergeant McCann stopped his vehicle in the hopes of discovering more serious criminal activity than an unilluminated license plate.

A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 6.³⁵ Specifically, a routine traffic stop is a form of investigatory detention (also known as a " Terry stop"), for which an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.³⁶ Delaware police officers possess statutory authority to conduct investigatory stops pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1902, which provides that an officer may stop a person in a public place when the officer has "reasonable ground to suspect" that the person is "committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime."³⁷ Consistent with constitutional requirements, Delaware courts construe "reasonable ground" to mean "reasonable and articulable suspicion."³⁸ Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion is judged "in the context of the totality of the circumstances as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer's subjective interpretation of those facts."³⁹ Moreover, an officer must be able to identify "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion."⁴⁰

At the outset, it does not affect the analysis if, as Mr. Brown contends, Sergeant McCann was motivated in whole or in part by a desire to uncover more serious criminal activity than a mere equipment violation. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Delaware Supreme Court have rejected the argument that "pretextual" stops are unreasonable seizures, so long as objective facts support the officer's conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed to investigate even a minor traffic offense.⁴¹

Here, Sergeant McCann had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Brown was violating a traffic law, specifically 21 Del. C. § 4334(c), which requires a vehicle's license plate to be illuminated and clearly visible from 50 feet away. The officer's testimony that the license plate appeared unilluminated from roughly 25 feet behind the vehicle, which was corroborated by the MVR video, is more than...