State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 21 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2015–K–0855.,2015–K–0855.
• Citation: 176 So.3d 761
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Sadie BROWN.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

176 So.3d 761

STATE of Louisiana

v.Sadie BROWN.

No. 2015–K–0855.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Oct. 21, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 2015.

Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, J. Bryant Clark, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Parish of Orleans, New Orleans, LA, for Respondent/State of Louisiana.

Robert E. Jones, IV, New Orleans, LA, for Relator/Sadie Brown.

Opinion

PAUL A. BONIN, Judge.

Sadie Brown was a guest passenger on an all-terrain vehicle when Daphne Cola, a pedestrian, was struck and killed by the ATV. The district attorney formally charged Ms. Brown with manslaughter. In response to Ms. Brown's application for a bill of particulars, the prosecution informed her that she was accused as a principal (along with the vehicle's driver) in the perpetration of at least one of three felonies, none of which are enumerated in the murder statutes, and are thus eligible as felony predicates under a subsection of the manslaughter statute in the event of death resulting therefrom.

Based upon the bill of information and the bill of particulars, and relying upon State v. Legendre,¹Ms. Brown filed a motion to quash, contending that there was no set of facts which could support a conviction for manslaughter. Following a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion, and Ms. Brown applied to us for supervisory review. We requested supplemental briefing and heard oral arguments from counsel. We also stayed proceedings in the district court pending our further orders.

We grant Ms. Brown's application. But because we find that the proof of the elements of the offense of manslaughter, under the subsection charged, is highly fact-intensive and not susceptible to resolution on a motion to quash, we deny relief. We also lift the stay previously entered by us.

We explain our decision and disposition in the Parts which follow.

I

Ms. Brown was a passenger on an ATV when the driver struck and killed a pedestrian. Thereafter, she and the driver left the scene. The prosecution charged her with felony-manslaughter under La. R.S. 14:31A(2)(a),²and, in its answer to defendant's motion for bill of particulars, alleged three separate offenses to serve as the predicate felony: 1) illegal possession of stolen things; 2) hit-and-run driving; and 3) obstruction of justice. Ms. Brown subsequently filed a motion to quash based on the failure to state an offense. SeeLa.C.Cr.P. art. 485(Effect of inconsistent or limiting allegations of bill of particulars); see alsoLa.C.Cr.P. art. 532(5)(One of the grounds for basing a motion to quash is that “[a] bill of particulars has shown a ground for quashing the indictment under Article 485.”). The crux of her argument was that none of the three alleged felonies could legally be used as a predicate felony for manslaughter. The trial judge denied the motion and the instant writ application followed.

A

If an indictment fails to charge a valid offense, it is defective and “its invalidity may be declared by a ruling on a motion to quash, for a motion to quash may be based on the ground that the indictment fails to charge an offense which is punishable under a valid statute.” Legendre,362 So.2d 570, 571 (1978). When considering a motion to quash filed under La.C.Cr.P. art. 485, “the court must accept as true the facts contained in the bill of information and the bills of particulars and decide whether or not a crime has been charged.” State v. Schmolke,12–0406, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/16/13), 108 So.3d 296, 298(citations omitted). The determination by the trial judge whether to grant or deny a motion to quash is solely a question of law and therefore any defenses on the merits are not valid grounds for quashal. See State v. Byrd,96–2302, pp. 18–19 (La. 3/13/98), 708 So.2d 401, 411; see also Franklin.Accordingly, we review the trial judge's legal ruling under a de novostandard. See State v. Hall,13–0453, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/9/13), 127 So.3d 30, 38–39; cf. State v. Tran,12–1219, p. 2, n. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/13), 115 So.3d 672, 673(rulings on motions to quash involving mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard).

B

Ms. Brown is charged under that provision of the manslaughter statute, sometimes referred to the felony-manslaughter provision, which states in pertinent part that “Manslaughter is ... [a] homicide committed without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm[ ] when the offender is engaged in the perpetration of anyfelony not enumerated in Article 30 or 30.1....” La. R.S. 14:31A(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, notably, Ms. Brown is not charged with a crime which requires the specific intent to kill. See State v. Brumfield,329 So.2d 181, 189–90 (La.1976). But the prosecution must prove that the homicide was committed when the defendant was in perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in La. R.S. 14:30(First degree murder) or 14:30.1 (Second degree murder). See id.And all of the alleged felony offenses specified in the bill of particulars in this case are not enumerated felonies in the murder statutes. SeeLa. R.S. 14:69(Illegal possession of stolen things); La. R.S. 14:100(Hit-and-run driving); La. R.S. 14:130.1(Obstruction of justice). Thus, each of these specified felonies qualifies as a “predicate felony” for the manslaughter charge. See State v. Anseman,607 So.2d 665, 668 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992). The bill of particulars also specified that Ms. Brown was being charged as a principal to the predicate felonies. SeeLa. R.S. 14:23(1)and 24³(defining principals).

We specially emphasize, however, that although La. R.S. 14:31A(2)(a), the felony-manslaughter provision, does not specifically set forth a causal requirement between the underlying or predicate felony and the death, such an essential element must be read into the statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that, in a prosecution for felony-manslaughter, the prosecution is still required to prove that the “defendant's conduct was a legal cause of the killing.” See State v. Kalathakis,563 So.2d 228, 231–33 (La.1990).⁴The Court has also found that a “causal relation between the defendant's conduct and the harm for which the prosecutor seeks to impose criminal sanctions is an essential element of every crime.” Id;see alsoState v. Kenny,11–1819, pp. 8–9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/13), 116 So.3d 992, 997. Noting that the underlying felony and unlawful killing must somehow be related, the Court in State v. Myersfound that the prosecution had to prove the defendant and his co-perpetrator were engaged in the perpetration of a felony not enumerated in La. R.S. 14:30or 14:30.1andthat the victim was killed in furtherance of the commission of this felony. See Myers,99–1849, p. 9 (La.4/11/00), 760 So.2d 310, 316.

Importantly for our purposes here, this issue of causation is a question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder, however, and therefore not properly disposed of by a motion to quash. See Kalathakis,563 So.2d at 231; Kenny,11–1819, p. 8, 116 So.3d at 997(“Causation is a question of fact which has to be considered in the light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the ultimate harm and its relation to the actor's conduct.”); see alsoLa.C.Cr.P. art. 532(setting forth the grounds for a motion to quash). Additionally, whether the prosecution can meet its burden of proof to establish that Ms. Brown was in perpetration of any of the three alleged felonies at the time of the victim's death is also an issue for trial. See Franklin,13–0488, p. 5, 126 So.3d 663, 667(“the prosecution's ability to meet its factual burden of proof at trial is a factual matter going to the merits of the charge and should not be a sufficient ground to quash a bill of information”); see also State v. Jordan,97–1756, pp. 7–8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So.2d 556, 563(allegation that evidence was insufficient to support charge of first degree murder was not properly raised in motion to quash).

Moreover, the rule in Legendreis inapplicable to the instant case. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Legendrefound that a concrete parking lot did not constitute a “dangerous weapon” for purposes of an aggravated battery charge. SeeLa. R.S. 14:34A (“Aggravated battery is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon.”). The Court then held that the motion to quash should be granted because the bill of information alleged facts “which [could not] conceivably satisfy an essential element of the crime.” Legendre,362 So.2d at 571. Here, unlike in Legendre,the prosecution has not attempted to improperly extend the definition of an essential element. As noted above, under the plain language of La. R.S. 14:31A(2)(a), “any” non-enumerated felony may serve as a predicate offense. Accepting as true the facts contained in the bills of information and particulars, the prosecution has alleged three felonies which, if all the essential elements of any one of them are proven, could conceivably satisfy an essential element of felony-manslaughter (the other essential elements being the killing of a human being and the causation).See Schmolke,12–0406, p. 3, 108 So.3d at 299.

Ms. Brown's arguments in support of her motion to quash are misdirected in that she presents defenses on the merits and claims that the prosecution will not be able to carry its burden of proof at trial. If Ms. Brown seeks to challenge the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, she may do so on appeal, should she be convicted. See generallyLa. Const. art. I, § 19. At this stage, however, she does not present any valid grounds to disturb the trial judge's denial of her motion to quash.

II

In this Part, we explain our use of the writ disposition “writ granted; relief denied.”

We acknowledge that this disposition of a writ application has been criticized. See State v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,04–2648 (La.1/14/05), 892 So.2d 569(Calogero, C.J., concurring). And we also concede that such disposition ought to be sparingly used and never as a writ denial in disguise. The...