State v. Brown

Citation489 P.3d 152
Decision Date29 April 2021
Docket NumberNo. 20190254,20190254
CourtSupreme Court of Utah
Parties STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Keith Scott BROWN, Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, David S. Sturgill, Provo, for appellee

Ann Marie Taliaferro, Dain Smoland, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

Justice Himonas, opinion of the Court:

God forbid that Judges upon their oath should make resolutions to enlarge jurisdiction - William Cowper

¶1 Keith Brown pled guilty to, and was sentenced for, child sodomy and child sex abuse. Nine years and numerous appellate proceedings later, Brown challenges the district court's denial of his motion to reinstate his right to appeal. We reject Brown's entreaty.

¶2 Strain as we might, we cannot enlarge our appellate jurisdiction to encompass Brown's challenge. The whys and wherefores are found in the language of, and interaction between, Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute, UTAH CODE § 77-13-6, its Post-Conviction Remedies Act, UTAH CODE § 78B-9-101 et seq. (the PCRA), and rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as interpreted by our decisions in Gailey v. State , 2016 UT 35, 379 P.3d 1278 ; State v. Rettig , 2017 UT 83, 416 P.3d 520 ; and State v. Flora , 2020 UT 2, 459 P.3d 975, among others.

I

¶3 Brown pled guilty to one count of child sodomy, a first degree felony, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child, second degree felonies, on February 17, 2011.1 Six weeks later, the district court sentenced Brown to ten years to life in prison on the child sodomy count and to one to fifteen years on each of the child sex abuse counts, the sentences to run concurrent to one another.

¶4 At no time between entering his plea and being sentenced did Brown ask that his plea be set aside. It wasn't until over a year-and-a-half later when Brown filed a Motion for Misplea that he first sought to set aside his guilty plea. See State v. Brown , 2013 UT App 99, ¶ 4, 300 P.3d 1289 (per curiam). For support, Brown argued that at the time of his plea he had been "severely injured in a traumatic" car accident "from which he was still recovering," was under the influence of "mind-altering, opioid pain relievers," and not thinking clearly. The district court found against Brown on these points and denied the motion, the court of appeals dismissed Brown's ensuing appeal for want of jurisdiction, id. ¶ 5, and both this court and the United States Supreme Court denied his petitions for a writ of certiorari.

¶5 Undeterred, Brown trod on, filing successive petitions for postconviction relief—the first in 2013, the second in 2017. In both he maintained, among other arguments, that he had entered his guilty plea without the benefit of effective assistance of counsel. Both petitions came up short.

¶6 With respect to the 2013 petition, the district court determined that the petition was procedurally improper because Brown could have sought to withdraw his plea in a timely manner but failed to do so. Importantly, the district court found that all of the facts material to Brown's claims were known to him more than a year before he filed the petition.2 Brown v. State , 2015 UT App 254, ¶¶ 4–5, 361 P.3d 124. Accordingly, the district court concluded the petition was time-barred.3 The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Brown's argument that the "petition was timely filed and should not be time-barred because," as Brown put it, he filed within a year of when he "recogniz[ed] the significance of his attorney's ineffective assistance." Brown , 2015 UT App 254, ¶ 7, 361 P.3d 124 (emphasis added).4

¶7 Brown's 2017 petition fared no better. Brown first filed this petition under the same case number as the 2013 petition. The thrust of his argument was the egregious injustice exception we have tossed about for some time. See , e.g. , Winward v. State , 2012 UT 85, 293 P.3d 259. The State contended, and the district court agreed, that Brown was procedurally required to file a new petition under a separate case number. After he did so, the State argued it was entitled to summary judgment because all of Brown's claims were or could have been previously brought. Again, the district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the State.

¶8 This brings us to the present: Brown's motion to reinstate his right to appeal5 and his appeal from the denial of that motion. Per Brown, the motion did not detail "the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or the reasons why his plea was invalid"; rather, it invited the district court to strike down the Plea Withdrawal Statute as unconstitutional and to fashion "some procedural mechanism ... wherein he could raise and detail his plea-based claims and have them reviewed on the merits." The district court declined Brown's invitation, noting "that it is not in a position to overrule prior holdings of higher courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, who have determined that Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute is constitutional."

II

¶9 Brown makes a two-pronged argument to us for the unconstitutionality of Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute, UTAH CODE § 77-13-6. First, he argues that because the statute fails to afford him the "right to appeal (or first review) of his pre-sentencing claims with the attached right to effective assistance of counsel, " it violates multiple provisions of the Utah and United States Constitutions. Second, he argues that the statute violates the "separation of powers provisions" of the Utah Constitution. We wish to be clear: These arguments raise meaty constitutional questions that deserve our attention. But we cannot turn a blind eye to the defect in our appellate jurisdiction in this matter.

¶10 Jurisdiction is the blood in our judicial system. Because of its vitalness, we "have an independent obligation to ensure that we have [it] over all matters before us." Trapnell & Assocs., LLC v. Legacy Resorts, LLC , 2020 UT 44, ¶ 31, 469 P.3d 989 ; see also State v. Collins , 2014 UT 61, ¶ 21, 342 P.3d 789 ("Appellate courts do not enjoy unlimited power to review the actions of trial courts and cannot conjure jurisdiction." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton , 399 S.W.3d 816, 820, n.3 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (determining no proper basis for invoking the court's exclusive jurisdiction and noting that "[t]his Court may not obtain jurisdiction of the subject matter of an appeal by consent, waiver, or in the interest of judicial economy").

¶11 A categorical prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction is a valid procedural basis for accessing the right to appeal. State v. Lara , 2005 UT 70, 124 P.3d 243, is instructive.

In Lara , we held that "[t]o invoke appellate jurisdiction after an appeal has been dismissed a party must establish the existence of two components: jurisdictional authority and a procedure to access it." Id. ¶ 8. Yes, Lara speaks in terms of "after an appeal has been dismissed," id. , but this is solely because that is how the jurisdictional issue factually presented itself in that matter. The requirement of a procedure that allows a party to access appellate jurisdiction is not limited to the facts of Lara ; it applies across the spectrum. See , e.g. , In re Krempp , 77 F.3d 476, *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Because the Krempps have presented no valid basis for invoking our appellate jurisdiction, we must dismiss this appeal and assess the Krempps with all costs." (citation omitted)).

¶12 The requirement of a valid procedural basis for lodging an appeal makes total sense. Without it, filing in the appellate courts of this state would turn into a legal free-for-all. Unfortunately for Brown, and as the State points out, this fundamental requirement for the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction is wanting here.

¶13 Before us, as before the district court, Brown relies on Manning v. State , 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, and rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as the basis for asking that we exercise jurisdiction and strike down the Plea Withdrawal Statute. His reliance is misplaced. As we explain in the paragraphs that follow, Manning has been supplanted by rule 4(f), and rule 4(f) doesn't provide us with appellate jurisdiction to consider Brown's constitutional arguments.

¶14 We take up the Manning point first. In that case, Carolyn Manning, a pro se criminal defendant, filed an untimely notice of appeal.6 2005 UT 61, ¶ 5, 122 P.3d 628. After the district court dismissed Ms. Manning's untimely notice, she filed an extraordinary writ in which she "claimed that her attorney ‘did not inform her that she could file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of judgment,’ and that, as a result, her ‘right to appeal under Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution [had] been violated.’ " Id. ¶ 6 (alteration in original). On certiorari review, we affirmed the court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's denial of the defendant's petition. In so doing, we clarified the process by which criminal defendants "improperly denied their right to appeal can promptly exercise this right." Collins , 2014 UT 61, ¶ 23, 342 P.3d 789 (quoting id. ¶ 26 ). More directly, we "held that ‘the trial or sentencing court may reinstate the time frame for filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove ... that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his right to appeal.’ " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Manning , 2005 UT 61, ¶ 26, 122 P.3d 628 ).

¶15 Following our opinion in Manning , we amended our appellate rules to "formalize[ ]" the process. Ralphs v. McClellan , 2014 UT 36, ¶ 16, 337 P.3d 230 ("The threshold question concerns the applicability of the principles set forth in Manning , as now formalized in appellate rule 4(f)."). Accordingly, Manning...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Bevan v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • October 7, 2021
    ...his direct criminal appeal right under Manning v. State , 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, superseded by rule as stated in State v. Brown , 2021 UT 11, 489 P.3d 152.3 Pursuant to a stipulation between Bevan and the county attorney's office, the district court issued an order reinstating Bevan's ri......
  • S.S. v. J.F. (In re E.M.F.)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • March 31, 2022
    ...1993) (Orme, J., concurring).Here, we exercise our discretion to reconsider the fundamental issue of appellate jurisdiction. See State v. Brown , 2021 UT 11, ¶ 10, 489 P.3d 152 ("Jurisdiction is the blood in our judicial system. Because of its vitalness, we have an independent obligation to......
  • Bevan v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • October 7, 2021
    ...P.3d 628. While "Manning has been supplanted by rule 4(f)" of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see State v. Brown, 2021 UT 11, ¶ 13, 489 P.3d 152, a motion reinstate a direct criminal appeal is often colloquially referred to as "a Manning motion," see, e.g., Garcia v. State, 2018 UT A......
  • Bevan v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • August 12, 2021
    ...v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. While "Manning has been supplanted by rule 4(f)" of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see State v. Brown, 2021 UT 11, 13, 489 P.3d 152, a motion to reinstate a direct criminal appeal is often colloquially referred to as "a Manning motion," see, e.g.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT