State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 27 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-033,81-033 |
| Citation | 318 N.W.2d 370,107 Wis.2d 44 |
| Parties | , 34 A.L.R.4th 1155 STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stephen P. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Patrick F. Brown, Waukesha, argued, for defendant-appellant-petitioner; Steven J. Steinhoff, Waukesha, on brief.
Steven Tinker, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued, for plaintiff-respondent; Richard A. Perkins, Dist. Atty., for Jefferson County, on brief.
The defendant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court for Jefferson county, John B. Danforth, circuit judge, entered on a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of speeding in violation of sec. 346.57(4)(h), Stats.1979-80. 1 The court of appeals in an unpublished decision, State v. Brown, 310 N.W.2d 654, 1981, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The two issues raised in the court of appeals are raised in this review, to wit: (1) Did the circuit court err in excluding evidence and in refusing to submit jury instructions and special verdict questions pertaining to the arresting officer's alleged violation of SEC. 345.55, STATS.1979-80; AND (2)2 Did the circuit court err in refusing to submit jury instructions and special verdict questions based upon the defendant's claim of legal justification, that is, that his conduct, although otherwise in violation of the law, is excusable on the ground of self-defense, necessity, coercion or entrapment.
The facts are in dispute. On the evening of November 13, 1978, the defendant, Stephen P. Brown, then 16 years old, was driving east from Madison to his home in Waukesha on Interstate Highway 94. With him in the car was his 10-year-old sister. The defendant testified he was traveling in the right-hand lane "at the speed limit" (55 miles per hour) when he noticed a vehicle behind him swerving in a "rather violent manner." According to the defendant, the vehicle approached the rear of his car at a high rate of speed until it was five or ten feet from his rear bumper. The vehicle then proceeded past the defendant's car and reentered defendant's lane, slowing to a speed which the defendant estimated at 15 to 25 miles per hour. When the defendant attempted to pass the vehicle it speeded up to match the speed of the defendant's car and took a position in defendant's "blind spot" (to the right rear of defendant's car). The defendant testified that when he attempted to get the vehicle out of his blind spot by speeding up and slowing down, which he did several times, the vehicle matched his speed changes to maintain its position. The driving pattern of the vehicle, which defendant characterizes as wild and erratic, alarmed the defendant and put him in fear of a physical confrontation with the driver of the vehicle. In his testimony the defendant admitted that he accelerated to a speed of 72 miles per hour to try to get away from the vehicle and that he exceeded the lawful speed limit. The vehicle which had "harassed" the defendant then displayed flashing red lights and signaled the defendant to pull over. The defendant stopped and was issued a citation by the driver of the vehicle, a state patrol officer, for traveling at 72 miles per hour, 17 miles per hour over the legal limit of 55, in violation of sec. 346.57(4)(h), Stats.1979-80.
Although both the defendant and the state patrol officer agree that the defendant's car was traveling at the speed of 72 miles per hour, the officer's version of the events preceding the issuance of the citation differs substantially from that of the defendant. The officer testified that he was on routine patrol in an unmarked state patrol car proceeding east on I-94 at a speed of between "fifty and fifty five miles an hour" when the defendant's car passed him on the left. The officer said that he increased the speed of his vehicle to match the speed of the defendant's car, that his vehicle remained approximately 250 feet behind defendant's car for a half mile, and that when his vehicle's speedometer registered between 72 and 74, he turned on the red lights, pulled the defendant to the side of the road and issued the citation.
At trial the defendant offered testimony to establish that the department of transportation evaluates the performance of its officers by, among other things, determining the number of citations issued per hour by each officer. 3 The defendant requested instructions relating to the invalidity of the citation on the ground of official misconduct, namely, evaluating the officer's performance on the basis of number of citations issued violates sec. 345.55, Stats.1979-80. The circuit court ruled the testimony irrelevant and inadmissible and refused to submit the defendant's proposed instructions.
In addition, the defendant submitted jury instructions to the circuit court relating to his claim of legal justification, that is, that he should be excused of liability because his conduct was in defense of his sister and in self-defense, occurred under circumstances of coercion or necessity, or was caused by improper law enforcement methods (entrapment). The circuit court rejected defendant's proposed instructions and instructed the jury that if it found that the defendant's vehicle was exceeding the speed limit, it should find the defendant guilty. The circuit court instructed the jury as follows:
After 30 minutes of deliberation the jury found the defendant guilty of speeding, and the circuit court entered judgment on the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that the officer's personal motivation in issuing the citation does not invalidate the citation and that the defendant's claim of legal justification is not available in a civil forfeiture action.
The defendant argues on review that because the officer's promotions and pay increases are based in part upon the number of citations he issues, the officer is receiving consideration for his enforcement activities in violation of sec. 345.55(1), Stats.1979-80, and therefore the citation for speeding is void.
It is unnecessary to decide whether a quota system for citations and arrests exists and whether such a quota system would violate sec. 345.55, Stats.1979-80. The defendant's argument fails because even if the officer were violating sec. 345.55, Stats.1979-80, the citation issued would not necessarily be void.
Sec. 345.55(1), Stats.1979-80, does not govern arrests, convictions or fines. Sec. 345.55(1) prohibits the officer from soliciting or receiving remuneration based upon the number of arrests, convictions or amount of fines. Violation of sec. 345.55(1) subjects the offending officer to the forfeiture set forth in sec. 345.55(2). Sec. 345.55 is silent about the validity of a citation issued by an offending officer.
If the legislature had intended a violation of sec. 345.55(1), Stats.1979-80, to void any action by the offending officer, including citations and arrests that are otherwise valid and within the scope of the officer's authority, we believe such intent would have been expressed clearly in the statute. In the absence of such expressed legislative intention, we conclude that a violation of sec. 345.55 does not invalidate the otherwise valid citation issued to the defendant and that the testimony offered by the defendant to establish a violation of sec. 345.55(1), Stats.1979-80, was properly excluded by the circuit court as irrelevant for the purpose offered.
The second issue raised by the defendant, namely, whether his claim of legal justification is available in an action for violating the speed limit, poses a more troublesome question.
At trial the defendant requested jury instructions on self-defense, coercion or necessity, and entrapment, defenses well recognized in the criminal law. 4
While the defenses of self-defense, 5 coercion, 6 necessity, 7 and entrapment 8 are well accepted in criminal law, and similar defenses are recognized in tort law, 9 the applicability of these defenses to strict liability civil forfeiture offenses is less clear. 10
The parties do not dispute that sec. 346.57(4)(h), Stats.1979-80, establishes a "strict liability" 11 civil offense. 12 The state maintains, however, that sec. 346.57(4)(h) creates not only a strict liability offense in the sense that the statute eliminates proof of defendant's state of mind but also creates an absolute liability offense in the sense that every violation of the literal terms of the statutes renders the offender guilty without exception. The doing of the proscribed act constitutes the wrong, argues the state, and the moral turpitude (scienter or state of mind) or purity of motive (justification) which prompts the proscribed act are not material to the question of...
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