State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 17 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 84-507-C,84-507-C
• Citation: 528 A.2d 1098
• Parties: STATE v. Charles BROWN. A.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1098

528 A.2d 1098

STATE v. Charles BROWN.

No. 84-507-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 17, 1987

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Jane M. McSoley, Annie Goldberg, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff.

William Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Asst. Public Defender, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

FAY, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Charles Brown (Brown), appeals from a Superior Court jury conviction on a one-count indictment for the murder of Holly Boyd (Boyd). The jury found Brown guilty of second-degree murder in the slaying and he was sentenced to the Adult Correctional Institutions for thirty years. The court ordered him to serve the first twenty-five years of his sentence, it suspended the remaining five years and placed him on probation for five years to commence upon his release. We affirm the conviction but remand the case for resentencing.

This sad tale of ill will toward men takes us back to the height of the Yuletide season, Christmas night, 1982. At approximately 11 p.m. on that night Boyd, accompanied by Gary Adams, arrived at an establishment known as the 11-11 Club (the club). The club is a discotheque-bar located on North Main Street in Providence.

Sometime around 2 a.m. on December 26, a fight involving three women, one identified as Boyd and another identified as Brown's sister, Janie "Porky" Brown, erupted inside the club near the doorway entrance. Several other individuals soon joined in the action. The club's bouncers interceded and escorted the women outside; however, the peace was short-lived as the women, once outside, refused to leave and began to fight again. The bouncers again interceded to break up the altercation.

After the second altercation was terminated, Brown was seen running to his automobile, opening the door, reaching under his seat, and extracting a hunting knife. He then proceeded to chase Boyd around the parking lot with the knife. Boyd, in attempting to elude Brown, ran out into North Main Street; Brown followed close behind. When they reached the center divider line of the street, Boyd turned, Brown swung the knife hitting her in the upper part of her arm, and they both fell to the ground. Boyd got up and ran to the far side of the street near the Ethan Allen furniture store building; Brown got up and continued the chase. When they reached the other side, Boyd fell down again, and Brown was observed standing over her and making a striking type motion at her.

The police arrived shortly after to find Boyd lying in front of the Ethan Allen furniture store bleeding and unconscious. They also found two other people who had been stabbed during the altercations. Boyd suffered three stab wounds, one to the right arm, one to the right leg, and one to the chest. The chest wound was determined to be the cause of death.

Brown raises several issues on appeal; where necessary we shall include additional facts.

I EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S FLIGHT TO NEW YORK

The first argument we will take up concerns Brown's allegation that the trial justice abused his discretion in permitting the state to introduce evidence of Brown's alleged "flight" to New York because it was irrelevant and because it was offered in violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.

A

In State v. Cooke, 479 A.2d 727 (R.I. 1984) we adopted the fourprong test for determining the relevancy of flight evidence from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977). We indicated in Cooke that the relevancy of flight from the crime scene as circumstantial evidence of a defendant's guilt depended upon "the degree of confidence with which a chain of inferences can be followed: (first inference) something the defendant did led him to flee, (second inference) he fled out of consciousness of guilt, (third inference) his consciousness of guilt derived from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged, and (fourth inference) his consciousness of guilt concerning a crime charged reflects actual guilt of the crime charged." Cooke, 479 A.2d at 732-33. We went on to say that "the linchpin of flight as probative of guilt is a defendant's knowledge of the reason why he is fleeing and that the reason he is fleeing is related to the crime on trial." Id. at 733.

Because of the difficulty in establishing the third and fourth inferences, courts generally place great reliance on the proximity in time between the flight and the crime charged in order to establish these inferences. United States v. Howze, 668 F.2d 322, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1982). Hence, when the time lapse between the flight and the crime charged is great, "the court must be certain there is evidence that a defendant knows he is being sought for the specific crime charged and not some other crime or event." Id. at 325. Conversely, if flight occurs shortly after the crime, the need to establish that the defendant knows he is fleeing from the specific crime charged becomes less crucial, and the probative value of the flight evidence becomes much more important. Cooke, 479 A.2d at 733.

Here, Detective Arnold Shone testified that from late December 1982 through January 1983, he went to Brown's home half a dozen times with an arrest warrant but that he could not locate Brown. Detective Shone informed Brown's mother, who lived with Brown, that the Providence police had a warrant for her son's arrest for the murder of Boyd. She in turn told him that she did not know her son's whereabouts. Based on further investigation, the police traced Brown to New York City and Detective Shone arrested him there on February 15, 1983.

Brown, testifying in his own behalf, stated that he left Providence the night of December 26 for New York to visit his uncle, that the trip was planned prior to Christmas, and that two days after the stabbing he learned about the arrest warrant issued against him. Brown stayed in New York for a week, returned home for two weeks, but then left for New York again because "[when] the police came by after they found out where my mother lived * * * they told her they'd shoot me on sight, and * * * I wasn't going to stay around for something I didn't do." Brown subsequently traveled from New York to Philadelphia to visit his grandfather, came back to Providence again, and then went back to New York before being arrested there.

Brown contends that so long as the state did not conclusively prove that he actually knew, prior to leaving for New York on December 26, that the police had a warrant for him in connection with the Boyd murder then the evidence of flight was inadmissible. Brown's argument misses the mark. The critical factor to the admissibility of evidence of flight is not whether the defendant has actual knowledge that he is fleeing from the specific crime charged; rather, it is whether the totality of the evidence creates an inference that he had knowledge. And the more immediate in time the flight is to the crime charged, the stronger the inference.

Here the evidence of Brown's flight to New York was relevant and, therefore, properly admitted. His flight from Providence was immediate, and although he may not have known when he left that the police had a warrant for his arrest, by his own admission, he certainly knew two days later that they were searching for him, and he also knew why they were looking for him. This actual knowledge certainly was more than sufficient to establish an inference that Brown knew why he was fleeing and that that reason was related to the crime of murder.

B

Brown also contends that the evidence of flight was admitted in violation of Rule 16 since the state never notified the defense that Detective Shone would give testimony about Brown's flight to New York.

Although Detective Shone was listed in the state's response to discovery as a witness for trial, the state failed to give any indication of what the detective would testify to. In response to a subsequent defense motion to compel disclosure of Detective Shone's anticipated testimony, the state responded on November 29, 1983:

"Det. A. Shone will testify consistent with the attached police narrative. Det. Shone will also testify to witnessing the statements given by Felicia Delgardo, Wayne Costa, Richard DeRobbio and Walter Catlin."

Since the state never said that Shone would testify about Brown's flight, and since none of the other police statements or summaries contained in the state's discovery response concerned the police attempts to locate Brown or to arrest him, Brown claims the evidence of flight should have been precluded by the trial justice. The trial justice's failure to do so, according to Brown, warrants this court's reversal of the conviction and entitles Brown to a new trial.

Rule 16(i) provides sanctions for the failure of either party to comply with discovery. ¹ We have stated that the imposition of any Rule 16 sanction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Concannon, 457 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I. 1983); State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 245 (R.I. 1982). In this case the trial justice found that "Rule 16 has been complied with, if not total [sic ], at least in [the] spirit of which it was intended." The trial justice was incorrect in his conclusion.

Consequently, on appeal, it is our task in selecting an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation to consider, "(1) the reason for nondisclosure, (2) the extent of prejudice to the opposing party, (3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and (4) any other relevant factors." Coelho, 454 A.2d at 245; see also State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 911 (R.I. 1986). If the violation is inadvertent in nature we look to determine whether the opposing party has been prejudiced by nondisclosure. It is the defense's burden, in a situation like this, to establish that, had the information been disclosed, there is a likelihood that defense counsel could...