State v. Brown, 86-134-C
| Decision Date | 13 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-134-C,86-134-C |
| Citation | 522 A.2d 208 |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. Bruce R. BROWN. A. |
This case comes before us on the defendant's appeal from a judgment of conviction for first-degree sexual assault entered in the Superior Court following a jury trial. We affirm. The facts of the case insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.
The defendant and the mother of the victim were married, and thereafter, in 1983, defendant adopted the victim, who was then approximately three years old. In July 1984, the couple separated. The victim, a little girl named Crystal then four years of age, was placed along with her sister in the care of defendant on weekends while the mother worked as a waitress. After one of the evenings of babysitting by defendant, Crystal mentioned to her mother that defendant had placed his penis in her mouth the night before. The mother immediately took steps to file charges, and defendant was indicted for first-degree sexual assault.
At trial Crystal was the major witness for the prosecution since the trial justice, after examination, found Crystal, who at the time of trial had attained the age of five years, to be a competent witness. The defendant testified that he had committed no such sexual acts upon the victim.
In support of his appeal defendant raises only one issue. He asserts that the trial justice was in error in failing to grant a mistrial when the prosecutor asked certain questions to which objections were sustained by the trial justice.
On cross-examination, counsel for the state sought to impeach the credibility of defendant by confronting him with two prior convictions. The first prior conviction took place in December 1984 when defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of exposing his genitals. The second prior conviction took place in January 1985 in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts when defendant pleaded guilty to accosting a female.
The defendant admitted the prior convictions, and the trial justice immediately cautioned the jury that such prior convictions could be considered "simply for the matter of passing upon the credibility, the believability of that witness and nothing more." The defendant does not assert that the use of these impeaching convictions or the cautionary instruction by the trial justice constituted error.
What he does argue is that interspersed with these questions on impeachment were several questions in which counsel for the state asked defendant in effect if he had a sexual problem and questioned whether that sexual problem would be of a type that would prompt defendant to commit the kind of act with which he was charged. In each instance the trial justice sustained defense counsel's objection to such questions but denied the defendant's motion to pass. The defendant in his brief cites the questions upon which his motion to pass the case was based.
It is undisputed that the questions posed were improper. It is also undisputed that the evidence concerning prior convictions was limited by the court's instructions both at the time the evidence was adduced and later in his charge to the jury to the assessment of credibility and for no other purpose.
We have said on a number of occasions that the decision concerning the declaration of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Collazo, 446 A.2d 1006 (R.I.1982); State v. Anil, 417 A.2d 1367 (R.I.1980); State v. Marrapese, 116 R.I. 1, 351 A.2d 95 (1976). In the event that the trial justice denies such a motion, his determination will be given great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong. Collazo, 446 A.2d at 1010; State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 339 A.2d 253 (1975).
When a defendant complains of alleged prejudicial remarks or questions posed by a prosecutor and predicates upon such remarks or questions a motion for mistrial, the trial justice must assess the prejudicial impact of such comments or questions. In the event that he or she finds that the prejudice is of such a nature as to be ineradicable or inexpiable, the motion to pass...
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