State v. Brown

• Citation: 235 Conn. 502,668 A.2d 1288
• Decision Date: 19 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 14883,14883
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2512 STATE of Connecticut v. Lionel BROWN.

Page 1288

668 A.2d 1288

235 Conn. 502, 64 USLW 2512

STATE of Connecticut v. Lionel BROWN.

No. 14883.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 21, 1995.

Decided Dec. 19, 1995.

Carolyn K. Longstreth, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene J. Callahan, State's Attorney, and Philip D'Eramo, Former Assistant State's Attorney, for the appellant-appellee (state).

Lauren Weisfeld, Assistant Public Defender, for the appellee-appellant (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and MARY R. HENNESSEY, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether, upon the receipt of information alleging serious jury misconduct, a trial court has a duty to conduct an inquiry into the allegations even in the absence of a proper request by counsel. After a jury trial, the defendant, Lionel Brown, was convicted of, inter alia, ¹ forgery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-140(a) ² and attempted larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a) and 53a-124(a)(2). ³ The trial court rendered judgment on the jury verdict and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed his convictions in part on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, but rejected his claim of jury misconduct. State v. Brown, 33 Conn.App. 339, 635 A.2d 861 (1993).

We then granted the state's and the defendant's petitions for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court. ⁴ The appeal was originally argued before a five judge court. See State v. Brown, 232 Conn. 431, 656 A.2d 997 (1995). Thereafter, we granted the state's motion for en banc reargument and reconsideration of the same certified issues. See, e.g., State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 532, 643 A.2d 1213 (1994); State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 284 n. 4, 636 A.2d 351 (1994). We now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. ⁵

The opinion of the Appellate Court describes many of the facts that the jury reasonably could have found. ⁶ "On May 8, 1991, at approximately 2:45 p.m., the defendant entered the Gateway Bank in Wilton. He identified himself as Clifford Sailer and attempted to make a split deposit ⁷ involving two checks. One check for deposit was made out to and endorsed by Clifford Sailer in the amount of $728.90; the other check, in the amount of $960 made payable to and endorsed by Sailer, was to be cashed. ⁸

"The teller was suspicious of the defendant because she was acquainted with Sailer, who is white, and the defendant is black. According to the teller, the endorsements on the checks appeared to be Sailer's. ⁹ Because the defendant could not produce any identification, the teller refused to make the transactions. The defendant then left the bank, taking the checks with him. The teller notified the bank manager of the incident and the manager put an alert signal into the bank computer system.

"Soon thereafter, a man, who identified himself as Robert Black, attempted to make a split deposit involving three checks: two for deposit in the amounts of $776.10 and $78, and the third to be cashed in the amount of $880. All three were payable to Robert Black and endorsed in general on the back. He too lacked identification. The bank manager refused to make the transactions and the second man left. The bank manager then observed this man join the defendant and a woman in a car. The bank manager wrote down the license plate number of the car and called the Wilton police.

"Shortly thereafter, Officer Gary Garuder of the Wilton police department stopped the car and arrested the three occupants. The driver, the woman, had identification in several names, along with $600 in cash. One of the men, the second man to enter the bank, had $453. The defendant had valid identification, $32, a deposit slip with Clifford Sailer's address written on it, a paper on which another name and address were written, and two checks totaling $1192.90 made out to Barbara Matison. Garuder seized a manila envelope from the car. Among the items in the envelope were various bank papers, checks, checkbooks, torn signature cards, customer receipts, and change of name forms." ¹⁰ State v. Brown, supra, 33 Conn.App. at 341-42, 635 A.2d 861.

The Appellate Court concluded that this evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of forgery in the third degree because there was no evidence that Sailer had not endorsed the checks that the defendant had presented to Gateway Bank. Id., at 349, 635 A.2d 861. The Appellate Court also concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of attempted larceny in the third degree because the court determined, as a matter of statutory construction, that the reference in General Statutes § 53a-121(b) ¹¹ to "committed" thefts impliedly precludes the aggregation of attempted thefts. Accordingly, the court modified the judgment on that count to attempted larceny in the fourth degree. Id., at 352, 355, 635 A.2d 861. Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly had failed to conduct, sua sponte, a hearing in response to allegations of jury misconduct. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had possessed a sufficient factual basis upon which to determine whether jury misconduct actually had occurred and that the court had not abused its discretion in failing to conduct a hearing in order to investigate the alleged jury misconduct. ¹² Id., at 345-46, 635 A.2d 861.

The state and the defendant have both challenged the validity of the decision of the Appellate Court in various respects. The state maintains that it adduced sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of forgery in the third degree and attempted larceny in the third degree. With respect to the conviction of attempted larceny in the third degree, the state argues that a proper construction of the applicable statutes permits aggregation of the dollar amounts that the defendant and his coconspirator attempted to steal from Gateway Bank. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court should have ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to investigate the alleged jury misconduct. We find both of the state's claims persuasive. To the extent that the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct any type of inquiry whatsoever in response to the allegations of jury misconduct, we also find his claim persuasive. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court on all three issues.

I

We first consider whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of forgery in the third degree. In order to prove forgery in the third degree, the state was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) had falsely made, completed or altered a written instrument, or had knowingly issued or possessed any written instrument that had been falsely made, completed or altered, (2) while possessing an intent to defraud, deceive or injure another. General Statutes § 53a-140(a). ¹³ The state claims that the Appellate Court assigned insufficient weight to the strength of the circumstantial evidence that had established the defendant's guilt of forgery in the third degree beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.

"When an appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a verdict of guilty, we have a twofold task. We first review the evidence presented at the trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.... We then determine whether the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... In this process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carpenter, 214 Conn. 77, 78-79, 570 A.2d 203 (1990), on appeal after remand, 220 Conn. 169, 595 A.2d 881 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1034, 112 S.Ct. 877, 116 L.Ed.2d 781 (1992); see State v. Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 399, 631 A.2d 238 (1993); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 455, 625 A.2d 791 (1993). "It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 245, 627 A.2d 877 (1993).

The scope of our factual inquiry on appeal is limited. "This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hart, 198 Conn. 424, 427, 503 A.2d 588 (1986). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scielzo, 190 Conn. 191, 197, 460 A.2d 951 (1983). "[I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence. The rule is that the jury's function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 127, 635 A.2d 762 (1993); see State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 221, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995); State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 132-33, 646 A.2d 169 (1994).

Applying these well established principles in this case, ...