State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 16 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2011AP2907–CR.,2011AP2907–CR.
• Citation: 850 N.W.2d 66,355 Wis.2d 668,2014 WI 69
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent–Petitioner, v. Antonio D. BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

355 Wis.2d 668

850 N.W.2d 66

2014 WI 69

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent–Petitioner,^†

v.Antonio D. BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2011AP2907–CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Jan. 15, 2014.

Decided July 16, 2014.

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was argued by Aaron O'Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.

For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by Hannah B. Schieber, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by Hannah B. Schieber.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

¶ 1 The State of Wisconsin seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals ¹ that reversed the circuit court's denial of Antonio Brown's motion to vacate his conviction and plea and to suppress all evidence seized during a stop of his vehicle. The court of appeals determined that the circuit court erred because there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Brown's vehicle. Accordingly, it concluded that the evidence resulting from the search should have been suppressed.

¶ 2 The State contends that the officers' observation of an unlit light bulb in Brown's tail lamp justified a stop because the law requires all light bulbs in a tail lamp to be lit. It asserts that this requirement is found in Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) (2009–10),² which prohibits the operation of a vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in “good working order.” Because the officers observed a violation of the law, the State maintains that they had probable cause to stop the vehicle. Even if the unlit bulb was not part of the tail lamp, the State contends that it still created reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and the results of the search should not be suppressed.

¶ 3 Contrary to the State, we do not interpret Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) as requiring every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit. The plain language of the statute requires that a tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours of darkness. This interpretation is further supported by related statutes requiring that the lamps be in proper working condition. Wis. Stat. § 347.06(3).

¶ 4 Because the only basis for the stop of Brown's vehicle was the unlit bulb, we conclude that there was not probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Where the stop of the vehicle was unlawful, so too was its search, and the results of that search must be suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.

I

¶ 5 It is uncontested that Brown was a passenger in a Buick Electra that was stopped by police officers. During the stop, the officers searched the vehicle and discovered a gun. Brown was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2). He subsequently filed a motion to suppress the gun, asserting that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle.

¶ 6 At the motion hearing the State presented the testimony of Officer Wawrzonek and Officer Feely. Although some details varied, the officers' testimony regarding the stop of Brown's vehicle was largely consistent.

¶ 7 According to the officers, they were on a routine patrol when they spotted a 1977 Buick Electra with a “defective tail light.” Officer Wawrzonek explained that there was a “wide band” with three light panels on the back of the vehicle and one of the panels was out. Officer Feely stated that it was the middle light on the driver's side that was out. Based on the Buick's “defective” tail lamp, Officer Feely activated the flashing red and blue lights on their patrol car and conducted a traffic stop. After stopping the vehicle and removing its passengers, Officer Feely searched the vehicle and discovered a firearm under the front passenger-side seat.

¶ 8 Brown presented the testimony of Willie Lipsey who stated that on the night of the stop he attended a barbeque with Brown. When they left, Lipsey drove Brown's car because Brown was intoxicated. Lipsey testified that he stopped at a gas station and observed that the tail lamps were functioning properly when he pumped gas into the car. He was in a position to see this as the gas tank of the Buick is behind the rear license plate. After leaving the gas station, Lipsey headed home. The stop occurred as he was parking.

¶ 9 Several photographs of the back of Brown's vehicle were admitted into evidence. One photograph is a close-up view of the rear-passenger side of the vehicle with the outside panel encasing the tail lamp removed. Four light bulbs are visible: a cluster of three bulbs on the left-hand side and a fourth bulb toward the center of the vehicle next to its license plate. In explaining the photo, Lipsey testified that the first and third lights were tail lights, the second light was a brake light, and the separate light was a reverse light. According to Lipsey, only the two tail lights are lit when the car is driving down the street.

¶ 10 The circuit court denied the suppression motion. It determined that Lipsey's testimony that the tail lights were working was not credible. In contrast, it found the officers' testimony to be credible and therefore determined that there was probable cause for the stop. It further determined that the search was justified by the need to protect the officers' safety.

¶ 11 Following the ruling, Brown pled guilty to the charge.³ Subsequently, the court sentenced Brown to five years imprisonment with three years initial confinement and two years extended supervision.

¶ 12 Brown submitted a motion for postconviction relief seeking an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and suppressing all evidence seized during the stop of the Buick. Citing Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1), he asserted that there was no basis for the stop because under the law only two tail lamps must be in good working order, not all of four of them. Accordingly, he contended that the stop of the Buick was unconstitutional and evidence found during its search must be suppressed.⁴

¶ 13 The circuit court denied the postconviction motion. It determined that the officers had a reasonable belief that one of the vehicle's tail lamps was defective. Even if the officers were wrong, the court stated, that did not affect their reasonable belief at the time of the stop.

¶ 14 On appeal, Brown again argued that the evidence from the search of the vehicle should have been suppressed because there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the stop.

¶ 15 Although a stop can be based on either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the court of appeals determined that the issue in this case was whether the unlit bulb created probable cause. State v. Brown, 2013 WI App 17, ¶¶ 14–15, 346 Wis.2d 98, 827 N.W.2d 903. It noted the officers' testimony that they stopped the vehicle because of the unlit bulb, stating “[t]hey did not act upon a suspicion that warranted further investigation, but on [their] observation of a violation being committed in [their] presence.” Id. at ¶ 15 (quoting State v. Longcore, 226 Wis.2d 1, 8–9, 594 N.W.2d 412 (Ct.App.1999)). Because the officers were not acting on a suspicion, but on what they believed was a violation of law being committed in their presence, the court concluded that probable cause was the appropriate focus. Id.

¶ 16 The court of appeals agreed with Brown. Id. at ¶ 21. It reasoned that under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) a vehicle's tail lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition in order to be in “good working order.” Id. Noting that a lawful stop cannot be predicated on a mistake of law, the court determined that the officers' mistaken belief that all the tail lights on a vehicle need to be lit could not serve as probable cause for a stop. Id. (citing Longcore, 226 Wis.2d at 9, 594 N.W.2d 412). Accordingly, it reversed the circuit court.⁵

II

¶ 17 In this case we are asked to consider whether Brown's vehicle was lawfully stopped.⁶ “Whether there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of constitutional fact.” State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶ 10, 317 Wis.2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569. As such, it is a mixed question of fact and law, requiring a two-step standard of review. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶ 8, 301 Wis.2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. This court reviews the circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, and reviews independently the application of those facts to constitutional principles. Id.

¶ 18 Here, the relevant facts are undisputed. The parties agree that the officers stopped Brown's vehicle because one of the three lights on the rear driver's side of the car was not lit. Thus, our inquiry focuses on whether under the facts there were sufficient grounds for a traffic stop. This inquiry calls upon us to interpret the relevant statute establishing the requirements for vehicle tail lamps, Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review independently of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶ 37, 342 Wis.2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238.

III

¶ 19 We begin our analysis by examining the constitutional principles underlying traffic stops. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. ⁷Traffic stops are considered seizures and thus must be reasonable to pass constitutional muster. Popke, 317 Wis.2d 118, ¶ 11, 765 N.W.2d 569; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). If the seizure is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional, then evidence obtained as a result is generally inadmissible. State v. Harris, 206 Wis.2d 243, 263, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996). A good faith exception to this...