State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 01 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 91,91
• Citation: 597 A.2d 978,324 Md. 532
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Derrick O. BROWN. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 532

324 Md. 532

597 A.2d 978

STATE of Maryland v. Derrick O. BROWN.

No. 91, Sept. Term, 1990.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 6, 1991.

Cathleen C. Brockmeyer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Michael R. Braudes, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and CHASANOW, JJ., CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned, and BRUCE C. WILLIAMS, Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Md., Specially Assigned.

McAULIFFE, Judge.

This case presents two questions. Did the defendant have a right to present argument at the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing of a motion to suppress his confession? If so, does this record permit a determination of whether he was denied that right?

I.

The body of Renee Thomas was found in a wooded area to the rear of a school in Capitol Heights in Prince George's County on 26 March 1988. She had been severely beaten about the face and head, and there was evidence of a sexual assault. The defendant was charged with the murder of Ms. Thomas, and he filed a motion to suppress statements made by him, alleging generally that the statements were illegally obtained and were involuntary. At the hearing on the motion, the following additional facts were received.

At about 2:30 a.m. on 2 August 1988, the defendant called the Prince George's County police and asked to speak to Detective Swope, whom he knew. According to the police, the defendant said he wanted to turn himself in for killing his girl friend in Capitol Heights. Detective Swope was not available, but other officers agreed to meet the defendant at a mutually convenient location. There, the officers asked the defendant to accompany them to the police station, and the defendant agreed.

The defendant admitted calling the police. He said he did so because an unidentified person told him Detective Swope wanted to talk to him about his involvement in the homicide of Renee Thomas. The defendant denied telling the officers he called that he was in fact involved in the homicide but said he agreed to meet with them.

The police officers testified that the defendant was advised of his rights upon arrival at the station and agreed to answer questions. Thereafter, the defendant gave an oral statement, signed and initialled a four-page statement written by the police, and wrote the following brief statement:

I, Mr. Derrick, did have a problem with Renee Thomas, and I got here [sic] on the corner, and took her in the woods, and took her off the map.

According to the police, the defendant told them he was angry with the victim because she had stolen money from him. They said he told them he took her to the rear of the school in Capitol Heights to have sexual relations with her and when he had completed the sexual act, he beat her repeatedly with a tree limb. At their request, the officers testified, the defendant took them to the scene of the crime, pointing out an area close to where the victim had been found.

The defendant testified that during the day immediately preceding his interrogation he had consumed four or five pints of whiskey and had smoked two small packs of PCP and about $50 worth of crack cocaine. He said he was drunk when he met with the police and when he was later at the police station. He identified his initials and signature on the statement prepared by the police; he said, however, that he had followed police directions by signing and initialing the statement, but had not read it. The defendant identified the brief written statement as his writing, but denied any recollection of writing it. He denied telling the police he had killed Renee Thomas. He said he believed the police were "making up" the alleged confession and trying to "pin the murder" on him. He testified that he signed the statement because Detective Gary Shimp told him "the quicker you sign this, the quicker you can get out of here." He said that because he was intoxicated he did not understand what he was signing, and believed only that his statement was required for his release. He said the police took him to the school; he did not direct them there.

Witnesses called by the defendant corroborated his use of alcohol and drugs throughout the day of August 1. A friend whom the defendant had called from the police station testified the defendant "sounded intoxicated" at about 3 or 3:30 a.m. on August 2. Another witness testified that the defendant was drunk at 11:00 p.m. on August 1. The defendant's sister testified that she spoke with the defendant at the police station at 6:30 a.m. on August 2, and at that time he was drunk and under the influence of drugs. She said the "whole room smelled like liquor," and that her brother did not know where he was, what had happened, or how he had gotten there. She testified that she asked the police to administer a "drug and alcohol test" to her brother.

The three police officers who had direct contact with the defendant on August 2 testified that he was sober, although one said he had a strong odor of alcohol about his person. Detective Garland Price, who permitted the defendant's sister to visit with him after the interview, testified that she had asked "have we or do we have any way of checking him for drugs." He said no tests were administered. Detective Shimp denied having told the defendant that the quicker he signed the statement the quicker he would be released, and denied making promises or inducements to the defendant.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge called upon defense counsel for argument. The following colloquy ensued:

THE COURT: Alright, Mr. Niland, what do you want to tell me, sir?

MR. NILAND: Your Honor, the law in this area I think is, so far as I know, is fairly set out in several cases, two of which are Hopkins versus State, 19 Maryland App 414 and Farr versus State, 36 Maryland App 615 with respect to the consideration of intoxication and/or the effect of intoxication upon a person in having given a statement and whether the statement's knowing and voluntary. I concede the law in those areas is not very definitive or clear cut in telling us what kind of cases intoxication has reached a level where a statement would not be knowing or voluntary and, in fact, cases indicate the simple fact that a person is intoxicated or under the influence of drugs does not per se make a statement involuntary or unknowingly given and, therefore, does not per se exclude a statement.

Now, however, I think that in this case you have several factual considerations.

THE COURT: Let me stop you right here. I am aware of everything that you've just told me and so forth and I really would give a lot more consideration to what you're saying except for one factor in this case, and I'm going to cut you short because I have to be someplace else.

But the problem I have in this case in regards to anything you're going to tell me about intoxication, drugs, whether it's free or voluntary, this is not the usual case that I see where there is an arrest made by the police or--your client initiated this whole procedure. It wasn't as a result of anything that the police did in this case that he was in Forestville.

MR. NILAND: I agree with that.

THE COURT: It was as a result of what he did and his actions in getting to Forestville were free and voluntary on his part. The police had nothing to do with getting him there. It was his idea. It was at his insistence. It was at his phone calls that he was in Forestville being questioned by the police.

MR. NILAND: I don't disagree that he initiated the contact.

THE COURT: That's what takes this case out of the ordinary and--

MR. NILAND: To an extent it does, but it also reflects upon his lack of judgment as a result of having been engaged in the use, heavy use of alcohol and drugs before he contacted the police. Most sensible people, I would think most sensible people wouldn't call the police and say come and get me and talk about homicide.

THE COURT: I'm going to cut this real short. That's a problem for the jury, as far as I'm concerned. At this time I'm convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that what he--whatever statements he made orally or written were freely and voluntarily given and as a consequence your motion to suppress any and all statements in this case are denied. Always a pleasure to see you gentlemen.

MR. NILAND: And you, Your Honor.

[PROSECUTOR]: Not to belabor anything, I think if you would indicate for the record that the--I think it's necessary we show that you're finding that Miranda was complied with and--

THE COURT: I'm going to amend the findings to show not only were the statements given freely and voluntarily, but they were given after he was advised of his constitutional rights.

[PROSECUTOR]: It was not as a result of any promises.

THE COURT: Well, it's freely and voluntarily.

[PROSECUTOR]: Maybe I'm belaboring it so far, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If it's freely and voluntarily--anything else? Always a pleasure to see you gentlemen.

MR. NILAND: Thank you, Your Honor.

[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, Your Honor.

A jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled to a full and fair opportunity to present argument at the conclusion of the suppression hearing and that the record demonstrated he had been denied that right. Brown v. State, 83 Md.App. 24, 30-32, 573 A.2d 403 (1990). We granted the State's petition for certiorari, and we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and affirm the judgment of conviction. Although we agree with the intermediate appellate court that under the circumstances of this case the defendant was entitled to present argument at the conclusion of the hearing, we...