State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 13 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 27231.,27231. |
| Citation | 402 S.C. 119,740 S.E.2d 493 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Lawrence BROWN, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2011–193606. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III of Sumter, for Respondent.
Lawrence Brown (Appellant) challenges his conviction for grand larceny of two motor vehicles in violation of section 16–13–30 of the South Carolina Code. We affirm.
In April 2010, Appellant contacted Don's Car Crushing (Don's), a business that crushes cars for scrap metal, and indicated that he owned several vehicles he wanted to sell. A tow truck operator for Don's, Dakota Cooper (Cooper) contactedAppellant to arrange a meeting. Appellant told Cooper where to meet him in Salters, South Carolina. Cooper testified that the location where he met Appellant appeared to be a salvage yard. Appellant explained to Cooper that his father had recently died and that Appellant had to take care of the property, including removal of up to seventy-five vehicles stored on the property. Appellant and Cooper negotiated for the sale of four vehicles. Appellant and Cooper executed a Bill of Sale for the four vehicles, but Cooper only took possession of two vehicles: a 1989 Chevrolet Corsica and a 1987 Ford Taurus. Cooper agreed to return the following day to retrieve the remaining two vehicles covered under the original Bill of Sale, and possibly purchase other vehicles on the property for approximately $2,400.
Later that day, Lawrence Williams (Lawrence) came to the location where Cooper and Appellant made their transaction. Lawrence's uncle, Robert Williams (Robert), owned the property. Lawrence noticed the Ford Taurus, which he owned, and the Chevrolet Corsica, which belonged to Robert, were missing. Lawrence called Robert and asked whether he moved the vehicles. When Robert replied that he did not, Lawrence notified police and reported the vehicles stolen.
Cooper returned the next day but could not locate Appellant. Cooper telephoned Appellant, and Appellant stated he would arrive in thirty minutes. However, after forty minutes and another telephone call, Appellant did not arrive. Cooper then approached the house on the property, and Lawrence met him at the front door. Cooper informed Lawrence that he was there to retrieve the remaining cars he agreed to purchase from Appellant. Lawrence refused, and notified police, who interviewed Cooper and obtained Appellant's name and driver's license number. Police arrested Appellant and charged him with grand larceny for the theft of the two vehicles. Meanwhile, Don's had already crushed both vehicles; thus, neither could be returned or recovered.
On May 5, 2011, the Williamsburg County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for two counts of grand larceny. Appellant did not appear at trial, and the trial proceeded in his absence. At the close of the State's case, Appellant's trial counsel moved for a directed verdict. According to Appellant's trial counsel, the State failed to prove that the value of either vehicle exceeded $1,000. The trial court denied Appellant's motion. The trial court then charged the jury on the elements of grand larceny, including the State's burden of proving that the value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000. Appellant's trial counsel did not object to the trial court's instruction.
On May 12, 2011, the jury found Appellant guilty and the trial court sentenced Appellant to five years' imprisonment on one of the grand larceny convictions, and a consecutive sentence of three years' imprisonment for the other conviction.
Appellant appealed his convictions, and this Court certified the case for review pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR.
I. Whether the amendment to section 16–13–30 of the South Carolina Code should be applied retroactively to Appellant's case.
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001). This Court is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 452, 527 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2000). On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 583, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001). The defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged. State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 97, 544 S.E.2d 30, 36 (2001). However, if there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury. State v. Pinckney, 339 S.C. 346, 349, 529 S.E.2d 526, 527 (2000). A circuit judge should grant a directed verdict motion when the evidence merely raises a suspicion the accused is guilty. State v. Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 132, 322 S.E.2d 450, 451–52 (1984).
Appellant argues that the amendment to section 16–13–30 of the South Carolina Code should be applied retroactively to the instant case.1 We disagree.
In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of grand larceny as section 16–13–30 provided at the time Appellant committed the offense, and not the elements of section 16–13–30 as amended at the time of his indictment or conviction. However, Appellant's trial counsel stated explicitly that he had no objection to the trial court's instruction. Thus, Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in failing to apply section 16–13–30 as amended is unpreserved.2 However, we analyze Appellant's argument for the education of the bench and bar.
Appellant committed the grand larceny in April 2010. At the time, section 16–13–30 provided, in pertinent part:
(B) Larceny of goods, chattels, instruments, or other personalty valued in excess of one thousand dollars is grand larceny. Upon conviction, the person is guilty of a felony and must be fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than:
(1) five years if the value of the personalty is more than one thousand dollars but less than ten thousand dollars;
(2) ten years if the value of the personalty is five thousand dollars or more.
S.C.Code Ann. § 16–13–30(B)(1)–(2) (2003) (emphasis added). On June 2, 2010, the General Assembly amended section 16–13–30 through enactment of the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010 (the Act). See Act No. 273, § 16.E, 2010 S.C. Acts & Joint Resolutions (2010). This amendment redefined grand larceny as, “larceny of goods, chattels, instruments, or other personalty valued in excess of two thousand dollars.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16–13–30 (Supp.2011) (emphasis added). The General Assembly included a savings clause within the Act. The savings clause provides:
The repeal or amendment by the provisions of this act or any law, whether temporary or permanent or civil or criminal, does not affect pending actions, rights, duties, or liabilities founded thereon, or alter, discharge, release, or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under the repealed or amended law, unless the repealed or amended provision shall so expressly provide. After the effective date of this act, all laws repealed or amended by this act must be taken and treated as remaining in full force and effect for the purpose of sustaining any pending or vested right, civil action, special proceeding, criminal prosecution, or appeal existing as of the effective date of this act, and for the enforcement of rights, duties, penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities as they stood under the repealed or amended laws.
Act No. 273, § 65 (emphasis added).
At Appellant's trial in 2011, the trial court instructed the jury on the version of section 16–13–30 in effect at the time Appellant committed the offense. Thus, the trial court instructed:
The state must prove that the value of the [vehicle] taken was $1,000 or more. An owner of personal property may provide an estimate of the reasonable value of personal property. If the state has failed to prove the defendant guilty of grand larceny, you may consider whether the defendant is guilty of the offense of petit larceny. Proof of petit larceny includes proof of the same elements as grand larceny except that the value is $1,000 or less.
(emphasis added).
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent whenever possible. State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 342, 531 S.E.2d 922, 923 (2000). The Court should give words “their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.” State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010). A statute is not to be applied retroactively unless that result is so clearly compelled as to leave no room for doubt. S.C. Nat'l Bank v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 297 S.C. 279, 281, 376 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1989). The statute must contain express words evincing intent that it be retroactive or words necessarily implying such intent. Pulliam v. Doe, 246 S.C. 106, 110, 142 S.E.2d 861, 863 (1965). The only exception to this rule is a statutory enactment that effects a change in remedy or procedure. Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142, 146, 394 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1990) ( ...
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