State v. Brown
Decision Date | 19 October 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 86-KA-1941,86-KA-1941 |
Citation | 514 So.2d 99 |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. John A. BROWN, Jr. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Eric Dubelier, Michael McMahon, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Dwight Doskey, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, M. Craig Colwart, New Orleans, for appellant.
In this appeal from defendant's conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death, the principal issues involve (1) the state's use of court records to establish defendant's prior convictions during the penalty phase of the proceeding (assignment of error number four); and (2) the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by a witness called on behalf of the defendant during the penalty phase, and the trial judge's ruling that she was not required to assert the privilege question by question (assignment of error number six). After considering these and other issues raised by defendant's assignments of error, 1 and upon an independent review of the record, we affirm the conviction and uphold the death sentence.
John A. Brown, Jr. was indicted by the Orleans Parish grand jury for the first degree murder of Omer Laughlin. Mr. Laughlin was robbed and stabbed to death on a New Orleans street corner on September 7, 1984. The jury convicted Brown of first degree murder following the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial. After a sentencing hearing held pursuant to La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 905.1 et seq. (West 1984 & Supp.1987), the jury unanimously recommended the imposition of the death penalty upon finding two statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed during the perpetration of an armed robbery and (2) the offense was committed in an especially heinous and cruel manner. La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 905.4(a) & (g) (West 1984).
The state established the following facts through the evidence it presented at the trial. On the night of the murder, Mr. Laughlin and his wife had eaten dinner at a restaurant near the corner of Dauphine and Touro Streets in New Orleans. At approximately 11:45 p.m., they left the restaurant and began walking to their car, which was located about a block away. The defendant exited a nearby vehicle and confronted the Laughlins. He pinned them against their car, and demanded money from Mr. Laughlin. Mrs. Laughlin screamed and ran back toward the restaurant. When she returned to the scene a short time later, her husband was dead. According to a New Orleans police officer who had arrived at the location, the victim was found lying "face down in the street, bleeding profusely." An autopsy later revealed that Mr. Laughlin had been stabbed thirteen times.
Mrs. Laughlin provided the police with a description of the perpetrator and the vehicle which she had seen him get out of prior to the attack. She also told police that a woman with dark hair had been driving that car.
Sgt. James Scott of the New Orleans Police Department was stopped at a traffic light on Franklin Avenue when he heard the description of the crime and the suspect being broadcast over the police radio. He looked to his left and saw defendant sitting in a vehicle that matched the description given by the victim's wife. There was a female at the wheel of the car. Defendant's vehicle pulled into a nearby service station, and Sgt. Scott followed, believing that the occupants of the car might be the suspects being sought. The officer watched as the woman put gasoline in the car while defendant walked over to a water hose and began washing his hands. Defendant then re-entered the car.
Sgt. Scott approached the vehicle and ordered the defendant to step out and place his hands on the hood of the car. When Brown did so, the police officer observed scratches, marks and droplets of blood on Brown's forearms. He also observed blood between defendant's toes, which were visible through the sandals that he was wearing. In plain view on the floor of the car was a New Orleans shopper's card which belonged to the victim.
Defendant was arrested and taken into custody. A search of the vehicle pursuant to routine police procedure yielded Mr. Laughlin's wallet. A second search pursuant to a properly secured warrant led to the discovery of a Bowie knife which had been concealed underneath the front seat of the car on the passenger side. Mrs. Laughlin positively identified Brown from lineup photographs as the man who had attacked her husband.
Anna Hardeman, the driver of the vehicle in which Brown was riding at the time of his arrest, was also indicted for first degree murder. Although she was originally charged in the same bill of indictment that named Brown as a defendant, the prosecution severed the charges against her on the date that the case was called to trial, and announced that she would be tried separately. Shortly after Brown was convicted and sentenced to death, Hardeman pled guilty to the amended charge of accessory after the fact to first degree murder, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor.
On appeal, the defendant directs two assignments of error to the selection of the jury, one to the guilt phase of the trial, and five to the sentencing hearing. Each of these assignments is reviewed below.
By these two assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in excusing for cause prospective jurors Lynda Boren and Julien Cardiff, Jr., on the basis of their stated opposition to the death penalty. Defendant argues that these prospective jurors should not have been excused because they indicated during voir dire that they could vote to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances, even though they were generally opposed to capital punishment.
After reviewing the voir dire testimony of the prospective jurors in question, we cannot agree with the defendant's summary of the position of these two jurors on capital punishment. Both unambiguously stated, in spite of efforts by defense counsel to elicit testimony to the contrary, that they would not vote to impose the death penalty.
Ms. Boren advised the prosecutor that she could not consider voting for the death penalty under any circumstances, for personal reasons. She then stated in response to one of defense counsel's questions that she could vote for the death penalty However, she responded to further questioning by defense counsel, that "I would not vote for the death penalty," and the total impression left by her voir dire testimony was that her strong opposition to capital punishment would lead her to vote against the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the evidence.
Similarly, Mr. Cardiff frankly stated that while he would attempt to weigh the evidence objectively as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, his opposition to capital punishment on moral grounds would "foreclose" any possibility that he would vote to impose the death penalty. Although this prospective juror also stated in response to one question that he would "consider the two alternatives" if faced with the choice of sentencing a person to life imprisonment or death, he added that his mind would be "definitely skewed one way," meaning against capital punishment. Again, the overall impression left by the prospective juror's voir dire testimony is that he would not have voted to impose the death penalty under any circumstances.
La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 798(2) (West 1981) provides in pertinent part that the state has good cause to challenge a juror when that juror:
has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment and makes it unmistakably clear (a) that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him....
Article 798 tracks language in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court indicated that it was proper for the state to exclude a juror for cause if he makes clear that he would automatically vote against the death penalty. Witherspoon's holding was subsequently clarified in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), which held that a prospective juror may be excused for cause when it is clear that his opposition to the death penalty would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath." Considerable discretion should be afforded the trial judge in the determination of whether a prospective juror's views on capital punishment warrant a challenge for cause. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426-29, 105 S.Ct. at 853-55, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853-55; State v. Ward, 483 So.2d 578, 583 (La.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 168 (1986); State v. Jones, 474 So.2d 919, 928 (La.1985).
Review of the complete testimony of both prospective jurors makes it clear that they would vote against the imposition of the death penalty under any circumstances. Thus they fall into the category of jurors who may be challenged for cause under article 798 and within the federal constitutional limits provided by Wainwright and Witherspoon. We therefore cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion by excluding these prospective jurors for cause.
Only one of the eight assignments of error pertains strictly to the guilt phase of the proceeding. It was not disputed at trial that the defendant was the person who stabbed and killed Mr. Laughlin. Counsel for the defendant acknowledged as much during voir dire and in his opening statement. Nor was there any true dispute about the fact that the murder occurred during the perpetration of an armed...
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