State v. Brown

Decision Date13 June 1966
Docket NumberNo. 51452,No. 1,51452,1
Citation404 S.W.2d 179
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard BROWN, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Stanley D. Rostov, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.

John D. Chancellor, St. Louis, for appellant.

HOLMAN, Presiding Judge.

Charged by indictment with murder in the first degree, the defendant, Richard Brown, was found guilty of that offense and his punishment was fixed by the jury at life imprisonment. See §§ 559.010 and 559.030, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. Defendant has appealed.

Defendant was jointly indicated with Courtney Lorenzo Beasley, Archie B. Brown (no relative of defendant), and Jimmie Sharp, but prior to trial defendant was granted a severance. Defendant and the others named were charged with killing Vernon Coleman on May 11, 1964, by beating and kicking deceased and striking him with a cluster of brick, held together by mortar, which weighed 90 pounds. Coleman, a 35-year-old Negro (all parties involved apparently were Negroes), lived in a shed on an alley at the rear of 4311 Garfield in St. Louis, Missouri. Coleman following the practice of purchasing intoxicating liquor for the teen-agers in the neighborhood, and his compensation each time was a drink out of the bottle purchased. On the dates in question defendant was 15 years old. All of the young people mentioned in this factual statement were juveniles except Beasley who was 17. At about 5 p.m. on May 11, Coleman bought some wine for defendant and Beasley. That evening Beasley, Tommy Brown (brother of defendant), Jimmie Sharp, Harold Frazier, Betty McAlpine, and Myra Hair gathered at defendant's home where they danced and drank wine. They left about 9:30 and the boys congregated on Pendleton Avenue across the street from the alley leading to Coleman's shack. The girls had gone to Betty's home where they were instructed by Betty's aunt to go out and get some food. Apparently their route took them by the place where the boys had gathered. At about that same time the boys decided to go to Coleman's shack, and the girls stood at the entrance of the alley and watched the proceedings. The boys entered the shed and Beasley asked Coleman for some wine. When he got none he commenced striking Coleman. After a time Coleman ran out of the building into the alley where one of the boys grabbed him and he fell to the ground. At that time all the boys gathered around Coleman and kicked him and hit him with sticks and bricks. Defendant picked up the large block of bricks and dropped it, according to the testimony, either on Coleman's chest or left shoulder. At about that point all of the boys, except Beasley, ran from the alley and were joined by the girls in leaving the immediate vicinity of the Coleman shack. The evidence does not disclose just when Beasley left or where he went. Some of the boys went to their homes, but defendant and Frazier spent the night in the apartment of Betty McAlpine's aunt, Mrs. Yvonne Collins, located in the same house in which Betty and her family lived.

At 12:58 a.m. May 12, at call was received by the police and upon going to the area in question they found Coleman lying on the ground unconscious. They immediately took him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. An autopsy was performed which disclosed that Coleman died as the result of a traumatic fracture of the skull in the right temporal region and resulting cranial hemorrhage. In response to a hypothetical question a physician testified that in his opinion death resulted from the beating of Coleman in the manner hereinabove described. The young people above mentioned were arrested within a few hours following the finding of deceased's body, although defendant was probably not arrested until about 7 o'clock the following morning. He and the others were questioned at the homicide division of Central Police Station and defendant signed a written statement admitting his participation in the assault. A motion to suppress the statement was overruled prior to trial and it was admitted in evidence over the objection of defendant.

As will hereinafter appear, it is important that we set out the substance of the confession signed by defendant and also a summary of his testimony in his own behalf. The confession was in question and answer form, but we will state it in the narrative in order to save space. Therein, after giving information concerning his age, address, parents, etc., defendant stated that at about 10 o'clock on the evening of May 11, Beasley and Archie B. suggested that the group of eight or nine boys go to the shed of Ace Coleman, saying, 'Let's go mess with Ace,' which he thought meant to go tease him about drinking wine; that when they got there Beasley went in the shed and said to Ace, 'Give me some wine,' and Ace said, 'I don't have none,' and Beasley hit him in his face with his fist; that Ace sneaked out some way and then Jimmie hit him and knocked him down, and all eight of the boys were around him 'kicking on him and everything'; that he kicked him about five times with the desert boots he had on, and some of the boys struck him with sticks; that he then picked up the cluster of bricks, lifted it a little over a foot, and dropped it on Coleman's left shoulder; that during all of the time Coleman was asking what he had done and saying that they shouldn't be bothering him; that after he had dropped the bricks somebody said, 'He's dead,' and that he said, 'No, he ain't, man, because he is still breathing'; that Coleman was still trying to get up and said something about calling the police and then everybody ran.

On direct examination defendant testified that at about five o'clock p.m. on May 11, Coleman bought some wine for him and Beasley; that Coleman also put a pill in a cigarette and gave it to him which made him dizzy when he smoked it; that later that evening, at Beasley's suggestion, he, Beasley, Jimmie Sharp, Harold Frazier, and Archie Brown went up to Ace Coleman's shed; that Beasley went in the shed and struck a match and called Coleman's name, and as Coleman raised up out of bed Beasley started throwing at him and he hit him; that Coleman then ran out of the shed and someone knocked him down and 'he fell beside me and grabbed my leg and I started kicking him. I then saw the cluster of bricks and I picked it up and dropped it on his shoulder to make him let go of my leg. He let my leg go and Harold Frazier said the man was dead. I got down on my knee and listened to his heart and I said he wasn't dead, and I then left the alley. As a left I looked back and he was trying to get up and was cursing.' He further stated that when the police officers and others questioned him the following morning he answered every question they asked; that he had an eighth grade education.

Defendant's first point is that the court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the confession and in admitting said statement in evidence at the trial. At the hearing of his motion to suppress defendant presented two witnesses. He first called Quentin Gansloser, the first assistant circuit attorney, who stated that he arrived at the homicide division of Central Police Headquarters at about 9 a.m. on May 12 and proceeded to take statements from a group of boys; that he did not recall contacting the juvenile court judge before taking the statements; that prior to questioning defendant he did not advise him of his right to consult an attorney, nor advise him of his right to contact his mother, but did ascertain that no one had threatened defendant or promised him anything; that he advised him that any statement he signed could be used against him in court and that he did not have to give one except of his own free will.

The other witness, John Brooks, testified that he was a deputy juvenile officer and that he had been informed, about 10 a.m. on May 12, that defendant was in the custody of the homicide division; that he immediately went to homicide and saw defendant and some other boys in a room with Officer Webb and Mr. Gansloser; that he then identified himself to Mr. Gansloser as a juvenile officer and asked if he could speak with defendant; that Gansloser replied, 'You can speak with him after a while, later'; that he then went into another room and waited, and later talked with two of the boys, but defendant had not been sent in at the time he left at 12:30 p.m.; that he saw defendant that afternoon in the detention office of juvenile court.

The reasons advanced by defendant in support of his contentioin that the statement should have been excluded are summarized in the following quotation from his argument: 'It must be clarified at the outset that no contention is here made that appellant suffered physical or psychological coercion or any threats or promises. Rather, the contention is that the confession was not voluntary for the purpose of due process because: Appellant, a fifteen year old Negro boy with an eighth grade education was not given the advice of his mother, an attorney or an adult friend, he was not taken before the juvenile court as required by law and an officer of the juvenile court * * * was restrained from talking with defendant until after he signed a confession in absolute defiance of * * * the laws of this state; and, further, appellant was not advised of his right * * * to remain silent and make no statement at all.' He relies mainly upon the cases of Gallegos v. State of Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, and Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224.

We have decided that we need not determine the contention as to whether the court erred in admitting the confession. This for the reason that, assuming arguendo (but not deciding) that the statement should have been excluded, its admission could not have been...

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  • State v. Turner
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 13, 1981
    ...declarations against penal interests are not admissible exceptions to the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings. See, State v. Brown, 404 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Mo.1966); State v. Williams, 309 Mo. 155, 274 S.W. 427, 433 (1925); State v. Hack, 118 Mo. 92, 23 S.W. 1089, 1091 (1893); State v. Ivicsi......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Section 23.72 Declarations Against Interest
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    • The Missouri Bar Criminal Practice Deskbook Chapter 23 Evidence
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