State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 22 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16235) |
| Citation | 772 A.2d 1107,256 Conn. 291 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JUDSON BROWN |
Borden, Palmer, Sullivan, Vertefeuille and Leuba, Js.1 Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Robert M. Spector, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and David P. Gold, former supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The principal issue of this appeal is whether there was a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct at trial that deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Following a jury trial, the defendant, Judson Brown, was convicted of two counts of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-1112 and one count of conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-111 and 53a-48.3 The trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-five years imprisonment. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1, and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
On appeal, the defendant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the state violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial by engaging in an egregious and pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct designed to prejudice the jury against him. He also argues that the pattern of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during closing argument constituted plain error. We reject these claims and, consequently, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In 1992, Lucille Cribs purchased the house located at 670 Prospect Street, in New Haven, for $170,000 and financed it with a $138,000 mortgage. Throughout the negotiations, purchase and paperwork involved with buying the property, Cribs was assisted by the defendant.4 Within one year, Cribs took out a second mortgage on the property in the amount of $24,137.39. In April, 1995, Cribs was notified that she had allowed the fire insurance to lapse; one of the mortgage requirements was that the property be insured in case of fire. The bank that held the first mortgage notified Cribs that it would purchase its own fire insurance on the property if she was unable to do so. The bank's insurance would not cover the contents of the house or any value of the house over the $138,000 owed to the bank on the first mortgage. Additionally, Cribs' bank loan had become seriously delinquent and the bank was about to commence a foreclosure action. At that time, Cribs did not purchase any insurance.
During this period, Cribs transferred the title of the property to JL Associates Corporation, of which the defendant was president. As president of the corporate owner of the property, the defendant arranged for it to be listed for sale and helped the broker by showing prospective buyers around the house. On January 30, 1996, the defendant quitclaimed the property back to Cribs.
On August 5, 1996, Cribs purchased homeowner's insurance on 670 Prospect Street that went into effect immediately. Cribs insured the structure of the house for $267,500 and its contents for $200,625. Thus, the insurance covered the replacement cost of the house and its contents.
On August 18, 1996, at approximately 1:50 a.m., a fire broke out in a third floor storeroom of the house. Cribs and her children were not in the house at the time the fire began; they had left earlier in the evening to visit relatives in New Jersey.5 The fire quickly spread and eventually turned into a "three alarm" fire, requiring three different response teams to be deployed.
The first firefighters arrived on the scene by 1:54 a.m. As the first firefighter entered the house through the front door, a burglar alarm sounded. The firefighters first searched for inhabitants throughout the house. One of the firefighters was injured. The fire ultimately was extinguished, leaving the house severely water damaged and uninhabitable.
After the fire was extinguished, the firefighter in command informed the battalion chief that an arson investigation was warranted because of the extreme density of the fire and the irregular burn pattern that the firefighter had observed in a closet or storeroom on the third floor of the house. The investigation first revealed that all of the doors except for the rear sliding door were locked and connected to the burglar alarm that had sounded when the first firefighter broke into the front door. In the backyard were Cribs' three guard dogs that were so fierce that the investigators could not enter the house through the rear.
In the storeroom on the third floor of the house, facing the backyard, the investigators discovered a "classic pour pattern," the pattern left on a hardwood floor after an accelerant has been poured onto it. The accelerant naturally finds the crevices in the hardwood and burns deeper into the wood than a fire that is not driven by an accelerant. The investigators brought in an accelerant sniffing dog that led them to the storeroom on the third floor. Furthermore, the state forensics laboratory examined samples and determined that a "medium range petroleum distillate" was present in the floor of the storeroom.
Hours later, the investigators canvassed the neighborhood, asking if anyone had witnessed anything suspicious. One of the detectives spoke to Jiki Bruce, a nineteen year old resident of the residential group home for children located next door to Cribs' house. Bruce claimed that he had been awakened by the sounds of barking dogs and breaking glass; he then saw flames coming from the top floor of the house next door. He saw a person running along the side of the house toward a waiting black sports car; the person jumped into the passenger side of the car and the car sped away. Bruce identified this person as the defendant. Bruce later picked the defendant out of a photographic array. When shown a photograph of a black Mercedes Benz, Bruce identified it as the car that he had seen on Prospect Street the night of the fire and the car always driven by the defendant. At trial, however, Bruce recanted his identification of the defendant as the person whom he saw fleeing the scene.
Meanwhile, Cribs collected $412,000 from her insurance company for the damage caused by the fire. On October 10, 1996, the defendant was arrested.6 He was charged with two counts of first degree arson in violation of § 53a-111 and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree arson in violation of §§ 53a-111 and 53a-48. The defendant tried the case pro se, without standby counsel.7 At trial, the jury found him guilty of all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty-five years. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant raises four claims of prosecutorial misconduct. He argues that the sum of these claims established a pattern of misconduct that deprived him of a fair trial in violation of his due process rights under the state and federal constitutions.8
Specifically, the defendant claims that the state's attorney improperly: (1) conducted the voir dire; (2) criticized the defendant's pro se trial techniques in front of the jury; (3) appealed to the jurors' emotions; and (4) commented upon the defendant's failure to testify. He argues that these claims reveal a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct that constitutes plain error and requires that he be granted a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we reject each of the defendant's claims.
Our standard of review of prosecutorial misconduct is well established. "In determining whether the defendant was denied a fair trial we must view the prosecutor's comments in the context of the entire trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 538, 529 A.2d 653 (1987). "In examining the prosecutor's argument we must distinguish between those comments whose effects may be removed by appropriate instructions ... and those which are flagrant and therefore deny the accused a fair trial." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The defendant bears the burden of proving that the prosecutor's statements were improper in that they were prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial. Id. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 540.
The defendant claims that the state improperly used the voir dire by asking questions that were designed to prejudice the jurors against him. He argues that the state "planted a seed ... that even routine pleasantries were an attempt by [the defendant] to manipulate the jury."
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