State v. Brusenhan
Decision Date | 16 February 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 106,106 |
Citation | 1968 NMCA 6,438 P.2d 174,78 N.M. 764 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy G. BRUSENHAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 93 (§ 21--1--1(93) N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp.1967)).
Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary on August 26, 1966. The imposition of sentence was deferred for a period of two years, conditioned on his compliance with the terms and provisions of the probation under which he was placed for this period.
On May 5, 1967, proceedings were conducted pursuant to an order to show cause why defendant's probation should not be revoked and sentence imposed. The trial court found defendant violated the terms of his probation and imposed a sentence of confinement in the New Mexico State Penitentiary for a term of not less than one year nor more than five years, with credit being given for the time he was on probation from August 26, 1966, to May 5, 1967.
On July 18, 1967, he filed his motion pursuant to Rule 93. The grounds asserted for relief are that he was not advised by either the court or his attorney of any of his constitutional rights relative to the revocation proceedings, that he was required to testify against himself, and that he was not advised of his right to a jury trial.
Our statute under which defendant's probation was revoked is § 41--17--28.1, N.M.S.A. 1953. Paragraph B of this statute relates to the nature of the hearing to be conducted in revocation proceedings and provides:
As stated in Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220, 222, 53 S.Ct. 154, 155, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932):
'Probation is * * * conferred as a privilege and cannot be demanded as a right. It is a matter of favor, not of contract. There is no requirement that it must be granted on a specified showing. The defendant stands convicted; he faces punishment and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain. * * * He is still a person convicted of an offense, and the suspension of his sentence remains within the control of the court.
See also State v. Serrano, 76 N.M. 655, 417 P.2d 795 (1966).
Our statute, as above quoted, provides that the hearing to revoke probation may be informal. In Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493, 55 S.Ct. 818, 820, 79 L.Ed. 1566 (1935), the following was stated concerning the nature of such a hearing:
Although the courts are not in agreement as to the degree of proof required to establish a violation of probation, we believe the following quotation from Sparks v. State, 77 Ga.App. 22, 47 S.E.2d 678 (1948), correctly states the rule:
See also Escoe v. Zerbst, supra; Yates v. United States, 308 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1962); People v. Johns, 173 Cal.App.2d 38, 343 P.2d 92 (1959); People v. Kostaken, 16 Ill.App.2d 395, 148 N.E.2d 615 (1957); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965); State v. Elder, 77 S.D. 540, 95 N.W.2d 592 (1959); Davenport v. State, 214 Tenn. 468, 381 S.W.2d 276 (1964); Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d, 4, 347 P.2d 554 (1959).
The Supreme Court of New Mexico long ago recognized in Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 P. 713, L.R.A.1918C, 549 (1917), that the right of personal liberty is one of the highest rights of citizenship and this right cannot be taken from a defendant in a revocation proceeding without notice and an opportunity to be heard without invading his constitutional rights. See also State v. Peoples, 69 N.M. 106, 364 P.2d 359 (1961); Blea v. Cox, 75 N.M. 265, 403 P.2d 701 (1965). However, here the defendant was given a hearing. He was represented at this hearing by the same attorney who had represented him in the initial criminal proceedings. He was given an opportunity to be heard, and evidence was offered by the State in support of its charges that he had violated the terms of his probation.
Insofar as the matter of counsel is concerned, in Blea v. Cox, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that in proceedings for revocation of suspension the same critical or crucial elements are present as are present in other proceedings wherein the right to counsel is guaranteed. See also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). As already stated, defendant was furnished the same counsel who represented him throughout the earlier proceedings.
In his petition he may be suggesting the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of his counsel, because he asserts that he was not advised by his counsel and that his counsel remained silent at the revocation hearing. Even if we were to accept these assertions as being entirely correct, we are of the opinion that the revocation hearing did not constitute a sham, a farce or a mockery of justice, which must be made to appear before a defendant can be said to have been denied the effective assistance of counsel. State v. Raines,78 N.M. 579, 434 P.2d 698 (Ct. of Apps. 1967); ...
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