State v. Bryan

• Decision Date: 14 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 42849,42849
• Citation: 287 So.2d 73
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. John L. BRYAN, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 73

287 So.2d 73

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. John L. BRYAN, Respondent.

No. 42849.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 14, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 11, 1974.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Manuel M. Garcia, Tampa, for respondent.

DEKLE, Justice.

Certified question hereinafter appearing vaults this second degree murder conviction to our Court for review upon challenged jury instructions, ¹ as reported at 271 So.2d 197 (Fla.App.1st 1972).

Respondent-defendant was indicted by the Volusia County Grand Jury for the crime of first degree murder in a New Year's Eve murder in a bar. The testimony presented at the trial established that some trouble arose between the respondent and the deceased which resulted in the respondent shooting the deceased causing his death. Other evidence offered by the State indicated that the shooting may have been unintentional and that the defendant meant instead to strike the deceased with the pistol. The jury adjudged the defendant guilty of second degree murder and he was given an indeterminate sentence of not less than six months nor more than twenty years.

At the close of all the evidence, the trial judge without any objection from counsel gave some 23 jury instructions on the criminal offenses of murder in the first degree, in the second degree and manslaughter. However, in his instructions, the judge tracked the statute (§ 782.04(2) on second degree murder) and did not define the terms 'evincing a depraved mind' in the second degree murder charge and 'culpable negligence' as related to manslaughter. Respondent-defendant moved for a new trial challenging the propriety of the jury instructions pertaining to murder in the second degree and manslaughter. Upon review, the trial judge denied this motion.

The First District Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge in his instructions to the jury failed to define and explain the meaning of 'evincing a depraved mind' and 'culpable negligence.' According to the district court, these legal terms are not 'commonly used in every day life and conversation' and accordingly should have been defined and explained by using common everyday examples, such as those stated in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases. ² The court asserted that 'any substantial deviation from use of these instructions (Standard Jury Instructions) will almost always end in error on the part of the trial court.' In conclusion, the district court relied on Robles v. State, 188 So.2d 789 (Fla.1966), and said the trial judge's action constituted fundamental error notwithstanding defense counsel's failure to object prior to the jury instructions.

One month before the First District rendered its opinion in the present case, the same DCA on August 10, 1972, filed an opinion in Padgett v. State, No. P--470 (1972). ³ There the First District in reversing the defendant's conviction and ordering a new trial found that the trial judge's jury instruction on manslaughter explaining and defining the term 'simple negligence' in addition to 'culpable negligence' was misleading and prejudicial to the defendant. In reaching this conclusion, the First District Court recognized that the jury instruction given by the trial judge tracked the Florida Standard Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases. Nevertheless, the DCA said these Standard Jury Instructions are not to be administered 'automatically or blindly regardless of the circumstances.' In this connection, it was held in light of the facts presented that the instruction including an explanation of 'simple negligence' confused and misled the jury.

In reviewing its opinions in Padgett and the present case, the district court recognized the possibility of an inconsistency in those decisions and accordingly certified the instant case to us via the following query:

'Is the Florida Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal Cases relating to the offense of manslaughter a correct and accurate statement of the law and a full and complete instruction to the jury in the trial of such offense as held by this Court in the case sub judice, or is it an erroneously misleading instruction to the jury in the trial of such offense as held by this Court in the case of Claude Padgett v. State of Florida, Case No. P--470, Opinion Filed August 10, 1972?'

The Florida Jury Instructions should be used, to such extent as may be applicable in the judgment of the trial court, but it does not follow, as the First District seems adamant in saying, that such instructions must be literally given in each and every case, ⁴ and even in the instance where no objection has been made (as here) to a charge which varies from the standard charge. We do not agree that 'Any substantial deviation from use of these instructions will almost aways end in error on the part of the trial court.'

Our caveat in the general approval of these, as in other jury instructions (240 So.2d 472 (Fla.1970)), makes express reference to the fact that the approval is only 'generally' of 'the theory and technique' involved 'as recommended by the Committee and embodied in its proposed instructions.'

We then said:

'The Court will, accordingly, authorize the publication and use of such instructions, but without prejudice to the rights of any litigant objecting to the use of one or more of such approved forms of instructions. The Court recognizes that the initial determination of applicable substantive law in every case should be made by the trial judge and that it would be inappropriate for the Court at this time to consider the recommended instructions with a view to adjudging that the legal principles embodied in the recommended instructions correctly state the law of Florida. Similarly, the Court recognizes that no approval of the forms by the Court could relieve the trial judge of his responsibility under the law properly and correctly to charge the jury in each case as it comes before him. This order is not to be construed as any intrusion on that responsibility of the trial judges. The Court is confident that the forms of instructions recommended by the Committee state as accurately as a group of experienced lawyers and judges could state the law of Florida in simple understandable language.'

It is apparent that the Supreme Court's approval of recommended committee instructions is not iron clad or carte blanche and must be applied in each instance as appropriate.

By this Court's approval of the jury instructions for publication, it was not intended that they be iron clad, because we recognized the importance of the trial judge on the scene who has the 'feel' of the case, the psychology of its movement through trial and what aspects appear from subtle inflections and overtones to be important in the jury's mind and for its decision. That is one of the reasons that a trial court's decision has historically had the presumption of correctness on appeal. These are matters, as we have repeatedly said, that are not apparent from the 'cold record'. What is important is that sufficient instructions--not necessarily academically perfect ones--be given as adequate guidance to enable a jury to arrive at a verdict based upon the law as applied to the evidence before them. The evidence presented in particular cases will, of course, often vary what instructions...