State v. Bryant, 15105
Decision Date | 09 May 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 15105,15105 |
Citation | 233 Conn. 1,658 A.2d 89 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Jarvis BRYANT. |
Todd D. Fernow, with whom were Thomas M. Nolan and Barbara N. Weady, certified legal interns, and, on the brief, Timothy H. Everett and David L. Polsky, certified legal intern, for appellant (defendant).
Frederick W. Fawcett, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., and Stephen J. Sedensky III, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON and PALMER, JJ.
The defendant, Jarvis Bryant, appeals 1 from the judgment of conviction, 2 rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). The defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense. 3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On June 7, 1991, the defendant shot Mervin Needham in Father Panik Village, a housing project in Bridgeport. Detective William Collette, responding to a citizen's report, arrived at the housing project and discovered Needham's body lying face down with blood surrounding his head. There were people around the body. Collette examined the body and discovered no vital signs.
Arkady Katsnelson, the state associate medical examiner, conducted an autopsy on Needham's body and determined that the sole cause of death was a .38 caliber gunshot wound to the back of the head fired from a distance of greater than three feet. Detective David S. Gibbs, a state department of public safety firearms expert, determined that the fatal bullet had been fired from either a .38 caliber or a .357 magnum revolver.
On June 10, 1991, the defendant, accompanied by family members and clergy, turned himself in to the police and voluntarily made a statement concerning his participation in the shooting of Needham. The relevant portion of the defendant's statement is as follows:
The defendant also contended that Needham had engaged in a pattern of conduct in which he had twice attempted to rob the defendant at gunpoint, and had threatened the defendant's family. At trial, the defendant testified that during the second robbery attempt, Needham had told him that The defendant testified that he had purchased his weapon six months prior to the attempted robberies, but did not begin carrying the weapon until after the second robbery attempt.
The defendant testified that he had fired his weapon at Needham five times, and that Needham had fallen on the fifth shot when he had been between 90 and 100 feet away. After Needham had fallen, the defendant fled the area. No weapon was discovered near the body.
Clarissa Crump, Needham's girlfriend, testified to the following. The evening prior to the shooting, Needham had stayed with her in her third floor apartment in Father Panik Village, around the corner from Harold's Market, near where the shooting took place. On the morning of the shooting, she had observed Needham dressing, and saw that he did not have a weapon. Further, she believed that his weapon had been stolen approximately one month earlier.
Crump testified further that she had sent Needham to the market to purchase milk, and, after he had left, she decided that she also wanted him to purchase cigarettes. She went to the window of her apartment in an effort to contact Needham and when she did so, she observed the defendant leaving his grandmother's apartment, heading toward Harold's Market. Crump testified that the defendant was carrying a small black gun. Crump left the window to get dressed. While she was dressing, she had heard gun shots. When she finished dressing, she went to see what had happened. Crump further testified that Needham had told her that he had used a weapon to "stick-up" the defendant on at least one occasion.
In light of the admission of the defendant that he had fired the fatal shot, the only remaining issue for the jury to determine was whether the defendant had been justified in his use of deadly force. The trial court instructed the jury with respect to self-defense as follows: (Emphasis added.) The trial court then read the relevant portions of General Statutes § 53a-19. 4 Thereafter the trial court stated that (Emphasis added.)
After more fully explaining the law with respect to self-defense, the trial court instructed the jury that "there are circumstances under which the use of physical or deadly physical force are not justified." As I've indicated to you, a person may not use deadly physical force upon another when he knows he can avoid it with complete safety by retreating. Therefore, you have to examine the totality of the circumstances and facts that you find happened at that location at the date and time charged in the information. You've heard this evidence. I'm not going to recapture it for you. This should be fresh in your mind. You'll examine the conduct of everyone that's been testified to here in this court, and you determine what the true facts are and apply this law to those facts.
The trial court then concluded its charge to the jury stating: (Emphasis added.)
After the jury had deliberated for a period of time, the jury requested a clarification on the legal meaning of self-defense. In response to the jury's request, the trial court reinstructed them on the statutory definition of self-defense, and then reminded the jury of the burden of proof, stating that (Emphasis added.)
After additional recitation of the legal requirements of self-defense, the trial court concluded that the jury must "examine all the facts, all the circumstances existing at that time and make those determinations." You must consider whether or not the claim of self-defense by the defendant, by the impact of credib[le] and reliable evidence you believed offered in this case by the State and the accused,...
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...improper instruction on an element of an offense, is of constitutional dimension." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant , 233 Conn. 1, 9, 658 A.2d 89 (1995).27 General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) provides in relevant part: "[A] person is not justified in using physical force when (......
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...the state can establish that it was not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the instructional error. See State v. Bryant, 233 Conn. 1, 9, 658 A.2d 89 (1995).The defendant maintains that harmless error analysis does not apply in this case because the trial court failed to instruc......
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