State v. Bryant

• Decision Date: 27 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 26278.,26278.
• Citation: 642 S.E.2d 582
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. James Nathaniel BRYANT, III, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

642 S.E.2d 582

The STATE, Respondent, v. James Nathaniel BRYANT, III, Appellant.

No. 26278.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 3, 2007.

Decided February 27, 2007.

Rehearing Denied April 4, 2007.

Deputy Chief Attorney for Capital Appeals Robert M. Dudek and Appellate Defender Aileen P. Clare, both of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General S. Creighton Waters, all of Columbia, and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

Chief Justice TOAL:

This is an appeal from a capital sentencing proceeding in which the trial court sentenced James Nathaniel Bryant, III ("Bryant") to death. Bryant appeals claiming that the trial court erred in 1) failing to require that jurors be physically present during jury selection; 2) failing to order the State to produce Bryant's prison records pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and Rule 5, SCRCrimP; and 3) failing to admit the defense expert's opinion testimony that the death penalty was more merciful than a sentence of life without parole. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2000, Cpl. Dennis Lyden of the Horry County Police Department ("Cpl.Lyden") was placing Bryant under arrest for driving with a suspended license when Bryant suddenly turned and wrestled Cpl. Lyden to the ground. During the course of the struggle, Bryant managed to obtain Cpl. Lyden's flashlight and pistol magazine from the officer's duty belt and used them to severely beat Cpl. Lyden about the head. After beating the officer unconscious, Bryant took Cpl. Lyden's pistol from his holster and shot him in the head at close range. Bryant drove off, taking the pistol and the pistol magazine with him and leaving Cpl. Lyden's body where it had fallen. After an extensive manhunt, Horry County law enforcement apprehended Bryant the next day.

A grand jury indicted Bryant for murder and armed robbery. Bryant's first issue on appeal involves the jury selection and capital voir dire beginning in September 2004.¹ During jury selection, the parties individually examined a total of sixty-seven jurors divided into thirteen panels. During individual voir dire, the parties inquired to the court about the method of jury selection. The court replied that jurors would be called for striking in the same order they had been qualified and that jurors would be brought before the parties to view before striking. The trial court eventually qualified forty-three potential jurors for service.

During the selection process, counsel for Bryant requested that the jurors be redrawn before being presented for striking. The trial court agreed to the request, but announced that instead of physically appearing for final jury selection, the parties would note their selections on a paper list of the jurors in the revised order based on their recollections from individual voir dire ("paper strikes"). Bryant's counsel objected to this method of jury selection claiming that because they had counted on physically viewing the jurors, counsel had not taken sufficient notes during voir dire to adequately exercise paper strikes. The court assured the defense that they would be given a chance to review their notes, juror sheets, and information forms, and reminded counsel that they had extensively interviewed each juror the week before. When counsel continued to object to paper strikes, the court offered them a chance to withdraw their request to have the jurors redrawn and instead conduct jury selection as originally planned. Counsel for Bryant declined this offer and jury selection proceeded with the jurors being redrawn and the parties exercising paper strikes.

The trial court initially addressed the issue in Bryant's second claim on appeal in a pre-trial motion to compel. During the motion hearing, Bryant claimed that the State was withholding certain discoverable documents believed by Bryant to be in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). The court determined that the State had largely complied with Bryant's discovery requests, finding no reason not to believe the State when it claimed that certain documents being requested did not exist. Where the existence of a particular document was unclear, the trial court ordered the State to offer a definitive answer as to whether or not the documents existed.

The issue of document disclosure arose again at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the proceedings. Just prior to the start of the sentencing phase, the court asked if any matters needed to be further addressed. Neither party requested any further hearing at that point. However, during the sentencing phase of the proceedings, the defense requested an in camera hearing on the State's failure to produce the same documents at issue in the pre-guilt phase motion to compel. Reviewing the list of classes of documents Bryant claimed the State had failed to produce, the trial court again found no indication that the State had produced incomplete documents, or failed to produce any documents that in fact existed. The court offered Bryant a chance to make a motion for continuance to which counsel for Bryant responded, "no."

The next day, just before the defense called their last witness, Bryant's counsel moved for a continuance based on the State's failure to turn over the same SCDC records at issue in previous in camera discussions. The court denied the motion for a continuance, finding once again that what records existed had been provided, and that even if records the State claimed were non-existent did actually exist, they would not prejudice Bryant's case.

The trial court addressed the SCDC documents a final time when the defense moved for a new trial "based on the State's noncompliance with the discovery rules and the Court's denial of our motion for a continuance." The court denied the motion noting that the issue had been dealt with "extensively" and reiterated its findings made throughout the trial that some of the documents were in the possession of the defense; the alleged contents of other "missing" documents had been stipulated to; and there had been no showing of prejudice due to the absence of the documents.

Bryant's third claim on appeal involves the testimony of Lorita Whitaker ("Whitaker"), an expert in clinical social work and human behavior in prison, who testified for the defense during the sentencing phase on the dismal conditions of prison life. When asked on direct if it was her opinion that prison was a pretty miserable place, she answered, "Some people feel that the death penalty is more merciful than life without parole." The court sustained the State's prompt objection that the expert was "getting into the ultimate issue."

At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended Bryant be sentenced to death. This appeal followed and Bryant raises the following issues for review:

I. Did the trial court deny Bryant's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury by refusing Bryant's request to have the jurors physically present during jury selection?

II. Did the trial court deny Bryant a fair sentencing proceeding by refusing to order the State to produce Bryant's prison records?

III. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow Bryant's expert witness to opine that some people feel the death penalty is more merciful than a sentence of life without parole?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, an appellate court reviews errors of law only and is bound by the factual findings of the trial court unless clearly erroneous. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). The conduct of a criminal trial is left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who will not be reversed in the absence of a prejudicial abuse of discretion. State v. Bridges, 278 S.C. 447, 448, 298 S.E.2d 212, 212 (1982). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law. State v. Garrett, 350 S.C. 613, 619, 567 S.E.2d 523, 526 (Ct.App.2002).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Jury selection

Bryant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jurors to be physically present during jury selection. Bryant claims the alleged error substantially impaired his ability to exercise peremptory strikes in a meaningful manner and therefore deprived him of his constitutional guarantee of a fair trial by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI; S.C. Const. art. I, § 14. We disagree.

Peremptory strikes are not constitutional rights. They are creatures of statute and "a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury." State v. Potts, 347 S.C. 126, 130, 554 S.E.2d 38, 40 (2001) (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)). Therefore, a defendant seeking to overturn a guilty verdict based on the way in which peremptory challenges were exercised must show that the statute granting him peremptory challenges was violated or that the jury which tried him was not impartial. Id. at 131, 554 S.E.2d 38, 554 S.E.2d at 40.

S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1100 (Supp.2005) provides:

In impaneling juries in criminal cases, the jurors shall be called, sworn and impaneled anew for the trial of each case, according to the established practice.

Bryant argues that the trial court violated the statute granting him peremptory challenges because striking jurors on paper without physically viewing the jurors was not an "established practice" of jury selection.

Because a trial court is given enormous discretion in conducting a criminal trial, we may logically conclude that "established practice" does not refer to only one method of impaneling a jury. Although not the most common method of jury selection in criminal trials, paper strikes are often...