State v. Bryant, 84-268

• Decision Date: 07 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-268,84-268
• Citation: 127 N.H. 69,498 A.2d 322
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Robert A. BRYANT.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 322

498 A.2d 322

127 N.H. 69

The STATE of New Hampshire v. Robert A. BRYANT.

No. 84-268.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Aug. 7, 1985.

Stephen E. Merrill, Atty. Gen. (Peter C. Scott, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief and orally), for State.

Law Offices of O. Lee Gregory, Conway (Fay E. Melendy, Conway, on brief and orally), for defendant.

SOUTER, Justice.

The defendant appeals an order of the superior court enjoining him from storing damaged automobiles on a strip of his land in Conway between Route 302 and a fence that blocks the view from the highway to an enclosed area. We affirm.

By Laws 1967, 252 the legislature enacted RSA chapter 249-B (now RSA 236:90 to :110) in response to the national Highway Beautification Act of 1965. See Pub.L. 89-285 (codified as 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 131, 135 note, 136, 319 (West 1966)). The stated policy of the New Hampshire statute was to control junkyards adjacent to segments of federal aid primary and other highways, see 23 U.S.C.A. 103 (West 1966), for the sake of promoting safety and recreation and preserving natural beauty. RSA 249-B:1 (now RSA 236:90). The statute defined a "junkyard" to include a place for storing "junked, dismantled or wrecked automobiles," RSA 249-B:2, II, III and IV (now RSA 236:91, II, III, and IV), and its practical effect was to require that a junkyard located within 1,000 feet of one of the specified highways be screened from view. See RSA 249-B:2, I (now RSA 236:91, I); RSA 249-B:4, :6, :7, :11 (now RSA 236:93, : 95, :96, :100).

For many years prior to the enactment of the statute in 1967 the defendant's father, Robert H. Bryant, carried on an automobile wrecking and salvage business along Route 302, a segment of the federal aid primary highway system. In 1979 the father, his wife and the present defendant signed an annual licensing agreement with the State, authorizing the operation of the business as a junkyard and providing for the storage of all junk within an area to be screened. At some point thereafter the present defendant assumed the operation of the business. By 1982, he was using a strip of land located within 1,000 feet of the highway, and lying between it and the screening fence, as a place to store automobiles damaged in accidents and held by him as bailee while their owners and insurers decided whether to repair or scrap them. The State charged that this was a violation of the statutory requirement to screen a junkyard and brought a petition to enjoin the practice.

The matter was heard before a Master (William H.M. Beckett, Esq.), whose report recommending an injunction was approved by the Superior Court (Wyman, J.). The master found that the damaged cars owned by third parties were "wrecked automobiles" within the meaning of RSA 249-B:2, II (now RSA 236:91, II) and were therefore junk required to be kept within the screened area. The court's order in accordance with the master's recommendation enjoined the storage of such cars between the fence and the highway.

In this appeal the defendant argues that "wrecked automobiles" must be defined so as to exclude any vehicle that is not irrepairable or that is owned by anyone other than the defendant. He claims that the master erred in defining "wrecked automobiles" broadly enough to include non-owned vehicles and vehicles that could be repaired, and erred further in admitting evidence of activity at the junkyard prior to the time at which the statutory violations were alleged to have occurred.

Taking up, first, the definition of "wrecked automobiles," we start with a statute that does not expressly define the term. From the context of its usage in RSA 236:91, II with "junked" and "dismantled," we can infer that a wrecked automobile may be something different from one that has been through a process of junking or dismantling, but beyond that we must look to common usage, RSA 21:2, and the evident purpose of the statute, White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69, 74, 470 A.2d 849, 852 (1983).

In common usage "wrecked automobile" certainly would include one that cannot, or cannot economically, be repaired, but the term is not understood to be confined to that narrow category. Several cases of somewhat mature age, construing the terms of insurance policies, followed a standard dictionary definition in holding that "to wreck" is to destroy, disable or seriously damage. Aurnhammer v. Brotherhood Acc. Co., 250 Mass. 563, 568, 146 N.E. 47, 48 (1925); Zohner v. Sierra Nevada Life & Casualty Co., 114 Cal.App. 85, 89, 299 P. 749, 751 (1931). "[I]n ordinary speech an automobile is said to be wrecked when it is disabled or seriously damaged, although it may not be totally destroyed or rendered incapable of use." National Casualty Co. v. Mitchell, 162 Miss. 197, 203, 138 So. 808, 809 (1932). The same definition, to destroy, disable or seriously damage, is carried forward into WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, under "wreck," with a specific, though not technical, illustration of a wrecked ship. Id. at 2639 (1961). Our own experience...