State v. Buckman
Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 46967–7–II,46967–7–II |
Citation | 381 P.3d 79,195 Wash.App. 224 |
Parties | State of Washington, Respondent, v. Brian Wallace Buckman, Appellant. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Peter B. Tiller, The Tiller Law Firm, P.O. Box 58, Centralia, WA, 98531–0058, for Appellant.
Sara I. Beigh, J. Bradley Meagher, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, 345 W Main St., Fl. 2, Chehalis, WA, 98532–4802, for Respondent.
Johanson, P.J.¶ 1 Brian Buckman pleaded guilty to one count of second degree child rape. He appeals the trial court's ruling denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, in the alternative, he appeals his sentence. We hold that the trial court properly denied Buckman's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Buckman was correctly informed about the consequences of his plea. But we hold that the trial court imposed an improper sentence because Buckman was under 18 years old at the time of the offense and RCW 9.94A.507(2) excludes him from indeterminate sentencing. We affirm the trial court's order denying Buckman's motion to withdraw his plea, reverse Buckman's indeterminate sentence, and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
¶ 2 K.B.S.1 was 13 years old and Buckman was 17 years and 7 months old when they had sexual intercourse. On November 1, 2011, when Buckman was 18, the State charged Buckman as an adult with second degree child rape.2 He pleaded guilty. During the plea hearing, the trial court engaged in a colloquy with Buckman to establish whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea and whether he entered the plea voluntarily.
¶ 3 Included in the discussion was this exchange:
Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 26, 2012) at 3–4.
¶ 4 The guilty plea form that Buckman signed set forth the standard range for his offense and the maximum penalty. It also specified that indeterminate sentencing under RCW 9.94A.507 applied if he were convicted of second degree rape of a child committed when he was at least 18 years old. The trial court accepted Buckman's guilty plea.
¶ 5 The trial court imposed a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), RCW 9.94A.670, with numerous conditions. Later, in August 2012, the trial court revoked Buckman's SSOSA based on condition violations and sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence of 86 to 114 months minimum to life maximum under RCW 9.94A.507.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 7 The trial court was not persuaded that Buckman had been misinformed of the sentencing consequences of his plea, and it denied Buckman's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Buckman appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶ 8 Buckman argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Buckman argues that because RCW 9.94A.507(2) exempts him from indeterminate sentencing due to his status as a juvenile at the time of the offense, his plea was rendered involuntary because the trial court misinformed him regarding his maximum punishment of life in prison. Because the trial court properly advised Buckman of the maximum sentence at the plea colloquy, we disagree.
¶ 9 We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Forest , 125 Wash.App. 702, 706, 105 P.3d 1045 (2005). A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Powell , 126 Wash.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995).
¶ 10 A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea under CrR 4.2(f) “whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”4 Due process requires an affirmative showing that a defendant entered a guilty plea intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Knotek , 136 Wash.App. 412, 423, 149 P.3d 676 (2006). “The State bears the burden of proving the validity of a guilty plea,” including the defendant's “[k]nowledge of the direct consequences” of the plea, which the State may prove from the record or by clear and convincing extrinsic evidence. State v. Ross , 129 Wash.2d 279, 287, 916 P.2d 405 (1996). The length of a sentence is a direct consequence of a guilty plea and, therefore, misinformation about the length of a sentence renders a plea involuntary, even where the correct sentence may be less than the erroneous sentence included in the plea. State v. Mendoza , 157 Wash.2d 582, 591, 141 P.3d 49 (2006).
¶ 11 Here, during the plea colloquy, the trial court informed Buckman that the maximum penalty for his crime was life in prison and that his standard range was 86 to 114 months. The trial court warned Buckman that if the court declined to grant SSOSA, the court would have to sentence Buckman “somewhere within the standard range of 86 to 114 months in prison.” RP (Jan. 26, 2012) at 5. The trial court did not inform Buckman that he could be subject to an indeterminate sentence.
¶ 12 The plea form, in a boilerplate provision, provided that RCW 9.94A.507 applied if the crime is one among several listed, including second degree rape of a child committed when the offender was at least 18 years old. As discussed below, this was a correct interpretation of RCW 9.94A.507(2).
¶ 13 Before accepting a plea, a trial court must inform a defendant of both the applicable standard sentencing range and the maximum sentence set by the legislature for the charged crime. State v. Kennar , 135 Wash.App. 68, 75, 143 P.3d 326 (2006). Here, there is no dispute that the applicable standard sentencing range was 86 to 114 months and that the maximum sentence for the crime of second degree child rape, a class A felony, is life in prison. RCW 9.94A.510 ; RCW 9A.44.076(2) ( ); RCW 9A.20.021(1)(a) ( ). Thus, Buckman was correctly informed at the plea hearing of the consequences of his plea. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Buckman's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 14 Crucial to this appeal is the interpretation and application of RCW 9.94A.507(2). The parties disagree as to the meaning of the phrase “seventeen years of age or younger” contained in the same provision. Buckman contends that the statute's plain language means that indeterminate sentencing does not apply to Buckman because he was 17 years and 7 months old, but not yet 18, at the time of the offense. The State argues that indeterminate sentencing applies to Buckman because the legislature intended to exclude from indeterminate sentencing only offenders up to and including their 17th birthday but no further. We agree with Buckman.
¶ 15 In construing a statute, our objective is to determine the legislature's intent. State v. Jacobs , 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). “ ‘[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’ ” Jacobs , 154 Wash.2d at 600, 115 P.3d 281 (alteration in original) (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9–10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) ). We discern the “plain meaning” of a statutory provision from the ordinary meaning of the language and from the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Jacobs , 154 Wash.2d at 600, 115 P.3d 281. If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and we may resort to legislative history for guidance in discerning legislative intent. State v. Larson , 185 Wash.App. 903, 909, 344 P.3d 244 (2015), rev'd on other grounds , 184 Wash.2d 843, 365 P.3d 740 (2015).
RCW 9.94A.507(2) (emphasis added).
¶ 17 Accordingly, offenders 17 years of age or younger and who have committed one of the three specified crimes are not subject to the indeterminate sentencing scheme. Buckman committed the offense of second degree rape of a child when he was 17 years and 7 months old. Therefore, RCW 9.94A.507(2) would apply to Buckman if the phrase “seventeen years of age or younger” includes a person who is beyond their 17th birthday but not yet 18 at the time of the offense. No Washington case has construed the meaning of this phrase and neither party cites to any authority interpreting...
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