State v. Buford, WD
Decision Date | 26 May 1981 |
Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
Citation | 619 S.W.2d 777 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. John Mack BUFORD, Appellant. 31776. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Joseph R. Colantuono and June Clark, Kansas City, for appellant.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Suzanne M. Boersig, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Before MANFORD, P. J., and DIXON and NUGENT, JJ.
This is a direct appeal from a jury conviction for robbery, first degree.The jury affixed punishment at 15 years.This punishment was enhanced by the court to 25 years upon finding the persistent offender statute applicable.The judgment is affirmed.
Appellant filed a pro se brief, which was joined by brief of counsel.Two points of error are presented, which allege that the trial court(1) committed plain error by interrogating a defense witness and (2) erred in failing to sustain appellant's objection and motion for mistrial because of remarks made by respondent's counsel during the closing argument.
Respondent moves this court to dismiss this appeal as untimely; however, the notice was filed within the ten days permitted under Rule 30.01(d), so respondent's contention is found to be without merit.In addition, respondent contends that appellant's brief does not comply with Rule 30.06(d) because it fails to state what actions of the trial court should be reviewed under his points relied on within his brief.Respondent argues that this failure demands dismissal since no points have been preserved for review and the allegations within the brief do not rise to the level of plain error.Respondent is correct in stating that appellant's points are conclusory and therefore fail to comply with State v. Davis, 556 S.W.2d 745(Mo.App.1977);State v. Robinson, 551 S.W.2d 309(Mo.App.1977)andRule 30.06(d).Review, however, is urged under the plain error rule (Rule 29.12(b)), and such review can be made of alleged errors not otherwise properly preserved.However, relief under Rule 29.12(b) can and will be granted only when there is a showing of manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged, and a brief recital of the facts, along with the declaration that such evidence supported the finding of appellant's guilt by the jury, suffices.During the morning hours of December 29, 1979, appellant, along with two companions, robbed the owner of a sawmill in eastern Jackson County.The armed robbery took place in the yard area of the sawmill, and the robbers secured over $1,600 in cash from their victim.The two escaped in a black-over-brown Cadillac.The victim fired a shot at their vehicle and gave chase, but without success.The local police were alerted and minutes later, appellant and his two companions were arrested some two miles from the scene of the robbery.The handgun used in the robbery, along with cash, personal papers and identification belonging to the victim were found in the escape vehicle.The victim positively identified appellant as one of the two men who robbed him, and also identified the weapon used in the robbery.
During trial, appellant called Raford Hunter as a defense witness.Hunter was charged with the same offense and was awaiting trial.Before Hunter took the stand, appellant's counsel informed the court that Hunter's case had not been resolved and that he(Hunter) intended to invoke the 5th Amendment and to refuse to answer any questions.Out of the presence of the jury, Hunter phoned his attorney.The court asked Hunter if he intended to take the 5th amendment and Hunter advised the court of his intention to do so.Hunter took the stand and after identifying himself and admitting that he was also charged with the same offense, the following exchange took place:
A.I have nothing to say.
Q.Could you please speak up?
A.I say I ain't got nothing to say.
Q.On the 29th of December of 1979 did you ride in a car in which Mr. Buford entered at some point along 23rd Street in Independence?
A.I still ain't got nothing to say.
Q.Do you have any information that Mr. Buford was involved in a robbery of the BeeMac Sawmill on December 29th of this last year?
A.No.
Q.You say 'no'?
A.No. I ain't got nothing to say.
Q.No, you have no information that he was involved in the robbery?Is that what you're saying?
A.I don't have nothing to say.
Q.Will you be answering any questions which I present to you in regard to the alleged robbery on December 29th at the BeeMac Sawmill?
A.No. No.
Q.Mr. Hunter, you, in fact, drove out to that sawmill with John Buford and with a man by the name of Rudolph McClure, didn't you?
A.No.
Q.You did not go out there with them?
A.No. I ain't got nothing to say.
Q.Are you stating that you did not go out there with John Buford and Rudolph McClure?
A.I'm stating that I ain't got nothing to say.
Q.Well, now, you have previously told officers of the Independence Police Department that you, in fact, went out to that sawmill with Rudolph McClure and John Buford, haven't you?"
At this juncture, appellant's counsel requested a bench conference, during which the following discussion was held:
It is apparent from the record that the trial judge was attempting to clarify the situation before ruling on the propriety of any further examination of this witness by respondent's counsel.In this quest, the record reveals precisely what inquiry the trial court undertook:
In his point (1), appellant argues that the "interrogation" by the trial judge amounted to plain error in that it was conducted in such a manner as to indicate to the jury the court's opinion regarding the meaning of a statement made by the witness.No objection was made to the court's questions.The point is reviewed to determine if manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice occurred to the prejudice of appellant, seeState v. Jones, 462 S.W.2d 715(Mo.1971);State v. McCullough, 411 S.W.2d 79(Mo.1967);State v. Sullins, 582 S.W.2d 732(Mo.App.1979)andRule 29.12(b).
Appellant's apparent argument is that the combination of questions by defense counsel and the court amounted to an expression of opinion by the court that witness Hunter did not intend to testify; rather, that he intended to disavow any particular facts about the offense charged.It is impossible for this court to reach the same conclusion from a reading of the foregoing testimony.Moreover, if appellant's interpretation of the questions and answers is applied, no prejudice to appellant is reflected therein.It needs to be pointed out that the court, out of the presence of the jury, had been advised by this witness of his refusal to testify, and the testimony of the witness given just prior to that portion now attacked by appellant disclosed the unwillingness of the witness to testify.
The trial judge had every good reason to assume that this witness intended to refuse to testify.In his attempt to clarify the witness's unwillingness to testify on any substantive issue, the trial judge properly asked two additional questions (see above).It is apparent that the initial response from the witness was at best ambiguous and that the trial judge had the authority...
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