State v. Bumpus
Decision Date | 18 July 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-565,89-565 |
Citation | 459 N.W.2d 619 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Claude F. BUMPUS, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Kevin M. Kirlin, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Amy M. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James Smith, Co. Atty., for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.
Claude Bumpus was convicted for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code section 204.401(1)(a)(1987). Bumpus was sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years, and since the offense was his second, the court enhanced the term to thirty years pursuant to Iowa Code section 204.411 (1987). The court also applied the provisions of Iowa Code section 204.413 (1987) to ensure that Bumpus would serve a minimum of one third of the enhanced sentence. We affirm.
Des Moines police officers Garey Bryan and Michael Stueckrath were patrolling in the vicinity of the Another World Lounge at approximately 11:00 p.m. on November 2, 1987. They noticed three men in the parking lot of the lounge crouching behind a car. Officer Stueckrath recognized one of the three men as Marvin Taylor, and Officer Bryan recognized Bumpus. The officers observed that the men were exchanging something, though they could not see exactly what. The Another World Lounge was at the time of the incident notorious as a site for drug transactions. Based on their past experience with the precise location, the nature and furtiveness of the actions of the three men, the notoriety of the night spot, and the lateness of the hour, the officers pulled their patrol car into the lot to investigate.
As they drove into the lot, Bumpus began to run away from them. Officer Bryan pursued Bumpus into the bar while officer Stueckrath detained the other two individuals. Once in the bar, Bumpus attempted to conceal a black pouch from officer Bryan's view and Bryan asked him to step outside. Bumpus continued to back away, keeping the pouch behind his back, and Bryan seized him by the arm, leading him outside. Once outside the bar, Bumpus threw the pouch over a fence, where it was retrieved by officer Stueckrath. Immediately after he threw the pouch away, Bumpus tried to flee. After a brief struggle, officer Bryan subdued Bumpus and placed him under arrest for interference with official acts.
The pouch was subjected to a warrantless search, and forty-nine individual portions of crack cocaine were discovered. Bumpus filed a motion to suppress, arguing that officer Bryan lacked probable cause for an arrest and that as a result the warrantless search of the pouch he discarded was tainted. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The trial court ruled that based on the facts officer Bryan had a "reasonable and articulable cause" to believe that criminal activity was occurring, and that the initial seizure of Bumpus by officer Bryan did not violate any constitutional rights. The trial court further stated that Bumpus's resistance constituted a violation of Iowa Code section 719.1 (1987). The trial court's ruling indicates that the court viewed the search of the pouch as a proper search incident to arrest based on the violation of section 719.1. The search of the pouch, in turn, was seen by the trial court as providing evidence for the arrest on the narcotics charge.
As his first assignment of error, Bumpus argues that, contrary to the trial court's apparent conclusion, he was under arrest the instant that officer Bryan physically compelled him to leave the bar. We agree. The situation presented is quite similar to that which arose in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). In one of the factual situations presented by that case, an off-duty officer chased and caught an individual attempting to commit a burglary in his apartment building. He questioned and searched the man, finding burglar's tools in his possession. Id. at 48-49, 88 S.Ct. at 1895, 20 L.Ed.2d at 926-27. Although no formal words of arrest were spoken until after the questioning and body search, the Supreme Court upheld the search and seizure as the fruit of a search incident to arrest. Id. at 66-67, 88 S.Ct. at 1904-05, 20 L.Ed.2d at 936-37. As Sibron indicates, an arrest occurs when an officer with probable cause takes a suspect into custody. Id. at 67, 88 S.Ct. at 1904-05, 20 L.Ed.2d at 937. In Bumpus's case, arrest occurred the instant that Bryan seized him by the arm and compelled him to leave the bar, if officer Bryan had probable cause. We do not mean to intimate that in all cases physical seizure constitutes arrest, or that seizure of an individual without probable cause always constitutes an improper arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Haye, 825 F.2d 32 (4th Cir.1987) ( ). Accordingly, we must analyze the factual situation to determine whether at the time officer Bryan seized Bumpus, probable cause existed.
Bumpus contends that it did not. He argues that his abandonment of the pouch in which the cocaine was found was coerced by the illegal arrest, and that the warrantless search of the pouch was a violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. He further argues that even if the arrest was valid, the warrantless search of the pouch was impermissible since it was not justifiable under any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Since we conclude that probable cause existed for Bumpus's arrest on narcotics charges at the time officer Bryan seized him and led him out of the bar, we must also conclude that his constitutional rights were not violated by an improper arrest. We also conclude that since his abandonment of the pouch containing the drugs was not the result of coercion, he lacks standing to challenge the search of the pouch.
When constitutional rights are at issue, this court will generally conduct a de novo review of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1990); State v. Swaim, 412 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Iowa 1987). A warrantless search or seizure is by definition invalid unless it comes within a recognized exception to constitutional warrant requirements. State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1984). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was lawful. State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Iowa 1982).
In making his argument, Bumpus relies on People v. Washington, 192 Cal.App.3d 1120, 236 Cal.Rptr. 840 (1 Dist.1987). In that case, as in the one before this court, officers observed a group of men engaged in what appeared to them to be a drug transaction. The transaction was occurring in an area where such transactions were commonplace. As the officers approached, one of the men, later identified as Washington, broke from the group and ran. One of the officers gave chase, demanding that the suspect stop. During the chase, Washington discarded several packets later found to contain drugs. Id. at 1122-23, 236 Cal.Rptr. at 841.
On appeal of the trial court's denial of Washington's motion to suppress, the appellate court held that at the moment when the officer began to give chase, Washington had been detained. Id. at 1125, 236 Cal.Rptr. at 843. The court did not determine that Washington was under arrest, but that his detention was pursuant to an investigatory stop. The court reasoned that the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion for detaining Washington. Consequently, the court held that the seized drugs were inadmissible. Id. at 1128, 236 Cal.Rptr. at 844.
Bumpus argues that his situation is nearly identical. We note that there are currently two lines of decisions emanating from the California appellate court system on this subject. In re Christopher B., 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 268 Cal.Rptr. 8 (4th Dist.1990), the most recently decided California case on the subject, severely questioned the reasoning behind the Washington decision. The court cited Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) for the proposition that chasing a subject did not constitute detention. Id. 219 Cal.App.3d at 461, 268 Cal.Rptr. at 13; see also People v. Patrick, 135 Cal.App.3d 290, 185 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App. 2nd Dist.1982) ( ). We agree with the California court that whatever vitality the reasoning behind the Washington decision might have had was nullified by the Supreme Court's decision in Chesternut.
We also disagree with the restrictive approach to a probable cause determination that Bumpus infers from the decision in Washington. The California court determined that the factors relied upon by the officer in making his determination that Washington may have been involved in a crime were insufficient to prompt even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, since none of the factors, standing alone, could have substantiated a reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1123-24, 236 Cal.Rptr. at 842. As a consequence, the court focused almost exclusively on the officer's testimony that one of the primary factors he relied upon in deciding that a drug sale may have been occurring was that "[b]lack men ... in the area usually had something to hide if they ran from the police." Id. at 1123, 236 Cal.Rptr. at 841. As the court pointed out in its decision, such racial inferences are clearly impermissible in making a probable cause determination. Id. at 1128, 236 Cal.Rptr. at 845. No such racial motivation has been shown by the facts of this case.
We disagree with the California court in its apparent determination that the other factors the officers relied upon in determining probable...
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