State v. Burnett
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana |
| Writing for the Court | Caraway |
| Citation | State v. Burnett, 768 So.2d 783 (La. App. 2000) |
| Decision Date | 04 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 33,739-KA.,33,739-KA. |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jimmie Ray BURNETT, Appellant. |
Amy Ellender, Louisiana Appellate Project, Mer Rouge, Counsel for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul J. Carmouche, District Attorney, Laura Wingate, Assistant District Attorney, Counsel for Appellee.
Before NORRIS, WILLIAMS and CARAWAY, JJ.
Defendant was charged by amended bill of information with one count of sexual battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1, and one count of oral sexual battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.3. On April 14, 1999, the defendant pled guilty as charged. The trial court then adjudicated the defendant a fourth felony offender and sentenced the defendant as a fourth felony offender on the sexual battery conviction to life imprisonment at hard labor and on the oral sexual battery conviction to ten years imprisonment at hard labor. It was also ordered that defendant's sentences run concurrently, and that both sentences be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
Defendant appeals his convictions, adjudication as a habitual offender, and his sentences, urging five assignments of error; two assignments from a brief filed by his counsel, and three assignments from a supplemental, pro-se brief. For the following reasons, the defendant's convictions, adjudication as a fourth felony offender, and sentences are affirmed.
Defendant, Jimmie Ray Burnett ("Burnett"), was charged by amended bill of information with one count of sexual battery and one count of oral sexual battery. A jury trial began on April 13, 1999. During the state's presentation of evidence, Burnett decided to enter guilty pleas to both counts.
During Burnett's guilty plea hearing, the state gave an account of the facts constituting Burnett's crimes. On or about August 14, 1997, Burnett went to the home of the 12 year old victim, V.J. The defendant and V.J. left the home to go buy milk. The two stopped at several places, and Burnett eventually took the victim to a secluded wooded area inside the Caddo Parish limits. Burnett forced V.J. into the back seat of his vehicle and threatened to tie her down if she did not stop squirming. The defendant then violently slapped the victim on both sides of her face. Burnett touched the victim's genitals with his hand, touched her anus, and touched the victim's genitals with his mouth.
Burnett was 42 years old, and his victim was 12 years old at the time of the incident. All of these events occurred without the victim's consent, in Caddo Parish, Louisiana.
By this assignment of error, Burnett contends that the state failed to present a prima facie case to the trial court establishing that his 1980 armed robbery plea was constitutionally valid.
In July 13, 1999, Burnett filed a motion to quash the state's fourth felony habitual bill of information. Burnett argued that the state's evidence of a 1980 armed robbery conviction was inadequate and that the state was required to provide a transcript of the guilty plea. The defendant argued that the transcript was the best proof of an intelligent and voluntary plea according to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The trial court denied Burnett's motion.
La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. The presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. If the person claims that any conviction or adjudication of delinquency alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the information. A copy of the response shall be served upon the prosecutor. A person claiming that a conviction or adjudication of delinquency alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the Constitutions of Louisiana or of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.
In State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La. 1993), the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the state's burden of proof in a habitual offender proceeding:
If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information, the burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. If the State meets this burden, the defendant has the burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. If the defendant is able to do this, then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea shifts to the State. The State will meet its burden of proof if it introduces a "perfect" transcript of the taking of the guilty plea, one which reflects a colloquy between judge and defendant wherein the defendant was informed of and specifically waived his right to trial by jury, his privilege against self incrimination, and his right to confront his accusers. If the State introduces anything less than a "perfect" transcript, for example, a guilty plea form, a minute entry, an "imperfect" transcript, or any combination thereof, the judge then must weigh the evidence submitted by the defendant and by the State to determine whether the State has met its burden of proving that defendant's prior guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights. (Footnotes omitted.)
To prove the existence of the 1980 armed robbery plea, the state introduced the following evidence: (1) The severed bill of information charging Jimmie Ray Burnett with committing the offense of armed robbery on or about April 2, 1980; (2) The certified minute entries showing that Jimmie Ray Burnett pled guilty on August 1, 1980 to the charge of armed robbery, that he was represented by counsel, and that "the Court informed the defendant of his Constitutional Rights as per Boykin v. Alabama; " and (3) Burnett's "pen pack" regarding the 1980 armed robbery conviction (exhibit S-2). Lieutenant Mark Rogers of the Shreveport Police Department was accepted as an expert in fingerprint identification analysis. Lieutenant Rogers fingerprinted Burnett in the courtroom during trial (exhibit S-1) and testified that the fingerprints on exhibit S-1 were made by the same person who made the fingerprints on the fingerprint card on exhibit S-2.
Based upon the above offered evidence, we hold that the state met its burden of proving the existence of Burnett's 1980 guilty plea to armed robbery, and that Burnett was represented by counsel at the time of the plea. The burden then shifted to Burnett to produce affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of his 1980 plea. The defendant failed to produce any such evidence to meet his burden of proof as required by State v. Shelton, supra. The trial court correctly denied defendant's Motion to Quash the habitual offender bill of information. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Burnett next complains that his life sentence, although statutorily mandated, is unconstitutionally harsh and excessive.
The trial court adjudicated Burnett as a fourth felony offender based on the following convictions: (1) an armed robbery conviction on August 1, 1980; (2) a simple robbery conviction on October 4, 1991; (3) a simple robbery conviction on July 28, 1993; and (4) a sexual battery conviction on April 14, 1999. The trial court then sentenced Burnett as a fourth felony offender on the sexual battery conviction to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Burnett filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, which was subsequently denied by the trial court.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), Burnett's penalty exposure as a habitual offender is as follows:
(c) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then:
(ii) If the fourth or subsequent felony or any of the prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
The trial court correctly noted that all of defendant's four felonies, including the charged offense, are crimes of violence. La. R.S. 14:2(13). Thus, under the sentencing requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), Burnett's life sentence without benefit was mandatory. Nevertheless, a sentence within statutorily authorized limits can be excessive. State v. Barnes, 28,835 (La.App.2d Cir.12/11/96), 685 So.2d 1148, writ denied, 97-0274 (La.10/10/97), 703 So.2d 602; State v. Freelon, 26,938 (La.App.2d Cir.5/10/95), 655 So.2d 687.
Whether the sentence imposed is too severe depends on the circumstances of the case and the background of the defendant. A sentence violates La. Const. art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623...
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