State v. Burnett

Decision Date25 July 2014
Docket NumberNo. 107,571.,107,571.
Citation329 P.3d 1169
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Ronnell BURNETT, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

329 P.3d 1169

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Ronnell BURNETT, Appellant.

No. 107,571.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

July 25, 2014.


[329 P.3d 1173]



Syllabus by the Court

1. The threshold determination for the admission of evidence in any proceeding is relevance. Relevance is established by a material or logical connection between the asserted facts and the inference or result they are intended to establish. Relevant evidence, as defined in K.S.A. 60–401(b), is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. Accordingly, relevance contains both a materiality element and a probative element. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination of materiality de novo and the assessment of probative value under an abuse of discretion standard.

2. Whether a third party was responsible for the crime a defendant is charged with is clearly a material fact related to determining the defendant's guilt or innocence.

3. While evidence of the motive of a third party to commit the crime, standing alone, is not relevant, such evidence may be relevant if there is other evidence connecting the third party to the crime. In other words, without additional evidence showing that a third party could have committed the crime ( e.g., presence at the crime scene, the opportunity and means to commit the crime), evidence merely suggesting that someone other than the defendant had a motive to commit the crime has little probative value and can be properly excluded at trial. A district court must evaluate the totality of facts and circumstances in a given case to determine whether the defense's proffered evidence effectively connects the third party to the crime charged. Because the district court's determination of this question contemplates whether the proffered evidence is probative to establishing a third party's involvement in the charged crime, the district court's decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

4. The erroneous exclusion of evidence is subject to review under the harmless error test of K.S.A. 60–261, which asks whether there is a reasonable probability that the error did or will affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. Factors an appellate court can consider in reviewing the erroneous exclusion of evidence for harmless error include: the importance of the witness' testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the case.

5. K.S.A. 22–3401 states that a district court may grant a continuance for good cause shown, and its refusal to grant a continuance

[329 P.3d 1174]

will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.

6. The felony-murder statute has two primary elements—killing and simultaneously engaging in an inherently dangerous felony. The second element can be established through proof that the killing occurred while the defendant was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing from an inherently dangerous felony. These are factual circumstances in which a material element may be proven. Therefore, this language in the felony-murder statute does not create alternative means.

7. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment is not implicated, however, unless the person invoking its protection had a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that was invaded by government action.

8. Because of their reasonable concern for prison security and inmates' diminished expectations of privacy, prison officials do not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they read inmates' nonprivileged, outgoing letters. Furthermore, once prison officials have a right to examine such messages, no rule requires them to close their eyes to what they discover therein.

9. Generally, a district court's refusal to appoint new counsel is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

10. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an indigent criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel in his or her criminal defense. However, such a defendant cannot compel the district court to appoint the counsel of defendant's choice. To warrant substitute counsel, a defendant must show “justifiable dissatisfaction” with his or her appointed counsel. Justifiable dissatisfaction may be demonstrated by showing a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable disagreement, or a complete breakdown in communication between counsel and the defendant. As long as the district court has a reasonable basis for believing the attorney-client relationship has not deteriorated to a point where appointed counsel can no longer give effective aid in the fair presentation of a defense, the court is justified in refusing to appoint new counsel.

11. A claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of fact and law requiring de novo review. Consequently, appellate courts review the underlying factual findings for support by substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusions based on those facts de novo.

12. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence before the judge or jury. The reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

13. Cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may require reversal of the defendant's convictions when the totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. Cumulative error will not be found, however, when the record fails to support the errors raised on appeal by the defendant. Furthermore, a single error cannot constitute cumulative error.


Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Christopher L. Schneider, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Elizabeth A. Evers, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.


The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSEN, J.:

A jury found Ronnell Burnett guilty of felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm

[329 P.3d 1175]

at an occupied dwelling, and criminal possession of a firearm. On appeal, Burnett argues that the district court erred by (1) excluding evidence of prior and subsequent shootings taking place at the same residence where the shooting at issue here took place; (2) refusing to grant defense counsel a continuance during trial to edit and present a redacted video recording of Burnett's interview with a detective; (3) instructing the jury on felony murder; (4) admitting into evidence copies of letters that Burnett had placed in the jail's outgoing mail; (5) failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs committed by Burnett; (6) failing to adequately investigate Burnett's request for substitute counsel made between his first and second trials; and (7) failing to grant a new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Burnett also argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged trial errors denied him a fair trial.

We conclude that the district court erred in preventing Burnett from presenting evidence of other shootings taking place at the residence for the limited purpose of cross-examining investigators who testified about the manner in which the shooting at issue here occurred. But, considering the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that this error was harmless. Similarly, we conclude that the failure to give a limiting instruction regarding Burnett's other crimes or civil wrongs did not constitute clear error. Finding no other error on the remaining issues Burnett raises, we affirm Burnett's convictions.

Facts

Tyrone Ramsey and Simone Dickson were engaged in an intimate relationship that resulted in children. At some point, this relationship ended and Dickson began to have a relationship with Burnett, which caused tensions to arise between Burnett and Ramsey. According to Dickson, Ramsey would call Burnett's phone “all the time making threats and stuff.”

At around 5 p.m. on July 7, 2008, Dickson and Burnett had a verbal confrontation in Dickson's apartment in North Kansas City, Missouri. The confrontation eventually moved to the apartment's parking lot where Dickson got into her car and tried to run over Burnett. As Dickson was driving away, Burnett threw a bottle of gin and a bottle of orange juice through the sunroof of Dickson's car. The plastic orange juice bottle hit Dickson in the head but did not injure her. Dickson proceeded to drive to a Target store, and Burnett followed her in his work truck—a Frosty Treats ice cream truck. Burnett followed Dickson on foot into and out of the store and then followed Dickson in his work truck back to her apartment, where he then drove away.

At some point, Dickson and Ramsey spoke over the phone about the bottle-throwing incident. Ramsey then called Burnett to ask him about throwing a bottle at Dickson. According to Ramsey, before he could say anything, Burnett threatened to kill him. Ramsey hung up on Burnett, but Burnett continued to call him.

At the time, Ramsey was at his residence in Kansas City, Kansas, with his nephew, Willie Claiborne, and Claiborne's friend, Rahi Larks, the victim in this case....

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