State v. Burnham

Decision Date07 October 1935
Docket Number5567
Citation87 Utah 445,49 P.2d 963
CourtUtah Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. BURNHAM

Appeal from District Court, Second District, Davis County; L. A Wade, Judge.

Frank James Burnham was convicted of a felony, and he appeals.

AFFIRMED.

R. B Thurman, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Joseph Chez, Atty. Gen., and Zelph S. Calder, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

EPHRAIM HANSON, Justice. ELIAS HANSEN, C. J., and FOLLAND, MOFFAT and WOLFE, JJ., concur.

OPINION

EPHRAIM HANSON, Justice.

The defendant was tried and convicted in Davis county on an information charging him with the commission of a felony. The record shows that the requisite number of jurors duly qualified on their voir dire examination to serve as jurors in the case. When defendant's attorney was requested to exercise his first peremptory challenge, he objected and insisted that R. S. Utah 1933, 104-24-12, of the Code of Civil Procedure be followed in impaneling the jury. The objection was overruled and the impaneling of the jury was proceeded with in accordance with the practice in use prior to the enactment of the statute referred to.

Defendant insists that the trial court committed error in thus impaneling the jury. No other question is raised on this appeal.

The section referred to provides in effect that when challenges for cause have been completed and there shall remain on the panel six jurors more than the number who are to compose the jury, the clerk shall make a list of those remaining in the order in which their names were called, and hand the same to plaintiff. The plaintiff shall then designate on such list the name of one juror peremptorily challenged by him, if any, and hand the list to the defendant, who shall designate the name of one juror peremptorily challenged by him, and that the parties shall so proceed alternately to challenge, until the peremptory challenges shall be exhausted; that the clerk shall then call the remaining names or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.

This section became effective in June, 1933. Although not in use in this state prior to that time, this method of impaneling juries in civil cases was in use in other jurisdictions. See Revised Code of Arizona 1928, § 1923.

R. S. Utah 1933, 105-29-1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in so far as it is pertinent here, provides that "trial juries for criminal cases are formed in the same manner as trial juries in civil cases." This statute has been in effect since statehood.

There are other statutes in our Code of Criminal Procedure, however, which have an important bearing upon the question of whether it was the intention of the Legislature that the method of forming juries prescribed in section 104-24-12 should be followed in criminal cases. R. S. Utah 1933, 105-31-14, of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a peremptory challenge can be taken by either party and may be oral. Section 105-31-15 of the same Code provides that where the offense is punishable by death or imprisonment for life, the number of challenges allowed to the defendant and the state shall be ten each; if the offense charged is a felony other than punishable by death or life imprisonment, the number of challenges is four each; and in misdemeanor cases the number of challenges is three each.

To make section 104-24-12, of the Civil Code applicable in criminal cases involving capital punishment or imprisonment for life, 32 jurors would have to be qualified on their voir dire examination before any peremptory challenge could be exercised by the state or the defendant. In other felony cases there would of necessity be 16 jurors thus qualified before a peremptory challenge could be exercised. In either case it would be impossible for only six jurors--the number specifically designated in section 104-24-12--more than the number to compose the jury to remain on the panel. The mention of six jurors, in this connection is an indication that the intent was to limit this method of challenge to...

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9 cases
  • Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • December 2, 1994
    ...762 P.2d at 1122. 4 Section 15-1-1 would control, in any event, because it is the most specific statute. See State v. Burnham, 87 Utah 445, 449, 49 P.2d 963, 965 (1935) ("It is a general rule of statutory construction that where two statutes treat the same subject-matter, the one general an......
  • Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 8659
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • October 16, 1957
    ...v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524.3 State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25; State v. Burnham, 87 Utah 445, 49 P.2d 963; Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Co., 60 Utah 423, 209 P. 207; State ex rel. Morck v. White, 41 Utah 480, 126 P. 330; Nelden v. Cla......
  • Bagshaw v. Bagshaw
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • March 8, 1990
    ...see also State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1983); Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Utah 1980); State v. Burnham, 87 Utah 445, 49 P.2d 963, 965 (1935). establish that this procedural rule was in effect at the time of ......
  • U.S. Smelting, Refining & Min. Co. v. Nielsen
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • January 23, 1968
    ...a general one see State ex rel. Public Service Comm. et al. v. Southern Pacific Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938); State v. Burnham, 87 Utah 445, 49 P.2d 963 (1935); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P. 207 (1922).4 That a later enacted statute generally takes precedence......
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