State v. Burr
| Decision Date | 19 March 1920 |
| Citation | 84 So. 61,79 Fla. 290 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. TRIAY v. BURR et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Original mandamus by the State of Florida, on relation of E. J. Triay as receiver of the Jacksonville Traction Company, against R Hudson Burr and two others, as the Railroad Commissioners of the State of Florida. Motion to quash alternative writ denied.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Syllabus by the Court
When a tribunal refuses to exercise jurisdiction that it clearly possesses and ought to exercise, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel its exercise.
The Railroad Commissioners are administrative officers having statutory powers and duties; and when they decline to exercise authority or to perform duties conferred upon them by law, they may, by mandamus, in the absence of other adequate remedy afforded by law, be required in proper cases duly presented to proceed with the performance of their duties. In such cases the command is to proceed to exercise their authority and discretion.
Municipalities may exercise only such powers as are clearly conferred upon them by the express or implied provisions of law; and all doubts as to the existence of a power in a municipality is resolved against the city. This rule was applicable to statutes conferring authority upon the Railroad Commissioners until the enactment of chapter 6527, Acts 1913 (Comp. Laws 1914, s 2892), which provides that 'the laws relative to the Railroad Commissioners shall be deemed remedial laws to be construed liberally,' and that 'all doubts as to their jurisdiction and powers shall be resolved in their favor.'
Independently of a right to regulate and control the rates to be charged for public service reserved in a grant of a franchise or right to use the city streets, a city or other municipality has no power to regulate the rates to be charged by public service corporations in the absence of express or plain legislative authority to do so. Nor does such authority arise from the power to regulate the opening and use of streets nor from a grant of the general right to control and regulate the right to erect works in the streets of the city.
Where it is doubtful whether a statute authorizes a municipality to fix rates for a public utility company, such doubt must be resolved against the authority of the city.
Even if authority is by statute given to a municipality to fix rates for a public service corporation operating therein, such authority is subject to legislative control.
If there is a general law conferring upon municipalities authority to fix rates for street railroads and also a special law conferring a similar power upon a particular city, being inconsistent with the general law, the special or local law prevails as to the ctiy to which it applies.
The provisions of chapter 4052, Laws of Florida 1891 (sections 1024-1028, General Statutes), do not confer upon municipalities authority to fix rates for public utility corporations. Nor does chapter 4859, Acts of 1899 (section 1016, General Statutes), confer such authority on municipalities.
The charter act (chapter 3775, Acts 1887), conferring upon the city of Jacksonville the 'power by ordinance * * * to grant the right of way through the streets, avenues and squares of said city for the purpose of street or other railroads,' and chapter 5347, Acts of 1903, amending the city charter, do not confer upon the city authority to fix rates of fares for street railroads.
Any contract ordinance passed by the city with statutory authority fixing by agreement street car fares, as an incident to the granting of franchises to a street railroad company, is subject to legislative control.
All regulations and contracts relative to transportation rates for common carriers, whether made by legislative authority or otherwise, are subject to a proper exercise of the police power of the state, under which power such rates may from time to time be increased or reduced or otherwise regulated as the interests of the public and the organic property rights of the carriers may require. The inherent and reserved police power of the state cannot be abrogated by legislative enactment.
Section 30, art. 16, of the state Constitution expressly recognizes and does not limit the power of the Legislature to enact laws for the regulation and control of rates charged by common carriers; and the power may be exercised notwithstanding statutory or municipal regulations or private contracts that may have been made with reference to such rates.
Under section 8, art. 8, of the Constitution, the jurisdiction and powers conferred by statute upon municipalities may be altered or amended at any time by the Legislature.
An ordinance of the city of Jacksonville which by agreement with the Jacksonville Traction Company limits to five cents the fares to be charged for street car transportation in the city does not preclude the exercise by the state of its right under the police power to fix rates for such transportation that will be reasonable and just to the carrier as well as to the public.
The Constitution protects lawful and valid contract rights of private parties against illegal impairment by legislation but the organic law, state or federal, does not forbid legislative control of the rights of the public in the rates to be charged by common carriers, even though such rates may be fixed by contract between the carrier and a municipality.
In the absence of express organic limitations, the police power of the state may be exercised in making just and reasonable rates to be charged by common carriers for the transportation of passengers and property; and all private contracts for such transportation, in so far as they affect public rights are in law made subject to a proper exercise of the police power of the state within organic limitations.
The state, in the exercise of its police power, may reduce or increase the rates fixed by a city ordinance for a common carrier company without reference to and independently of and notwithstanding the ordinance contract or rights thereunder claimed by the company or by the municipality or the public when justice and the general welfare demand it.
In granting to corporations franchises to engage in the business of common carriers, the law contemplates a continuance of the public service, unless otherwise provided; and the law also contemplates an adequate and efficient service, and that a reasonable compensation therefor shall be allowed, to comport with organic property rights; therefore it is clearly within the legislative power and duty to enact regulations by which a reasonable return for service rendered by common carriers may be effectuated as well as to enact regulations by which excessive charges and unjust discriminations by common carriers may be prevented and redressed.
The intent of a valid statute is the law, and this is ascertained by a consideration of the language of the enactment.
Where the legislative intent is clearly manifest by the language used, considered in its ordinary and grammatical sense, rules of construction are unnecessary and inapplicable.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty of meaning in the words employed in a statute, the legislative intent should be ascertained by a consideration of the entire act and of others in pari materia; and in doing so appropriate effect should, if possible, be given to all the material portions of the law so as to carry out and effectuate in the fullest degree the intention of the lawmakers.
Where a rule of construction is contained in the statute itself, that rule should be applied if it is necessary to use any rules of construction in determining the meaning or effect of the law.
The state has the power to reduce or increase or otherwise regulate the transportation fares charged by the Jacksonville Traction Company; and such power is not affected by any authority conferred upon the city of Jacksonville or by the ordinance of the city limiting the fares to five cents. And the power of the state in the premises may properly be exerted through the Railroad Commissioners, an administrative tribunal of the state, under appropriate authority conferred by statute.
When a valid statute confers a power or imposes a duty upon designate officials, a failure to exercise the power or to perform the duty does not affect the existence of the power or duty or curtail the right to require performance in a proper case.
The statute conferring upon the Railroad Commissioners authority to regulate the tariff rates of 'all railroads, railroad companies and common carriers' must be interpreted by its own terms, and must be considered as a whole in determining whether it applies to street railroads.
Where an amendment is enacted, it must be assumed that a change in the existing law to the extent indicated by the nature of the amendment was intended unless a contrary intent appears from all of the enactments on the subject; and courts should give appropriate effect to the amendment.
Chapter 6527, Acts of 1913, 'relating to the Railroad Commissioners and the regulation of common carriers,' provides 'that the laws relative to the Railroad Commissioners shall be deemed remedial laws to be construed liberally to further the legislative intent to regulate and control public carriers in the public interest,' and that 'all doubts as to their jurisdiction and powers shall be resolved in their favor,' and these requirements should be observed in construing and applying the statute.
The word 'jurisdiction' relates to the subjects or objects over which authority may be exercised, as well as to the nature and extent of the authority to be exercised over the subjects or objects.
Chapter 6527, Acts of 1913,...
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