State v. Burroughs
Decision Date | 23 September 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 17894.,17894. |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. David BURROUGHS. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, and Kelley P. Swift, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Robert S. Bello, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick D. McCabe, Lawrence M. Lapine and Thomas M. Cassone, Stamford, for the appellee (defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the defendant, David Burroughs, was seized within the meaning of article first, §§ 71 and 9,2 of the Connecticut constitution when two uniformed, armed police officers exited their patrol car and approached his vehicle. The state appeals from the Appellate Court's judgment, claiming that that court improperly reversed the trial court's determination that the conduct of the officers did not amount to an unconstitutional seizure of the defendant. The state specifically argues that such conduct would not have caused a reasonable person in the defendant's position to believe that he was not free to leave. We agree with the state and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court, relying on the trial court's memorandum of decision and articulation, set forth the following uncontested facts in its decision. "On the night of May 21, 2003, Joseph Duguay, a uniformed member of the Stamford police department since June, 1977, and his partner ... Officer Robert Macari, were on patrol in a marked police vehicle. At approximately 10:30 p.m., the officers received a radio transmission from the police department dispatcher directing them to investigate a suspicious car in the area of 70 Dyke Lane. The vehicle was described as a possible black BMW with license plate 685 PXD.
State v. Burroughs, 99 Conn.App. 413, 416-18, 914 A.2d 592 (2007). In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that the police officers' conduct prior to the time that Duguay smelled the marijuana did not constitute a seizure because there was no use of physical force or demonstration of authority, and, therefore, there was no constitutional violation that would justify exclusion of the evidence.
Thereafter, the defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a,3 entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charges of possession of narcotics with intent to sell and possession of marijuana. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the defendant's plea and sentenced the defendant to six years imprisonment and six years of special parole.
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that he was the victim of an illegal seizure and that the trial court improperly had denied his motion to suppress. The Appellate Court agreed and reversed with respect to the trial court's decision on the motion to suppress, concluding that a "seizure occurred at the time that the officers left their marked patrol car and began their approach [toward] the defendant's vehicle because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave in that situation." Id., at 421, 914 A.2d 592.
On appeal to this court,4 the state claims that the defendant was not seized until after the police had developed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, which occurred when Duguay came close enough to the defendant's vehicle to detect the smell of marijuana. The state thus claims that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the contraband discovered in his possession. The defendant responds that he was seized illegally prior to the existence of probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying an investigative stop when the police officers exited their patrol car and began to approach his vehicle. We agree with the state and conclude that there was an insufficient show of police authority before the officers detected the smell of marijuana to establish a seizure under the state constitution.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blackman, 246 Conn. 547, 553, 716 A.2d 101 (1998). We undertake a more probing factual review when a constitutional question hangs in the balance. See State v. Damon, 214 Conn. 146, 154, 570 A.2d 700 (, )cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819, 111 S.Ct. 65, 112 L.Ed.2d 40 (1990). In the present case, in which we are required to determine whether the defendant was seized by the police, we are presented with a mixed question of law and fact that requires our independent review.5
See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).
We next articulate the legal test used to determine when a person is "seized" within the meaning of article first, §§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution. We previously have concluded that a person is seized when, "by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ostroski, 186 Conn. 287, 291, 440 A.2d 984, cert. denied, 459...
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