State v. Bussey, Nos. 64966
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
| Writing for the Court | BOYD; ADKINS |
| Citation | 463 So.2d 1141,10 Fla. L. Weekly 105 |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 105 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ricky BUSSEY, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant v. Herbert Lee GAINES, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant v. James Earl DOTSON, Appellee. |
| Docket Number | Nos. 64966,64967 and 64968 |
| Decision Date | 07 February 1985 |
Page 1141
v.
Ricky BUSSEY, Appellee.
STATE of Florida, Appellant
v.
Herbert Lee GAINES, Appellee.
STATE of Florida, Appellant
v.
James Earl DOTSON, Appellee.
Page 1142
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, 15th Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for appellees.
BOYD, Chief Justice.
These consolidated cases are before the Court on appeal from decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in which that court held a state law unconstitutional. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We find the district court's rulings erroneous and therefore reverse.
The state accused appellee Bussey of agreeing, consenting, or offering to sell heroin, a controlled substance, and then selling another substance, a compound of caffeine and methapyrilene, in lieu of heroin, in violation of section 817.563, Florida Statutes (1981). Bussey moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The state appealed and the district court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. State v. Bussey, 444 So.2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
Appellees Gaines and Dotson were also charged separately with the offense proscribed by section 817.563. Both moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds. The trial courts denied the motions. Both men were convicted. However, on appeal the convictions were reversed on the authority of State v. Bussey. Dotson v. State, 446 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Gaines v. State, 444 So.2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
Section 817.563 provides:
It is unlawful for any person to agree, consent, or in any manner offer to unlawfully sell to any person a controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03 and then sell to such person any other
Page 1143
substance in lieu of such controlled substance. Any person who violates this section with respect to:(1) A controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03(1), (2), (3), or (4) is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) A controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03(5) is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
The district court of appeal found several constitutional infirmities affecting the statute. First, the court found due process principles violated by the lack of a sufficient requirement of intent. Second, the court found the statute vague due to the lack of clarity about what degree and quality of intent is required. Third, the court also suggested that the statute is invalid for lack of a rational connection to a legitimate state purpose.
On the question of intent, the district court reasoned that the statute is essentially a measure against fraud and that therefore proof of specific intent is necessary under historical common-law principles now considered part of the concept of due process. We do not agree that the statute is aimed at preventing fraud. The legislature, in enacting section 817.563, was not concerned with protecting persons illegally purchasing controlled substances from the danger of being sold bogus controlled substances. The district court noted that "[t]he statute is a fraud measure contained in Chapter 817, Florida Statutes, governing 'Fraudulent Practices.' " 444 So.2d at 64. This observation does not establish that the statute is a fraud measure. The arrangement and classification of laws for purposes of codification in the Florida Statutes is an administrative function of the Joint Legislative Management Committee of the Florida Legislature. § 11.242, Fla.Stat. (1983). The classification of a law or a part of a law in a particular title or chapter of Florida Statutes is not determinative on the issue of legislative intent, though it may be persuasive in certain circumstances. Where there is a question, established principles of statutory construction must be utilized. It seems clear to us that section 817.563 is not a fraud statute; it is not designed to protect illegal drug users and dealers from fraudulent representations by other dealers. We find that the statute is merely a part of the law of this state pertaining to drug abuse prevention and control and is rationally...
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Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, Nos. 77,308
...their substantive rights. Substantive due process may implicate, among other things, the definition of an offense, see State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141 (Fla.1985); Baker v. State, 377 So.2d 17 (Fla.1979); the burden and standard of proof of elements and defenses, see, e.g., State v. Cohen, 5......
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NORTH FLA. WOMEN'S HEALTH SERVICES v. State, No. SC01-843.
...is on the challenger to demonstrate that the law does not bear a reasonable relationship to a proper state objective. State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 1985).18 On the other hand, under "strict" scrutiny, which applies to legislation impinging on certain fundamental rights, just t......
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Westerheide v. State, No. 5D99-785.
...960. Substantive due process implicates the vagueness doctrine. Id. (citing Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991); State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141 (Fla.1985); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 10. The term "likely" is also typically defined in dictionaries as meaning "probably." See e.g......
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Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, No. SC06-688
...of an impingement upon constitutional rights ... an act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional.") (quoting State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla.1985)); Bunnell v. State, 453 So.2d 808, 809 (Fla.1984) (stating in review of single subject challenge that "legislative acts ar......
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Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, Nos. 77,308
...their substantive rights. Substantive due process may implicate, among other things, the definition of an offense, see State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141 (Fla.1985); Baker v. State, 377 So.2d 17 (Fla.1979); the burden and standard of proof of elements and defenses, see, e.g., State v. Cohen, 5......
-
NORTH FLA. WOMEN'S HEALTH SERVICES v. State, No. SC01-843.
...is on the challenger to demonstrate that the law does not bear a reasonable relationship to a proper state objective. State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 1985).18 On the other hand, under "strict" scrutiny, which applies to legislation impinging on certain fundamental rights, just t......
-
Westerheide v. State, No. 5D99-785.
...960. Substantive due process implicates the vagueness doctrine. Id. (citing Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991); State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141 (Fla.1985); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 10. The term "likely" is also typically defined in dictionaries as meaning "probably." See e.g......
-
Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, No. SC06-688
...of an impingement upon constitutional rights ... an act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional.") (quoting State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla.1985)); Bunnell v. State, 453 So.2d 808, 809 (Fla.1984) (stating in review of single subject challenge that "legislative acts ar......