State v. Butler

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Citation: 69 So. 771,70 Fla. 102
• Parties: STATE ex rel. WEST, Atty. Gen. v. BUTLER.
• Decision Date: 09 July 1915

69 So. 771

70 Fla. 102

STATE ex rel. WEST, Atty. Gen.
v.
BUTLER.

Florida Supreme Court

July 9, 1915

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Legislation creating judicial officers to exercise the powers of a co-ordinate department of the government should accord with organic law affecting that subject.

While the lawmaking power of the Legislature is limited only by the express and clearly implied provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, and while all fair intendments should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a duly enacted statute, yet the provisions expressed and implied of the Constitution are superior to legislative enactments, and the Constitution must prevail where a statute conflicts therewith; and where the terms of a statute plainly conflict with an applicable provision of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court, in proceedings where the matter is appropriately presented, to 'support, protect and defend the Constitution,' by giving effect to its provisions, even if in doing so the statute is held to be inoperative.

Express or implied provisions of the Constitution cannot be altered, contracted, or enlarged by legislative enactments.

A legislative construction of an ambiguous or uncertain provision of organic law may be persuasive; but constitutional provisions that are clear and explicit in terms or made so by the history of their adoption and by long-continted application and recognition in governmental proceedings cannot be given by legislation a meaning that conflicts with the terms of such clear and explicit provisions.

In construing and applying provisions of a Constitution, the leading purpose should be to ascertain and effectuate the intent and object designed to be accomplished.

In determining the meaning of words in a Constitution, they should be taken not separately, but in conjunction with other words, and should be considered in the light of the purpose of the lawmakers as shown by the provisions as an entirety. When words may import different meanings, they should have the meaning and effect designed to be given them as appears by a fair consideration of the whole context in view of the object intended to be accomplished.

Every word of a state Constitution should be given its intended meaning and effect, and essential provisions of a Constitution are to be regarded as being mandatory.

Where numerals are used in a Constitution to indicate a definite number in express provisions, as one judge, or three justices, or five county commissioners, or a tax of one mill, the number expressed should be regarded as a limitation excluding other and different numbers unless the entire context clearly shows a different intent.

Implied repeals, amendments, and modifications of organic provisions occur only when the provisions as adopted are positively and irreconcilably repugnant to each other, and then only to the extent of the repugnancy.

Distinct provisions of the Constitution are repugnant to each other only when they relate to the same subject, are adopted for the same purpose, and cannot be enforced without material and substantial conflict.

While the terms of an organic provision will not be strained to imply a limitation upon the lawmaking power of the Legislature, yet, where express and definite limitations are imposed by a separate section of the organic law, amendments of other sections of the Constitution will not be construed to remove such fixed limitations further than the terms of the amendments fairly require.

Words of terms used in a Constitution which is dependent upon a ratification by the people must be interpreted in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption.

A Constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time and another at some subsequent time, when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable.

Where a particular construction has been generally accepted and acted upon, and especially when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand the intention of the instrument, a strong presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the intention.

Where a constitutional provision will bear two constructions, one of which is consistent with, and the other inconsistent with, an intention expressed clearly in a previous section, the former must be adopted, that both provisions may stand and have effect.

A construction of the Constitution which renders superfluous or meaningless or inoperative any of its provisions should not be adopted by the courts.

A construction that nullifies a specific clause will not be given to a Constitution unless absolutely required by the context.

In the construction of the Constitution, courts have nothing to do with the argument from inconvenience; their duty being simply to declare what the Constitution provides.

The Constitution was intended to be exact in its limitations of power, not to be changed, except in such particular and deliberate way as to render as certain as practicable that the electors desired it, evidenced by an expression of judgment after ample time and facility for investigation and maturity of thought on the subject.

Under section 8 of article 5 of the Constitution there is an express limitation of one circuit judge to each judicial circuit of the state, and, as this limitation has not been removed by the amendment of such section in 1901-02, or by amendment of section 35 of article 5 in 1909-10, or by the amendment of section 1 of article 5 in 1913-14, the provision of section 1 of chapter 6899, Acts 1915, purporting to authorize two circuit judges for one judicial circuit, is in conflict with the Constitution and inoperative.

Cockrell and Ellis, JJ., dissenting.

Quo warranto by th State, on the relation of T. F. West, Attorney General, against J. Turner Butler. Ordered tht judgment of ouster be entered.

The following is the information filed herein:

COUNSEL [69 So. 776] [70 Fla. 119] T. F. West, Atty. Gen., and C. M. Cooper, of Jacksonville, for relator.

Cockrell & Cockrell, J. C. Cooper & Son, E. J. L'Engle, Axtell & Rinehart, F. P. Fleming, Carter & McCollum, Wm. H. Baker, Odom & Crawford, Geo. M. Powell, Kay & Doggett, and Knight & Adair, all of Jacksonville, Jas. E. Calkins, of Fernandina, H. E. Merryday, of Palatka, and John E. & Julian Hartridge, of Jacksonville, for respondent. [69 So. 773] [70 Fla. 105] The following is the information filed herein:

'In the Supreme Court of the State of Florida

'In the name and by the authority of the state of Florida, Thomas F. West, as the Attorney General of the state of Florida, who sues for the state of Florida and for the people of the state of Florida in this behalf, comes here before the Supreme Court of the state of Florida, on this 14th day of June, during the June term of said court in the year 1915, and while said court is sitting, and [70 Fla. 106] hereby gives the said court to understand and be informed that J. Turner Butler, a resident and citizen of and in said state and the county of Duval, now and for some time last past has used, enjoyed, exercised, and performed, and still does use, enjoy, exercise, and perform, all without warrant or authority of law, and in violation of the Constitution of the state of Florida, the franchise, functions, jurisdiction and powers of circuit judge of the Twelfth judicial circuit of the state of Florida, as hereinafter set forth, and said office and the franchise, functions, jurisdiction, and powers thereof the said J. Turner Butler during the time aforesaid usurped and still does usurp, within the state of Florida and within the jurisdiction of this court, upon the state aforesaid and the people of the state aforesaid, to their great damage and prejudice. And the Attorney General aforesaid of the state aforesaid further gives the court to understand and be informed as follows:

'(1) That it is claimed or pretended by the said J. Turner Butler that he is such circuit judge of the Twelfth judicial circuit of the state of Florida, by appointment of the Governor of said state, under and by virtue of an act of the Legislature of the state of Florida, which act is as follows:

"An act creating an additional judicial circuit in the state of Florida, to be designated the Twelfth judicial circuit, and providing for two additional circuit judges therefor, and defining and fixing the territorial limits and boundaries of the Fourth, Eighth and Twelfth judicial circuits, and prescribing when said circuit courts shall take jurisdiction, and the effect on pending cases, and the time for holding the term of court in the Fourth and Twelfth judicial circuits.

[70 Fla. 107] "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Florida:

"Section 1. There is hereby created and established an additional judicial circuit in the state of Florida, to be known and designated the Twelfth judicial circuit of the state of Florida. This additional judicial circuit shall be composed of the counties of Duval and Nassau. And for this additional judicial circuit there shall be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate two additional circuit judges other than the judge of the circuit court for Duval county under section 42 of article V of the Florida Constitution.

"Sec. 2. The Fourth judicial circuit of the state of Florida shall be composed of the counties of St. Johns, Clay and Putnam.

"Sec. 3. The Eighth judicial circuit of the state of Florida shall be composed of the counties of Alachua, Bradford, Levy and Baker.

"Sec. 4. On and after the seventh day of June, A. D. 1915, the circuit courts of the Fourth, Eighth

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