State v. Butterfield

• Docket Number: Cum-24-282
• Decision Date: 26 June 2025
• Citation: State v. Butterfield, 2025 ME 57, Cum-24-282 (Me. Jun 26, 2025)
• Parties: STATE OF MAINE v. DAMION L. BUTTERFIELD
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

1

2025 ME 57

STATE OF MAINE v. DAMION L. BUTTERFIELD

No. Cum-24-282

Supreme Court of Maine

June 26, 2025

Argued: May 6, 2025

Reporter of Decisions

James P. Howaniec, Esq.(orally), Lewiston, for appellantDamion L Butterfield

Aaron M. Frey, Esq., Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta for appelleeState of Maine

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

LIPEZ J.

[¶1]Damion L. Butterfield appeals from a judgment of conviction of murder and other offenses, entered by the trial court(Cumberland County, MG Kennedy, J.) following his plea of guilty.He contends that the court abused its discretion by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea, which was entered after trial but before the jury announced its verdict, and by denying his motion for a new trial.Butterfield also appeals from his sentence of thirty-five years in prison.SeeState v. Butterfield,No. SRP-24-283(Me. Sent.Rev. PanelJul. 31, 2024)(granting leave to appeal the sentence).We disagree that the court abused its discretion and affirm Butterfield's conviction.We dismiss Butterfield's appeal of his sentence because discretionary review is unavailable for a sentence imposed pursuant to a joint recommendation of the parties.See15 M.R.S. § 2151(2)(2025);M.R.U. Crim. P. 11A(a)(4);State v. Bean,2018 ME 58, ¶ 20, 184 A.3d 373.

I.BACKGROUND

A.Facts

[¶2]We draw the following facts from the evidence admitted at trial as well as the State's recitation of the evidence at the time of Butterfield's guilty plea.^[1]SeeState v. Weyland,2020 ME 129, ¶ 2, 240 A.3d 841;M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), (e).

[¶3] Shortly after midnight on April 26, 2022, Jonathan Geisinger, Thomas McDonald, and Damion Butterfield dropped off Anthony Osborne at Burger King in Portland.Osborne was there to meet the two victims in this case-a man and a woman-who had contacted Osborne earlier in the night looking to obtain drugs.As it turned out, Osborne did not have drugs and instead hoped to obtain drugs from the victims.

[¶4] A short time later, Osborne sent a text message directing Geisinger, McDonald, and Butterfield to an address in Portland.Upon arriving at that address, Geisinger, McDonald, and Butterfield encountered Osborne and the two victims.A scuffle ensued involving Geisinger, McDonald, Butterfield, and the male victim.

[¶5] The female victim then saw a tall male, later identified as Butterfield, pull out a gun and shoot the male victim twice while the other two men involved in the scuffle ran away.Butterfield then approached the female victim, ordered her to get down on her knees, and shot at her twice before he, too, ran away.

[¶6] The male victim died from gunshot wounds to his abdomen.The female victim, who sustained an injury to her arm and had bullet holes in her hat and coat, survived.

B.Procedure

[¶7] Butterfield was charged with murder and attempted murder by criminal complaint on June 8, 2022, and arrested the same day.One month later, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Butterfield with intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A)(2025)(Count 1); aggravated attempted murder with a firearm (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 152-A(1)(A)-(B)(2025)(Count 2); possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(1)(2022)^[2](Count 3); and robbery (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 651(1)(E)(2025)(Count 4).Butterfield entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment.

[¶8]The court held a jury trial starting on December 6, 2023.On the evening of December 14(the night before closing arguments), the court informed the parties via email that it intended to grant the State's request to instruct the jury on accomplice liability.The next day, the court gave the instruction over Butterfield's objections that it was not generated by the evidence and represented an unfair late-in-the-game shift from the State's theory that Butterfield was the shooter.

[¶9] On December 19, 2023, while the jury was deliberating, Butterfield elected to plead guilty as charged in return for a jointly recommended sentence of thirty-five years' imprisonment.He decided to accept the State's offer after several notes from the jury convinced him that the jury was likely to find him guilty as an accomplice to murder.Defense counsel strongly opposed the change of plea.Butterfield, however, proceeded with the unconditional plea^[3]even after being informed that the jury had reached a verdict.The court conducted two change-of-plea colloquies on the record, one in chambers and one in open court, before ultimately accepting Butterfield's guilty plea.^[4] The jury was dismissed without announcing its verdict.

[¶10] Two weeks later, Butterfield timely moved to withdraw his plea and for a new trial.SeeM.R.U. Crim. P. 32(d), 33.The court denied both motions after hearing.At a sentencing proceeding held on June 13, 2024, the court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of thirty-five years' imprisonment.^[5]

[¶11] Butterfield filed a timely notice of appeal and application to allow an appeal of sentence.See15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-2157(2025);M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20.The Sentence Review Panel granted the application, and the sentence appeal proceeded as part of the appeal from the conviction.State v. Butterfield,No. SRP-24-283(Me. Sent.Rev. PanelJul. 31, 2024);seeM.R. App. P. 20(g), (h).

II.DISCUSSION

[¶12] Butterfield contends broadly that "the trial and unusual plea process" were not fundamentally fair and resulted in a due process violation.As he acknowledged at oral argument, however, our appellate review of a conviction entered upon an unconditional guilty plea is limited to an examination of the denial of any subsequent motion to withdraw the plea.^[6]SeeWeyland,2020 ME 129, ¶¶ 16-32, 240 A.3d 841(reviewing denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea);State v. Adams,2018 ME 60, ¶¶ 11, 13, 184 A.3d 875(dismissing direct appeal of unconditional guilty plea in light of our "long-standing jurisprudence strictly limiting direct appeal following a guilty plea");State v. Plummer,2008 ME 22, ¶ 2, 939 A.2d 687(dismissing appeal from guilty plea "[i]n the absence of either a conditional guilty plea . . ., or a motion to withdraw the guilty plea before sentencing").We accordingly proceed to review the denial of Butterfield's motion to withdraw his plea as well as the associated motion for a new trial.Finally, we address Butterfield's appeal from his sentence.

A.Motion to Withdraw Plea

[¶13]"We review the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion."Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶ 16, 240 A.3d 841.Factual determinations are reviewed for clear error.Id.¶ 19.We have explained that '''[a]lthough relief should be granted liberally, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea.'Instead, the trial court's decision must be 'based upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case with the ultimate purpose of furthering justice.'"Id.¶ 17(citations omitted)(first quoting State v. Hillman,2000 ME 71, ¶ 7, 749 A.2d 758; and then quoting State v. Malo,577 A.2d 332, 333(Me.1990)).The relevant factors, which the court thoroughly analyzed, are "(1) the length of time between the defendant's entering the plea and seeking to withdraw it; (2) any prejudice to the State that would result if the plea were withdrawn; (3)the defendant's assertion of innocence; and (4) any deficiency in the Rule 11 proceeding."Id.¶ 18.On appeal, Butterfield focuses primarily on the fourth factor, arguing that the trial court's decision to "blindsid[e]" him with "an eleventh[-]hour accomplice liability instruction" led to a "poisoned" process that ultimately rendered his plea involuntary.We reject his contentions and, upon review of all four factors, affirm the court's exercise of its discretion to deny Butterfield's motion to withdraw his plea.

[¶14]We turn first to the timing of the motion.Butterfield waited only fourteen days before seeking to withdraw his plea.Seeid.¶ 19 n.3 (noting that "[w]e have held that nineteen days weighed in favor of granting a motion and that three months weighed against granting a motion"(citations omitted)).The court determined that the prompt filing of the motion was the sole factor that lay in Butterfield's favor but that it did not "outweigh the remaining factors and other circumstances."We agree with the trial court that although Butterfield filed his motion quickly, his rapid change of heart is not dispositive.Instead, we must examine the remaining factors.Cf.id.¶ 21(analyzing all four factors even when motion was filed only twenty-two days after the plea);Hillman, 2000 ME 71, ¶ 9, 749 A.2d 758.

[¶15]We next consider whether allowing Butterfield to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial-in this case, for a second time-would prejudice the State by "seriously compromis[ing]the State's case."Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶ 22, 240 A.3d 841(alteration and quotation marks omitted).Here, the court found that although the State did not articulate any such prejudice, the deceased victim's family and the surviving victim would endure trauma during a second trial.The court was rightfully sensitive to this concern.Nonetheless, we emphasize that we will consider "the retraumatization of victims" in this context only if it "affect[s]the State's ability to present its case,"id.¶ 23, a finding absent from this record.Even so, as discussed below, we conclude that the court appropriately determined that the balance of factors weighed against granting Butterfield's motion.Seeid;Hillman,2000 ME 71, ¶ 10, 749 A.2d 758.

[¶16] The...