State v. Butterfly

• Decision Date: 16 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. DA 15–0391.,DA 15–0391.
• Citation: 2016 MT 195,377 P.3d 1191,384 Mont. 287
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roderick Lee BUTTERFLY, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

384 Mont. 287

377 P.3d 1191

2016 MT 195

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Roderick Lee BUTTERFLY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 15–0391.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs July 20, 2016.

Decided Aug. 16, 2016.

For Appellant: Jacquelyn M. Hughes, Hughes Law, P.L.L.C., Billings, Montana.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Mary Leffers Barry, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana.

Justice BETH BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Third Judicial District Court dismissed Powell County escape charges against Roderick Lee Butterfly when the parties agreed to venue in Yellowstone County. After almost seven months, the State re-filed the charges in Yellowstone County. The principal dispute in this appeal is whether that time should count in analyzing Butterfly's speedy trial claim. The District Court ruled that the speedy trial clock did not start running at all until the Yellowstone County charges were filed. Although we count the time somewhat differently, we agree that Butterfly was not denied a speedy trial. We affirm the denial of his motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On October 10, 2013, Butterfly failed to return to the Billings Pre–Release Center as scheduled. He was charged with escape in violation of § 45–7–306, MCA

, the following day in Powell County. Butterfly was arrested in Glacier County and was transferred to Montana State Prison (MSP). Butterfly objected to the Powell County venue, asserting that he should have been charged in Yellowstone County where the alleged offense took place. The State stipulated that venue was proper in Yellowstone County.

¶ 3 The State then moved to dismiss the escape charge without prejudice based on the parties' stipulation of proper venue. The Powell County District Court granted the State's motion and dismissed the case without prejudice on February 11, 2014. Nearly seven months later, on September 8, 2014, the State filed the escape charges in Yellowstone County. Butterfly was transferred from MSP to the Yellowstone County Detention Facility for prosecution. Trial was set for February 9, 2015.

¶ 4 Before trial, Butterfly filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of speedy trial, arguing that 445 days would have passed by the time he appeared for trial. Butterfly asserted that his right to speedy trial had attached upon his initial appearance on the Powell County charge and continued throughout the charge's dismissal and its pending re-filing in Yellowstone County. Butterfly attributed the excessive delay to the State and claimed that he had suffered prejudice because of it.

¶ 5 Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Butterfly's motion to dismiss. It concluded that Butterfly's right to a speedy trial had not attached until the charges were re-filed in Yellowstone County—155 days before trial. The court also analyzed the alleged speedy trial violation under the factors articulated in State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶¶ 106–112, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815

, and concluded that there was “insufficient prejudice” to Butterfly to constitute a speedy trial violation. Butterfly later pleaded guilty to the escape charge, reserving the right to appeal the speedy trial issue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 A speedy trial violation presents a question of constitutional law that we review de novo to determine whether the court correctly interpreted and applied the law. State v. Zimmerman, 2014 MT 173, ¶ 11, 375 Mont. 374, 328 P.3d 1132

(citing Ariegwe, ¶ 119). We review the court's underlying factual findings for clear error. Zimmerman, ¶ 11.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 Did the District Court err in denying Butterfly's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial?

¶ 8 The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution

guarantee every accused person the right to a speedy trial. Zimmerman, ¶ 12. When an accused claims that right has been violated, we consider (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the accused's responses to the delay, and (4) prejudice to the accused as a result of the delay. Zimmerman, ¶ 12. We balance these factors “with any other relevant circumstances to determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” State v. Stops, 2013 MT 131, ¶ 19, 370 Mont. 226, 301 P.3d 811. “[E]ach factor's significance will vary from case to case,” and “a given factor may outweigh all of the others in one case but be of little consequence in another.” Ariegwe, ¶ 105.

(1) Length of the Delay

¶ 9 We determine initially whether the length of the delay is at least 200 days, “which is the trigger date for conducting the four-factor balancing test.” Zimmerman, ¶ 13. In the present case, the District Court found that Butterfly “first became an accused on September 8, 2014, the date [he] was charged with Escape in Yellowstone County.” The interval between the Yellowstone County filing and trial was 155 days. The court concluded, “Because the interval between the accusation and the trial is less than 200 days it does not trigger any analysis under the four [Ariegwe] factors or the balancing of those factors.”

¶ 10 Butterfly argues that the District Court erred in determining that his speedy trial right did not attach until he was charged in Yellowstone County. Butterfly contends that “the length of delay runs from the time of accusation” and “as soon as an individual is subjected to proceedings for an offense.” Butterfly claims that this Court “has not specifically addressed when the speedy trial clock starts running if a charge is filed, dismissed and subsequently re-filed.” He relies on State v. Daniels, 248 Mont. 343, 811 P.2d 1286 (1991)

, in which we concluded that a defendant's right to a speedy trial attached upon a petition charging the defendant for burglary in youth court despite the charge being later transferred to district court. Daniels, 248 Mont. at 349, 811 P.2d at 1289. Butterfly argues that, “like Daniels, [he] was subject to criminal proceedings regarding exactly the same charge for exactly the same conduct a full year before the [information] was filed in Yellowstone County.”

¶ 11 The State agrees that the District Court erred in its determination that the speedy trial right attached only when the charges were filed in Yellowstone County. Relying on United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982)

, however, the State argues that “the speedy trial clock stops running while the charges are dismissed.” The State maintains that the speedy trial clock started running when the charge was filed in Powell County, stopped when the charge was dismissed, and began running again when the charge was re-filed in Yellowstone County. The State contends that Daniels is distinguishable “because Daniels was continuously subject to charges in either the youth court or the district court.” Here, in contrast, “[t]here was not a charge pending against Butterfly from the time the charge was dismissed in Powell County until he was charged in Yellowstone County.”

¶ 12 Butterfly attacks the State's reliance on MacDonald because it dealt with an arrest on a military investigation and “there is a question whether a military investigation constitutes a formal charging for speedy trial issues.” Butterfly points out the MacDonald Court's acknowledgment that in United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.1976)

, the speedy trial clock did not stop between the time charges were dismissed in one district and subsequently re-filed in another district. He contends that the factual scenario in Avalos is more applicable to his case because he was not in the same position he would have been in a pre-filing investigation. Because of the escape charge “hanging over his head,” Butterfly contends that he “was not free to go about discharging his other sentence.”

¶ 13 The right to a speedy trial is intended to

minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.

MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1502

.

¶ 14 In MacDonald, a military physician was accused of committing murder on a military base. The Army charged MacDonald with the murders, but dropped the charges after several months and MacDonald was honorably discharged. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 4–5, 102 S.Ct. at 1500

. Four years later, the government obtained an indictment in federal district court charging MacDonald with murder. MacDonald claimed that the delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fourth Circuit agreed. The United States Supreme Court reversed. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 11, 102 S.Ct. at 1503. The Court concluded that the speedy trial guarantee did not attach to the time period after dismissal of the military charges and before the civil indictment. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 7–8, 102 S.Ct. at 1501–02. The Court reasoned that during that time there was no pretrial incarceration, no impairment of liberty associated with being released on bail, and no “disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1502. The Court stated, “Following dismissal of charges, any restraint on liberty, disruption of employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public obloquy, stress and anxiety is no greater than it is upon anyone openly subject to a criminal investigation.” MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 9, 102 S.Ct. at 1502.

¶ 15 As Butterfly points out, the MacDonald Court noted that the Fifth Circuit had “reached a seemingly contrary result” in Avalos by counting the time between indictments. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 7 n. 7, 102 S.Ct....