State v. Byrne
| Decision Date | 21 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | DA 19-0420 |
| Parties | STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. CHARLES MICHAEL BYRNE, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Haley Connell Jackson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Kathryn McEnery, Powell County Attorney, Patrick Moody, Deputy County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana
¶1 A jury convicted Charles M. Byrne in the Third Judicial District Court, Powell County, of three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent (SIWC) with a victim twelve years old or younger, in violation of § 45-5-503(4)(a), MCA (2009). Byrne appeals his conviction and presents the following issue[1] for review:
Did eliciting testimony that vouched for M.G.'s credibility and personally commenting on M.G.'s reliability as a witness undermine Byrne's right to a fair trial?
¶2 We reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶3 In 2018, the State charged Byrne with three counts of felony SIWC for conduct that occurred between 2009 and 2011. The victim, M.G., was under the age of twelve at the time of the offenses and fifteen at the time of trial. Byrne denied the allegations.
¶4 Byrne filed a motion in limine to bar the State from eliciting lay or expert testimony vouching for M.G.'s credibility. In his motion, Byrne acknowledged that Montana allows expert witnesses to testify directly about the credibility of a victim who testifies in a child sexual abuse trial, but argued that, to render that opinion, the expert must be properly qualified, citing State v Scheffelman, 250 Mont. 334, 342, 820 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1991) (citing State v. Geyman, 224 Mont. 194, 729 P.2d 475 (1986)). He moved the court to exclude opinion testimony of M.G.'s credibility without appropriate qualification of the expert witness. The State responded that it "agree[d] that commenting on the victim's credibility is generally barred absent laying foundation for that opinion as an expert opinion" and that it did not intend to introduce such evidence. Later, the State confirmed that Byrne's motion to bar lay witnesses from proffering expert opinions was unopposed but stated that it "reserve[d] the right to proffer experts when proper foundation is laid." At a motions hearing, Byrne again reiterated that he was "trying to keep out the expert getting on the stand and saying this child is a credible witness . . . the stipulation by [the prosecutor] is that he will not be eliciting from the expert, you know, do you believe the child . . . ." The State assured the District Court and Byrne that it would not ask any questions regarding whether M.G. was credible:
The court acknowledged a narrow exception to the rule that expert witnesses cannot testify to an alleged child victim's credibility but noted that a specific foundation must be laid first. The following exchange then occurred:
At the final pretrial hearing, the court noted that "the Defense motions uh, as to credibility and those kinds of things uh, are stipulated by the State . . ." and The District Court ruled that "[e]verything was stipulated and so all the motions that were made that were agreed to are granted."
¶5 During its opening statement at trial, the State emphasized that the important issue for the jury to decide was why M.G. would lie:
[Prosecutor]: During the course of this testimony, I'm going to be asking you to evaluate one important question. Why would [M.G.] lie to you? Why would she subject herself to coming here and sitting in front of twelve strangers and telling you about the three worst days of her life? It's an important question.
The State then proceeded to question four of its witnesses regarding M.G.'s credibility. The following are relevant excerpts from the witnesses' testimony.
¶6 Wendy Dutton testified as a blind expert witness for the State. Among other topics, the State questioned Dutton about malicious false reports of sexual abuse and whether children ever misidentify their abuser. Though she did not give exact statistics, Dutton responded that it is "rare" and "doesn't happen very often."
Dutton qualified her statement, saying that little research has been done on the subject because controlled studies would be both unethical and illegal. The only studies that are conducted involve closed cases that were subsequently investigated and then determined to be malicious false reports. The characteristics of these post-hoc cases are then studied.
¶7 Fredericka Grunhuvd, a therapist who worked with M.G. for several years before and after the alleged abuse and who worked closely with M.G.'s family, testified about M.G.'s oppositional defiance disorder diagnosis and a disclosure M.G. made to Lisa (M.G.'s mother) about inappropriate touching.
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to clarify Grunhuvd's testimony and asked if M.G. showed signs of untruthfulness.
On redirect, the State referred to Grunhuvd's testimony about M.G.'s "rare untruthfulness."
¶8 Jane Hammett, a registered nurse who conducted M.G.'s forensic interview and medical exam, testified as an expert about her findings. The State asked Hammett if during the forensic interview she saw signs of dishonesty.
¶9 Finally, Gina Dalrymple, a therapist who worked with M.G. after the alleged abuse, also testified about her therapy sessions with M.G. Dalrymple testified that on one occasion she had a conversation with M.G. about the allegations against Byrne, though M.G. did not provide details.
Defense counsel objected, but the District Court overruled without explanation. Dalrymple responded, "No."
¶10 At trial, Lisa testified that while living in Deer Lodge M.G.'s family became friends with Byrne, his wife Rachel and their two children. The...
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