State v. Bzdyra
| Decision Date | 06 November 1973 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Anthony J. BZDYRA. |
Igor I. Sikorsky, Jr., Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
George D. Stoughton, Chief Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was John D. LaBelle, State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.
On April 20, 1972, the defendant, Anthony J. Bzdyra, shot and killed his brother Chester Bzdyra. He was charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55(a)(1) of the General Statutes and, on a trial to the court, was found guilty as charged. He has appealed to this court from the judgment.
Although the defendant has made ten assignments of error, he has briefed only the claim that the court erred in finding that the state had proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in that it had failed to prove intent, one of the elements of the crime charged. This claim is contained in several of the assignments of error. The remaining assignments, not having been briefed, are treated as abandoned. Housing Authority v. Dorsey, 164 Conn. 247, 248, 320 A.2d 820; State v. Kohlfuss, 152 Conn. 625, 635, 211 A.2d 143; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 327.
The court found the following facts, none of which is disputed in this appeal: The defendant called his brother to pick him up at the residence of Juanita Hagins at about noon of April 20, 1972. The brothers left together and returned to the Hagins residence at about 7 p.m., at which time the defendant was armed with a shotgun and with a pistol in his belt. He threatened to kill Juanita Hagins and her children and took out the pistol-behavior which frightened Linda Hagins, the daughter of Juanita. The two brothers left the house and returned again about 8:15 p.m. The defendant had the pistol in his pants. The defendant went upstairs, and then came back and told his brother, who was watching television, to go upstairs with him. The defendant called Juanita Hagins and asked for shells for the shotgun, which she gave him. Ten or fifteen minutes later Juanita Hagins heard the sound of a gunshot. Juanita went upstairs and found Chester Bzdyra lying across the foot of her bed, still alive. Juanita Hagins said that the defendant told her that he had had a stupid accident and shot his brother. The defendant had the gun in his pocket but then took it out. Juanita told the defendant to call an ambulance and to get Chester to the hospital. He said that he should finish killing his brother because he was no good. After Juanita had gone downstairs, Linda Hagins heard a noise which sounded like a bump. When the police arrived shortly after 9 p.m., the body of Chester Bzdrya was still in the house, but was lying on the floor in the bedroom. Although Juanita Hagins testified that she had seen no wound, the police found the body on the floor in a large amount of blood. There was blood on the back of the neck, on a jacket, on the bed, and on the floor next to the body. When the defendant was apprehended by the police, he was walking, completely sober, toward his residence, four or five miles from the place of the shooting, and he had bloodstains on his shirt. When the police found the body of Chester Bzdyra, they noticed that two buttons which they found in the room had been ripped from his shirt. The bullet which killed Chester Bzdyra struck him in the neck and traveled downward through the right lung to the back. The police were unable to find the gun which had been used to fire the fatal bullet. At the trial the defendant's father and brother Edward stated that there were no quarrels between Chester and the defendant.
Section 53a-55(a) provides that '(a) person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person. . . .' There is no question that it was incumbent upon the state to prove a specific intent to cause serious physical injury because intent to achieve a result is an element of the crime charged. State v. Bitting, 162 Conn. 1, 5, 291 A.2d 240. The defendant maintains that no evidence was introduced to show the existence of that specific intent and that the court was in error in inferring intent from the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the killing.
Intent may be, and usually is, inferred from conduct. State v. Cofone, 164 Conn. 162, 164, 319 A.2d 381; State v. Smith, 157 Conn. 351, 354, 254 A.2d 447. Intention is a mental process, and of necessity it must be proved by the statements or actions of the person whose act is being scrutinized. State v. Cofone, supra, 164 Conn. 162, 164, 319 A.2d 381; State v. Mazzadra, 141 Conn. 731, 735, 109 A.2d 873. A person's intention is to be inferred from his conduct; Kiernan v. Borst, 144 Conn. 1, 6, 126 A.2d 569; and generally can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 87, 147 A.2d 686. 'The law recognizes no distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence so far as probative force is concerned.' State v. Smith, 138 Conn. 196, 200, 82 A.2d 816, 819. Intent is a question of fact, the determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one. State v. Farrah, 161 Conn. 43, 49, 282 A.2d 879. Thus the only real question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had the intent to commit serious bodily injury when he shot his brother.
The statements and conduct of the defendant and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the killing convince us that the inference was properly drawn. While none of the facts presented in this case, taken singly, is decisive on the issue of intent, the cumulative effect of a number of salient facts was sufficient to permit the trier to find that intent had been proved. The first of these facts was the use of a gun. State v. Litman, 106 Conn. 345, 352, 138 A. 132, 134.
In addition to the use of a deadly weapon, with which the defendant had earlier threatened the life of Juanita Hagins and her children, there were numerous 'other circumstances' supporting the inference of intent. The defendant called his brother to join him upstairs and shortly thereafter asked for shells for the shotgun....
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State v. Montanez, No. 17087.
... ... 6 See General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(5) (assault in first degree by means of discharge of firearm requires proof of "intent to cause physical injury to another person"); State ... Page 934 ... v. Bzdyra, 165 Conn. 400, 403, 334 A.2d 917 (1973) (manslaughter in first degree requires proof of specific intent "to cause serious physical injury to another person" [internal quotation marks omitted]). The defendant argues that the trial court's instruction on general intent 7 "misled the jury into ... ...
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...[182 Conn. 388, 396, 438 A.2d 696 (1980) ]; see, e.g., State v. Holley, [174 Conn. 22, 26, 381 A.2d 539 (1977) ] State v. Bzdyra, 165 Conn. 400, 404-405, 334 A.2d 917 (1973); State v. Litman, 106 Conn. 345, 352-53, 138 A. 132 (1927). These inferences are necessary because the direct evidenc......