State v. C. P. (In re C.P.)

• Decision Date: 28 September 2022
• Docket Number: A173762
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the Matter of C. P., a Youth. v. C. P., Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent,

322 Or.App. 51

In the Matter of C. P., a Youth.

STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. C. P., Appellant.

A173762

Court of Appeals of Oregon

September 28, 2022

Argued and submitted March 1, 2022

Multnomah County Circuit Court 19JU08303; Petition Number 191108028; Amy Holmes Hehn, Judge.

Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Youth, Rights & Justice.

Gregory A. Rios, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and Pagán, Judge.

MOONEY, J.

The Oregon Constitution provides that the victim of a crime has the right "to be heard at the *** juvenile court delinquency disposition." Or Const, Art I, § 42(1)(a). The Juvenile Code provides that "reports and other material relating to the * * * adjudicated youth's history and prognosis in the record of the case or the supplemental confidential file are privileged and, except at the request of the * * * adjudicated youth, shall be withheld from public inspection except that" those files may be "open to inspection" by certain designated individuals or by "any other person" having a "legitimate need" to inspect the file, as determined by the juvenile court pursuant to ORS 419A.258. ORS 419A.255(2)(a), (b)(0); ORS 419A.255(1)(Q).^[1] Crime victims are not listed among the designated individuals to whom such privileged materials may be open to inspection.

The question presented by this case is whether the juvenile court erred when it granted the victim's ORS 419A.258 motion to inspect and copy a psychological report and a juvenile court counselor's (JCC's) report related to youth, which are contained in the supplemental confidential file of the juvenile court, based on its determination that the victim's constitutional right to be heard at youth's delinquency disposition gave rise to a "legitimate need" for the victim to inspect the contents of youth's supplemental confidential file. We conclude that the juvenile court erred insofar as it granted the victim's request to inspect and copy the "Psychological Report" prepared by Molly Persky PsyD, and the "Report to Court" prepared by youth's JCC. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the order regarding disclosure of records.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to the issue before us are not disputed. The victim rented a room in youth's home. Youth entered her room while she slept and then struck her in the head with a mallet. In the juvenile court, youth admitted to that conduct and also admitted that if he had been an adult at that time, his act would have constituted second-degree assault. The juvenile court accepted youth's admissions and, based on those admissions, adjudicated youth to be within the court's delinquency jurisdiction.

Before the dispositional hearing, the victim filed a motion under ORS 419A.258 requesting to inspect and copy portions of the juvenile court supplemental confidential file, including a psychological evaluation and a counselor's report pertaining to the youth. She argued that she needed to inspect those records "to facilitate [her] meaningful participation" in the case. Specifically, relying on both Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution and ORS 419C.273, she argued in the juvenile court that disclosure was necessary to preserve her right as a crime victim to "meaningfully participate" in critical stages of the juvenile court proceedings, including disposition. She argued that, as a crime victim, her "constitutional right to participate meaningfully in the prosecution of her abuser trumps state statutes that interfere with such participation." She also argued that a "right of a crime victim to discovery in her offender's criminal case is necessary to fulfill the wishes of the voters" who passed the ballot measure that added Article I, section 42, to the Oregon Constitution.

More specifically, the victim asserted that disclosure would help her to "rebut" youth's anticipated reliance on matters reflected in the psychological report to mitigate his responsibility for the assault and to request release to his parents rather than confinement at an Oregon Youth Authority facility. She also argued that she had an important interest in assessing whether information within the report concerning the assault was "accurate" to "ensure the safety of the community and the victim." In her view, disclosure pursuant to a protective order would sufficiently balance her interests and the interests of the public with youth's interest by allowing limited disclosure structured to safeguard youth's privacy interests.

Youth opposed the victim's motion, arguing that the requested reports are confidential and privileged under ORS 419A.255. He argued that the records contain details about mental health diagnoses and prescribed medications as well as matters ranging from youth's childhood struggles with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), toilet training, and bullying, to information about youth's parents, including divorce and custody issues and the parents' health and sobriety.

After a hearing and in camera review, the juvenile court granted the motion in part. It ordered the disclosure of the following specific records from the supplemental confidential file: police reports related to the underlying incident;^[2] youth's psychological evaluation; and the JCC's report to the court. The juvenile court, in a thoughtful decision from the bench, began by stating:

"I have carefully considered the materials provided by the parties. I find that the victim doesn't have a constitutional right per se to access to the records in the case file, because the listed rights under Oregon Constitutional Article I, Section 42(1), include specific and enumerated rights. And, I'm persuaded that those rights were limited for a reason.

"And, so-but, it is accurate *** that the victim has a right to be heard at any dispositional hearing, which is what we have coming up. And, * * * I agree with [the victim's counsel] that in order for that right of a victim to make a statement to be fully informed and is persuasive as the victim is entitled to it being, it needs to be an informed argument. And so I do view my analysis of 419A.258 through that lens."

The court further ruled that it would limit the victim's access to certain documents in the supplemental confidential file.

The juvenile court later issued a written order setting forth its findings regarding the relevant statutory interests under ORS 419A.258.^[3] In considering youth's privacy interest, the court found that the "protective order adequately addresses the concerns of the Youth and his family about disclosure of records to others not legitimately involved in these proceedings." As to the victim's interest, it found that "the interests of the victim in this case are significant and legitimate" and it adopted the reasons stated by the victim's lawyer. The court also found that "[t]he interest of the public in safety are similar to the victim's safety needs and interests."

Youth appeals that order. On appeal, youth contends that the victim did not establish a "legitimate need" for the reports, as required by ORS 419A.258(7)(a), and that the juvenile court erred in determining otherwise. In youth's view, the context and legislative history of ORS 419A.258 demonstrate that the confidentiality of juvenile records is paramount to the rights of crime victims in juvenile proceedings. He also argues that the court's consideration of the victim's interest was predicated on the incorrect legal premise that, to effectuate the victim's constitutional "right to be heard," she had a right to "be fully informed" and to make an "informed argument" to the court, which, in turn, supported a "legitimate need" for disclosure. Lastly, youth argues that, "[i]f a victim's right to be heard is construed to include a general right to 'informed argument' by means of disclosure of [confidential information], this would confer a de facto right to discovery upon the victim[.]"

The state's response is multifold. It contends that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, asserting both that the order granting the victim's motion is not appealable, and that, in any event, the appeal is moot because the records were disclosed as ordered. As for the merits, the state responds that the juvenile court did not err in allowing the victim access to youth's confidential records, and that the court correctly followed the governing statutory framework. Further, the state argues that the plain text of ORS 419A.258 demonstrates that the legislature intended for the interest of victims to be "on par with those of parties to a juvenile proceeding when it comes to the disclosure of confidential documents." As we explain, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, it is not moot and, further, the juvenile court erred in ordering disclosure.

II. APPEALABILITY AND MOOTNESS^[4]

We first consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. In particular, we consider (1) whether the disclosure order is an appealable order, and (2) whether the disclosure of the contents of the supplemental confidential file have rendered this appeal moot.

Youth asserts that this court "has jurisdiction pursuant to ORS 419A.200 and ORS 419A.205(1)(d)." ORS 419A.200(1) provides that "a party to a juvenile court proceeding *** whose rights or duties are adversely affected by a judgment of the juvenile court may appeal therefrom." "For the purpose of being appealed," ORS 419A205(1)(d) defines "judgment" to include "[a] final order adversely affecting the rights or duties of a party and made in a [juvenile]...