State v. Cabral

Citation122 R.I. 623,410 A.2d 438
Decision Date29 January 1980
Docket NumberNo. 78-178-C,78-178-C
PartiesSTATE v. John CABRAL. A.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
OPINION

DORIS, Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant, John Cabral (Cabral), from a conviction by a Superior Court jury on a charge of indecent assault, a violation of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-37-6. On December 19, 1976, Cabral was indicted for rape and indecent assault on Marilyn, then aged seven, and for rape and indecent assault on Shawn, then aged eleven.

At a January 1978 trial, Marilyn and Shawn both testified that Cabral had raped and indecently assaulted them separately and on different occasions in the boiler room of one of the Providence Housing Authority's housing developments. The girls lived in this development, and Cabral was employed there as a maintenance man. During the course of the trial, the trial justice granted Cabral's motion for acquittal on both counts of rape. The jury acquitted Cabral on the charge of indecent assault against Shawn but found him guilty of indecent assault against Marilyn. Thereafter, the trial justice denied Cabral's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to a five-year term in the Adult Correctional Institutions with the imposition of four years of that sentence suspended. Cabral has been free on bail pending the disposition of his appeal.

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the testimony of a complainant of tender age in a prosecution for a sexual offense must be corroborated. This court concludes that corroboration is not required. 1 We have reached this conclusion after a review of common law principles, statutory provisions in our own and neighboring states, and the balancing of interests, societal and individual, in the ascertainment of truth and determination of credibility.

Although the United States Constitution, Art. III, sec. 3, sets forth a corroboration requirement to prove a charge of treason, there is no such requirement prescribed for the prosecution of sex crimes. In Rhode Island, by statute, treason is the only crime which requires corroborative proof. G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-43-2. The General Assembly at its January 1979 session enacted P.L. 1979, ch. 302, An Act Relating to Rape and Seduction, which repealed in its entirety G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) chapter 37 of title 11. Section 11-37-11 of the new act specifically states: "The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under this chapter." Since Cabral's trial and conviction precede the 1979 legislation, § 11-37-11 has no bearing on this appeal, except to show that the Legislature has now codified the common law.

Wigmore, after pointing out that the corroboration requirement for prosecution of a sex violation was unknown at common law, observed:

" * * * a rule of law requiring corroboration has probably little actual influence upon the jurors' minds over and above the ordinary caution and suspicion which would naturally suggest itself for such charges; and the rule thus tends to become in practice merely a means of securing from the trial judge the utterance of a form of words which may chance to be erroneous and to lay the foundation for a new trial. Finally, the purpose of the rule is already completely attained by the judge's power to set aside a verdict upon insufficient evidence, and under this power verdicts are constantly set aside, in jurisdictions having no statutory rule, upon the same evidence which in other jurisdictions would be insufficient under the statutory rule requiring corroboration.

"The fact is that, in the light of modern psychology, this technical rule of corroboration seems but a crude and childish measure, if it be relied upon as an adequate means for determining the credibility of the complaining witness in such charges * * *."

7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2061 at 354 (3d ed. 1940).

The arguments most often heard in support of the rule of corroboration involve many factors, such as the jury's outrage at testimony of sex offenses, the difficulty in defending against such charges, the dangers of falsification, and the severe penalties involved. Many of these concerns have their origins in the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench of 1671 to 1676. Hale, in dealing at length with the subject of rape, wondered whether prosecutrixes under the age of twelve should be allowed to testify at all. He recommended that such a victim's tale should always be put before the jury under oath if the court in its discretion felt the witness qualified to be sworn, but otherwise as a sworn statement. It was in this context that Hale went on to write these words:

"But in both these cases, whether the infant be sworn or not, it is necessary to render their evidence credible, that there should be concurrent evidence to make out the fact, and not to ground a conviction singly upon such an accusation with or without oath of an infant.

"For in many cases there may be reason to admit such witnesses to be heard, in cases especially of this nature, which yet the jury is not bound to believe; for the excellency of the trial by jury is in that they are the triers of the credit of the witnesses as well as the truth of the fact; it is one thing, whether a witness be admissible to be heard, another thing, whether they are to be believed when heard.

"It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent."

1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. ed. 1847) p. 635.

The requirement for independent corroboration in sex-offense cases has been the subject of ever increasing criticism. 2 Contemporary empirical studies suggest that the factors employed to support the corroboration requirement do not justify the rule. There is a great reluctance to report a rape. Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape 27-28 ...

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18 cases
  • State v. Lynch
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • August 12, 2004
    ...appreciate the necessity of telling the truth." Seabra v. Trafford-Seabra, 655 A.2d 250, 252 (R.I.1995) (citing State v. Cabral, 122 R.I. 623, 629, 410 A.2d 438, 442 (1980)). This Court will overturn a competency decision only for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d ......
  • Lawson v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • January 10, 2005
    ...that it formerly embraced, the Idaho court quoted at length from an opinion of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in State v. Cabral, 122 R.I. 623, 410 A.2d 438, 441 (1980), in which Rhode Island's highest court explained its reasons for holding that the crime of rape should be treated no di......
  • State v. Byers
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 1, 1981
    ...and (3) the difficulty of disproving an accusation of rape. See United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1977); State v. Cabral, 410 A.2d 438 (R.I. 1980); The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L. J. 1365 (1972) (hereinafter Rape Corroboration These justifi......
  • State v. Long
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • February 28, 1985
    ...I, sec. 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution and Rule 44 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 See State v. Cabral, 122 R.I. 623, 628, 410 A.2d 438, 442 (1980); State v. Delahunt, 121 R.I. 565, 571-72, 401 A.2d 1261, 1265 (1979). Defendant Long, however, does not claim that h......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2015 Contents
    • July 31, 2015
    ...and consequences of the proceedings and charges with which he is faced, or is unable to assist properly in his defense. State v. Cabral , 122 R.I. 623, 410 A.2d 438 (1990). A witness is not competent to testify at trial if he or she is unable (1) to observe, (2) to recollect, (3) to communi......
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2016 Contents
    • July 31, 2016
    ...and consequences of the proceedings and charges with which he is faced, or is unable to assist properly in his defense. State v. Cabral , 122 R.I. 623, 410 A.2d 438 (1990). A witness is not competent to testify at trial if he or she is unable (1) to observe, (2) to recollect, (3) to communi......
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2017 Contents
    • July 31, 2017
    ...and consequences of the proceedings and charges with which he is faced, or is unable to assist properly in his defense. State v. Cabral , 122 R.I. 623, 410 A.2d 438 (1990). A witness is not competent to testify at trial if he or she is unable (1) to observe, (2) to recollect, (3) to communi......
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2018 Contents
    • July 31, 2018
    ...and consequences of the proceedings and charges with which he is faced, or is unable to assist properly in his defense. State v. Cabral , 122 R.I. 623, 410 A.2d 438 (1990). A witness is not competent to testify at trial if he or she is unable (1) to observe, (2) to recollect, (3) to communi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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