State v. Caddy
Decision Date | 25 October 1901 |
Citation | 87 N.W. 927,15 S.D. 167 |
Parties | STATE v. CADDY. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Lawrence county; Joseph B. Moore, Judge.
Herbert D. Caddy was convicted of robbery, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Frawley & Laffey, for plaintiff in error. John L. Pyle, Atty. Gen and S. C. Polly, State's Atty. (W. G. Rice, of counsel) for the State.
At the February term, 1900, of the circuit court of Lawrence county the defendant was indicted for the crime of robbery. The indictment charges that the plaintiff in error and one Thomas Carberry on the 29th of October, 1899, did unlawfully wrongfully, and feloniously take and carry away from the person of Michael R. Russell the sum of $5, and that said taking was accomplished by means of force and putting the said Russell in fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to his person. To this indictment the defendant entered the plea of not guilty, and also pleaded that he had been acquitted upon the trial of an indictment charging him with an assault with intent to commit a felony, other than an assault with intent to kill, and adding thereto the usual allegations that the parties named in the two indictments were the same, and that the transaction upon which the second indictment was based was the same identical transaction as the one upon which the former indictment was based, and that the proof to sustain the indictment to which the plea was interposed would be identically the same as that given in support of the former indictment. To this plea of former acquittal the state interposed a demurrer, except to the portion of the plea alleging that the evidence would be the same, which allegation was denied. The court sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiff in error was thereupon tried upon the indictment for robbery and convicted, and has brought the case to this court by writ of error.
The principal question presented to this court for review is as to the rulings of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the plea of former acquittal. The indictment under which the plaintiff in error was tried and convicted was based upon section 6481, Comp. Laws, which reads as follows "Robbery is a wrongful taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." The indictment under which he was tried and acquitted was based upon section 6491, Comp. Laws, which reads as follows: "Every person who shoots or attempts to shoot at another with any kind of fire arm, air gun, or other means whatever, or commits any assault or battery upon another by means of, any deadly weapon, or by such other means or force as was likely to produce death, with intent to commit a felony other than assault with intent to kill, or in resisting the execution of any legal process, is punishable by imprisonment in the territorial prison not exceeding ten years." It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that, having been acquitted of the offense charged in the former indictment, he could not, under the constitution of this state, again be tried upon the second indictment, and that the court therefore erred in sustaining the demurrer of the state to his plea in bar. Section 9, art. 6, of the constitution of this state, reads as follows: "No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to give evidence against himself or to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." A similar provision is found in all or nearly all of the constitutions of the several states, and the decisions construing the same are very numerous and somewhat conflicting, and we shall not attempt to review them in this opinion. The rule applicable to this class of cases, in our opinion, is clearly stated by Gray, J., speaking for the supreme court of Massachusetts, in Morey v. Com., 108 Mass. 433. He says: In People v. Bentley, 77 Cal. 7, 18 P. 799, 11 Am. St. Rep. 225, the defendant was tried and convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon under an information charging him with an assault with intent to commit murder. He was afterwards indicted for an attempt to commit robbery, and upon that indictment he sought to prove that he had been convicted of the former offense, as a bar to the action, but the trial court excluded this evidence. It seemed to have been assumed in the opinion of the appellate court that the parties were the same, and that the acts constituting the two offenses were substantially the same, and were sustained by substantially the same evidence, but the ruling of the court below was sustained by the supreme court. In the opinion the court says: In State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282, 32 Am. Rep. 69, the supreme court of that state, in discussing the question we are now considering, says: "The English rule is that, when the facts necessary to convict upon the second prosecution would necessarily have convicted on the first, a final judgment on the first prosecution will be a bar to the second; but, if the facts which will convict on the second prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the first, then the first will not be a bar to the second, although the offenses charged may have been committed by the same state of facts; and we believe this rule is valid in all the states of the Union." The court in its opinion further says: "But when the same facts constitute two or more offenses, wherein the lesser offense is not necessarily involved in the greater, and when the facts necessary to convict on the second prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the first, then the first prosecution will be a bar to the second, although the offenses were both committed at the same time and by the same act." This is cited with approval by the supreme court of California in the case of People v. Majors, supra. In the case of Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496, Shaw, C. J., says: ...
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