State v. Cade

• Decision Date: 29 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 46297,46297
• Citation: 153 So.2d 382,244 La. 534
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Troy Bland CADE.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 382

153 So.2d 382

244 La. 534

STATE of Louisiana v. Troy Bland CADE.

No. 46297.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 29, 1963.

Dissenting Opinion May 9, 1963.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1963.

James R. Venable, James Sharp, J., Monroe, for defendant and appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty., Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albin P. Lassiter, Dist. Atty., Gilbert T. Brown, Jr., Wm. L. Crowe, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

SANDERS, Justice.

The defendant Troy Bland Cade, is the leader or minister of a religious sect known as Islam in the City of Monroe, Louisiana. The sect is composed of negroes, who style themselves Muslims. He was indicted for criminal anarchy, a violation of LSA-R.S 14:115. After the overruling by the trial judge of a motion to quash the indictment and a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant was tried and adjudged guilty. The trial judge sentenced him to a term of six years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. The defendant has appealed his conviction, relying upon fourteen Bills of Exception reserved during the course of the trial.

LSA-R.S. 14:115, upon which this prosecution is based, provides:

'Criminal anarchy is:

'(1) The advocating or teaching, in any manner, in public or private, of the subversion, opposition, or destruction of the government of the United States or of the State of Louisiana by violence or other unlawful means; or

'(2) The organizing or becoming a member of any organization or society which is known to the offender to advocate, teach, or practice the subversion, opposition, or destruction of the government of the United States or of the State of Louisiana by violence or other unlawful means.'

The Bill of Indictment charges the defendant in the following language:

'* * * that Troy Bland Cade late of the Parish aforesaid, in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Louisiana, beginning on or about the 1st day of the month of July Anno Domini, nineteen hundred and fifty-nine and continuously since that date, in the Parish, District and State aforesaid, did then and there wilfully and feloniously: violate Article 115 of Title 14 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Louisiana, a criminal offense entitled 'Criminal Anarchy', in that the said Troy Bland Cade (1) did teach and advocate, in public and in private, opposition and destruction of the government of the United States and of the State of Louisiana by violence or other unlawful means, and (2) by becoming and remaining a member of an organization or society which he knew advocated, taught and practiced subversion, opposition and destruction of the government of the United States and of the State of Louisiana by violence or other unlawful means, for this, towit: (1) that said Troy Bland Cade has taught and advocated, and is teaching and advocating, that the Negro under our system of government 'gets nothing but slavery, hell and death' and that a separate and new nation and government must be established by the Negro people and that this nation and government shall be within the United States, and that this Negro nation i entitled to the State of Louisiana and other southern states because 'we feel that 310 years of slave labor that our parents have undergone in America should be enough pay', and that the owners of such land today have no rights or interest, and that such new nation and government must be established whether by violence or any other unlawful means within the boundary of the United States, and that such teaching is being done to adults and children; (2) that said Troy Bland Cade is a member of an organization or society which advocates and teaches these things as set forth herein, such organization being known as Muslims or Islam and is a leader and teacher of such destruction and opposition to the United States and of the the State of Louisiana * * *'

In this Court, the defendant has filed a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the state courts. He contends that the state courts are without jurisdiction in cases involving subversive activities since the federal government has preempted this field by the enactment of the Smith Act. ¹ In essence, defendant contends that criminal anarchy, as proscribed by LSA-R.S. 14:115, is a crime against the nation, that the state statute is unenforceable, and that the state courts are without jurisdiction to punish this crime. Defendant relies upon Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed. 640, and State v. Jenkins, 236 La. 300, 107 So.2d 648.

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, the United States Supreme Court resolved that federal legislation had preempted the field of subversive activity, thus rendering state legislation on the subject matter inoperative. Following that decision, this Court held in State v. Jenkins, supra, that any claim of reserved state power in prosecutions for communist activity had been foreclosed by the Nelson decision. However, this Court further stated that 'If a case of sedition is ever presented under our law which does not necessarily involve seditious acts against the Federal government, it will be time enough to decide whether the ruling in Commonwealth v. Nelson precludes such a prosecution.'

The Supreme Court of the United States has now clarified its holding in the Nelson case by the following pronouncement in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 S.Ct. 1040, 3 L.Ed.2d 1090:

'In Nelson itself we said that the 'precise holding of the court * * * is that the Smith Act * * * which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which proscribed the Same conduct.' (Italics supplied.) 350 U.S., at 499, 76 S.Ct. at 478, 100 L.Ed. 640. The basis of Nelson thus rejects the notion that it stripped the States of the right to protect themselves. All the opinion proscribed was a race between federal and state prosecutors to the courthouse door. The opinion made clear that a State could proceed with prosecutions for sedition against the State itself; that it can ligitimately investigate in this area follows A fortiori. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 U.S. 234, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311), supra, where the same contention was made as to the identical state Act, it was denied Sub silentio. Nor did our opinion in Nelson hold that the Smith Act had proscribed state activity in protection of itself either from actual or threatened 'sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds.' In footnote 8 of the opinion it is pointed out that the State had full power to deal with internal civil disturbances. Thus registration statutes, Quo warranto proceedings as to subversive corporations, the subversive instigation of riots and a host of other subjects directly affecting state security furnish grist for the State's legislative mill.'

The plain import of this judicial pronouncement is that state statutes proscribing criminal anarchy have been superseded by federal legislation only insofar as they specifically punish sedition against the United States Government. The sovereign states have not been stripped of their means of self-defense.

The instant prosecution is clearly one in which the state seeks to protect its own governmental integrity. Hence, the plea to the jurisdiction is without merit.

Pretermitting earlier Bills of Exception, we must pass to a consideration of Bill of Exception No. 13, for it has given us grave concern. This Bill was reserved to the overruling by the trial court of defendant's motion for a new trial. Among other things, the motion for a new trial alleged that no evidence had been adduced to establish that the defendant taught or advocated opposition to the established government by violence or other unlawful means, or that the defendant belonged to an organization which he knew advocated such a doctrine. The transcript of evidence was made a part of and attached to the Bill of Exception. Hence, the Bill raises a question of law of which this Court has cognizance. ²

The purpose of the statute proscribing criminal anarchy is to prohibit the advocacy or teaching of any doctrine that contemplates violence, crime or other unlawful means of effecting governmental change. It is true that the defendant has attacked ³ the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it is an unwarranted impairment of the freedom of speech and the press protected by the federal and state constitutions. The defendant also contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. ⁴ However, we find no merit in this attack. Freedom of speech and press has at no time been considered an unrestricted license. It is subject to reasonable legislative regulation. As we view it, the statute in the instant case imposes only a reasonable limitation upon this basic freedom. It is a reasonable and constitutional exercise by the state of its police power. ⁵ Moreover, it defines the crime with sufficient precision to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice as to what conduct is criminal. Hence, it is not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite. ⁶

An examination of the statute and the indictment discloses that an essential element of the crime charged is the defendant's advocacy of violence or other unklawful means in opposition to or destruction of the established government, or the defendant's belonging to an organization which he knows advocates such a doctrine. It is not a crime to advocate governmental change through orderly, democratic processes, which our form of government provides. Neither is it a crime to persuade or exhort others in an effort to enlist public support for such a change. In the battle of ideas is found the genius of our form of government. The litmus test of the crime charged is whether violence, terrorism, or other unlawful methods have been advocated.

In the instant case, the evidence adduced by the...