State v. Cadotte

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
Citation542 N.W.2d 834
Docket NumberNo. 94-1824,94-1824
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Douglas CADOTTE, Appellant.
Decision Date17 January 1996

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Sharon R. Stevens, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Julie H. Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Brent D. Heeren, County Attorney, and Richard Vander Mey, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, LAVORATO, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

Douglas Cadotte was convicted of second-degree burglary under Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.5 (1993); criminal mischief, Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.6 (1993); and interference with official acts, Iowa Code section 719.1(1) (1993). He appealed, complaining that the district court erroneously overruled his pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest. 1 We affirm.

I. The Facts.

The On Broadway bar in Toledo, Iowa, was burglarized on January 1, 1994. Based on leads obtained from a surveillance camera at the bar and information received from a bar patron, Toledo police chief Martin began to look for Cadotte.

Martin heard that Cadotte was staying with his grandmother, Elizabeth Roberts, in a trailer home owned by Roberts. Martin went to the door of the trailer and knocked. Roberts told Martin to come in, and he did. Martin told Roberts that he wanted to talk with Cadotte about a break-in, and Roberts asked a young granddaughter to go to a bedroom to get Cadotte. The granddaughter returned and said that Cadotte refused to get out of bed. She also hinted that another man was in the room with Cadotte.

After Roberts again sent her granddaughter to get Cadotte, he came out of the bedroom. While the door was briefly open, Martin saw bottles of Budweiser beer--the brand that had been stolen from the tavern. Cadotte asked Martin if he had a warrant; Martin responded that he did not. Cadotte told Martin to leave, but Martin remained and began to ask Cadotte about the break-in. The confrontation soon deteriorated into a scuffle, and Martin called for help. Other officers arrived, and Cadotte was subdued.

The officers then entered the bedroom to see if there was in fact a second person there. They thought it was possibly a man implicated in the burglary with the defendant. They found Matt Sanache, a person who was shown on the security camera's tape. While in the bedroom, the officers found the Budweiser beer, liquor, cigarettes, candy bars, and a garbage can--all of which were consistent with the goods taken in the burglary. Cadotte moved, unsuccessfully, to suppress this evidence.

II. The Law.

We review this constitutional question de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Schultzen, 522 N.W.2d 833, 835-36 (Iowa 1994). Fact-findings underlying the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Iowa 1990).

A search conducted without a valid warrant is per se unreasonable unless a valid exception to the warrant requirement exists. State v. Cullor, 315 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1982). Valid exceptions exist for those searches (1) with consent, (2) based on probable cause and exigent circumstances, (3) involving items in plain view, or (4) incident to arrest. State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Iowa 1984). The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search falls within one of these exceptions. State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Iowa 1993); State v. Folkens, 281 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1979).

III. The Issue.

The State argues that it had consent to search the trailer based on the grandmother's permission. The defendant counters that the consent was revoked prior to the search. However, despite the lengthy discussion of consent searches, we do not view this as a consent search case. Even under the State's own version of the facts, Martin had consent only to enter the trailer; he did not request, nor was he given, consent to search. The district court found that Martin was legally on the premises, based on the owner's consent, and that the search was valid as an incident to Cadotte's arrest. These are the issues before us.

IV. Legality of the Officer's Presence.

A. The consent to enter. The first question is whether the officer was validly on the premises, and that turns on whether he had consent. Using analogous cases involving consent searches, we conclude that he did. When two or more individuals share a common right of access or control of property to be searched, any one of them has the authority to consent to a warrantless search in the absence of the others. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); State v. Knutson, 234 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1975); State v. Kelly, 284 N.W.2d 236 (Iowa 1979). Obviously, if consent to search may be given by such a person, that person may surely give consent to enter, as in this case.

It is undisputed that Roberts, who owned the trailer, consented to Martin's entry. Nothing in the record suggests that this consent was revoked by her. In fact, according to the officer's testimony, she was very cooperative and seemed to encourage the officer's presence. Cadotte was, at most, a part-time occupant of the home, and he had no authority to "revoke" the consent given by the owner. As noted by one authority,

the hard choice between these opposing positions [of the objecting and consenting parties] need be made only when "two or more persons had equal use of a place in which both are present," as compared to where "one's privacy while present someplace is derivative of and dependent on the privacy of another." In the latter situation, it makes sense that the individual with a predominant interest should prevail. Thus, if that individual were to consent to the search, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • State v. Cline
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 7, 2000
    ...the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Cadotte, 542 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1996). III. Issues on A. Issues raised by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant continues to argue the challenged evidence must be sup......
  • State v. Lewis
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • February 25, 2004
    ...the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Cadotte, 542 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). Exceptions recognized by this court are search......
  • State v. Bergmann
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 6, 2001
    ...in plain view; or (4) search conducted incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Iowa 2001); State v. Cadotte, 542 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1996). Because the drug dog alert established probable cause, the police legally searched the car without a warrant under the prob......
  • State v. Turner
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • July 5, 2001
    ...our scope of review with respect to factual findings of the district court in cases alleging constitutional error. In State v. Cadotte, 542 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1996), we said, in a case raising Fourth Amendment claims, that "[f]act-findings underlying the district court's ruling ... are bindin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT