State v. Caffrey

Citation332 N.W.2d 269
Decision Date06 April 1983
Docket NumberNo. 13633,13633
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Timothy Sean CAFFREY, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota

Richard H. Wendt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

Stanley E. Whiting of Day, Grossenburg & Whiting, Winner, for defendant and appellant.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for first degree murder. We reverse and remand.

On the evening of January 24, 1981, William Caffrey was shot to death in his home in Martin, South Dakota. His adopted Indian son, the appellant, Timothy Caffrey, who was then seventeen years old, was taken into custody by the sheriff's department a few hours after the incident. During an interrogation that ran from 12:20 a.m. to 2:58 a.m. on January 25, 1981, appellant ultimately confessed that he had argued with and later shot his father.

Following a hearing, appellant was transferred to adult court, where a jury returned a verdict of guilty to murder in the first degree. Appellant was sentenced to life in the penitentiary.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in transferring him from juvenile court to adult court. The trial court considered the factors set out in SDCL 26-11-4 for determining whether a juvenile shall be transferred to adult court. 1 In its transfer order, entered following the hearing on the transfer motion, the trial court set forth the reasons for its decision with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review, see People in Interest of D.M.L., 254 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1977); People in Interest of L.V.A., 248 N.W.2d 864 (S.D.1976), by way of findings of fact as required by SDCL 26-11-4. Without detailing the evidence presented at the transfer hearing, our review of the record satisfies us that the trial court's findings in support of its decision to transfer are not clearly erroneous, which is the standard by which such findings are to be reviewed on appeal. SDCL 26-11-4. In reaching this conclusion, we note that appellant, who was born on May 28, 1963, was less than two months short of his eighteenth birthday on the date of the transfer hearing.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his written confession inasmuch as it was not voluntarily given. 2

In determining whether a defendant made a voluntary waiver of his constitutional right against self-incrimination, we are guided by the following principles:

In making the determination with respect to whether there was a voluntary waiver on the part of the defendant, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation are inquired into. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). That decision must be made by the trial judge in the first instance. State v. Stumes , 241 N.W.2d 587 (S.D.1976); State v. Adkins, 88 S.D. 571, 225 N.W.2d 598 (1975). If the trial court finds the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, such a finding is binding upon this court, unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Lyons, 269 N.W.2d 124, (S.D.1978); State v. Lewis , 244 N.W.2d 307 (S.D.1976); State v. Stumes, supra; State v. Aschmeller, 87 S.D. 367, 209 N.W.2d 369 (1973); State v. Kiehn, 86 S.D. 549, 199 N.W.2d 594 (1972); State v. Thundershield, 83 S.D. 414, 160 N.W.2d 408 (1968).

State v. Cowell, 288 N.W.2d 322, 324 (S.D.1980).

The interrogation was conducted in a back room in the sheriff's office in Martin, South Dakota, by the Bennett County Sheriff and two deputies. Appellant's mother was in Ipswich, South Dakota at the time of the interrogation, and neither she nor any other family member or adult was called by the officers to be with appellant during the interrogation. The officers did contact a court services officer, who advised them to keep appellant in custody for observation. 3

At the beginning of the interrogation, appellant was read his Miranda rights and then signed a written waiver of these rights. There is no claim or evidence of any physical coercion during the interrogation. Although the State contends that no threats or promises were made during the interrogation, the interrogation transcript discloses that the interrogating officers made the following statements:

Deputy: Well Tim, we'd like to have you now, tell us now what happened to your dad, we're sure that you, you know something more than you're telling us, right now nobody's been accused of anything or nothing, and if you did get in a fight and you did hit him with your numb-chucks or whatever you hit him with. If you tell us now, we can help you. But as soon as we start these other people there's going to be a lot of people talk to you and they are going to run lie detector test [sic] on you, polygraph examination. There's going to be a lot of other people and I'm sure your mom's going to talk to you and that's going to be the hardest of all. (Emphasis added)

* * *

Sheriff: Have you ever taken a lie detector test or been around anybody's that taken one Tim?

Appellant: Huh-uh

Sheriff: You know what they are?

Appellant: Ya

Sheriff: You know how they operate?

Appellant: Ya

Sheriff: Do you think you could take one of them. Advise that machine your telling the truth?

Appellant: Ya

Sheriff: Think you could do her, huh?

Appellant: Huh-uh

Sheriff: You know what happens when you tell lies on that thing?

Appellant: They charge in different kinds of waves on the mind on that (unreadable)

* * *

Sheriff: That's right. (Emphasis added)

Deputy: Big ones (Emphasis added)

Sheriff: Do you still think that you could pass that test?

Appellant: Yep

Sheriff: I don't think you can.

* * *

Deputy: ... I don't exactly how [sic] your father passed away. If he was beat over the head or if he was shot boy your in a lot of trouble. [sic]

Deputy: But if it was an accident and you tell us now and you got in a fight and ya hit him with your numb-chucks or something.

* * *

Deputy: You realize Tim that we're going to have to keep coming back and back and back, to you all the time.

None of those present at the interrogation informed appellant that he could not be compelled to take a lie detector test, even though all three officers knew that he could not be required to do so.

The trial court concluded that prior to the confession no questioning pressure was used on and no promises of any consequence were made to appellant. We disagree.

The youth of an accused is a significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). A juvenile's constitutional right against self-incrimination should be afforded additional protection. State v. Lohnes, 324 N.W.2d 409 (S.D.1982). 4 If counsel is not present when an admission is obtained, a court must take great care to assure that the juvenile's confession was voluntary "in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair." Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1458, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 561 (1967).

A totality-of-circumstances analysis when applied to juveniles involves evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving such rights. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

Although appellant was nearly eighteen years old at the time the crime was committed and had been proceeded against in juvenile court on one prior occasion, the record made at the suppression hearing does not indicate that appellant had had extensive contacts with law enforcement officers, probation officers, and the courts that marked the juvenile in Fare v. Michael C., supra.

Added to the factors of appellant's immaturity and inexperience is the seriousness of the misrepresentation by the interrogating officers that they could help appellant if he told them what had happened and that he would be forced to take a lie detector test. Deception is a factor to be considered in evaluating the totality of the circumstances. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). Contrary to the State's position, the interrogation transcript clearly shows that appellant was told that "they are going to run [a] lie detector test on you," rather than that he would be asked to take a lie detector test. Moreover, not only did the interrogating officers deliberately mislead appellant into thinking that he would be compelled to submit to a lie detector test, they reinforced and exaggerated his misconceptions of the nature of such a test by leading him to believe that the waves that he thought would be "charged in" would be "big ones."

This court commented on the psychological impact of a lie detector test in a case where the defendant, who had taken the test, confessed after being told that he had not passed the test. In State v. Faller, 88 S.D. 685, 227 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1975), we stated:

The situation a lie detector presents can best be described as a psychological rubber hose. A defendant, when suddenly faced with the impersonal accuracy of a machine, may believe it is safer to confess and place himself at the mercy of the law rather than lie to the examiner and sacrifice any possibility of leniency. Under circumstances such as this we find it difficult to believe that a confession is voluntary unless it can be shown the defendant knows his constitutional rights and knows that his interests cannot be harmed by exercising those rights.

In State v. DuBois, 286 N.W.2d 801 (S.D.1979), we held voluntary certain inculpatory statements made after a polygraph examination. In doing so, however, we pointed out...

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