State v. Cain
| Decision Date | 15 March 2016 |
| Citation | 133 A.3d 619,224 N.J. 410 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Scott M. CAIN, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Brian F. Plunkett, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).
Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney).
Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney).
In State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65, 80–81, 560 A. 2d 1198 (1989), we held that an expert witness in a drug-distribution case could testify to the ultimate issue of fact—whether a defendant possessed drugs with the intent to distribute. We cautioned, however, that the expert's testimony should not amount to a pronouncement of guilt. Allowing an expert to offer an opinion on a defendant's guilty state of mind in a drug case while prohibiting the same expert from offering an opinion on defendant's guilt are not easily reconcilable principles. In a series of cases since Odom, we have attempted to curtail the misuse of expert testimony that has intruded into the jury's exclusive role as finder of fact. Odom's approval of expert testimony on the state of mind of a defendant in drug cases also has spawned lengthy and intricate hypothetical questions that have the appearance of a prosecutorial summation. We therefore must revisit whether such ultimate-issue expert testimony is appropriate in a drug-distribution case.
Expert testimony in many drug-distribution cases provides necessary insight into matters that are not commonly understood by the average juror, such as the significance of drug packaging and weight, scales and cutting agents, stash sites, the role of confederates, and other activities consistent with drug trafficking. However, once the jury is informed about the peculiar characteristics of a drug-distribution scheme, the average juror is well-equipped to make the final determination whether a defendant possessed the requisite mental state to commit a drug offense. That determination does not require special expertise; it requires the sound judgment of jurors, who rely on their life experiences, common sense, and collective reasoning in rendering a verdict.
In the case before us, the prosecutor posed a hypothetical question to a law-enforcement drug expert. The question extended onto three trial transcript pages and elicited the expert's opinion that defendant intended to distribute drugs. Defendant was found guilty of committing a number of drug offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed those convictions.
We reverse and hold that the expert's testimony—following the lengthy and intricate hypothetical question—exceeded appropriate bounds and encroached on the jury's exclusive domain as finder of fact. The hypothetical not only resembled a mid-trial summation encapsulating every minor detail of the case, but also permitted the expert to opine on defendant's state of mind—whether he intended to distribute drugs. Expert testimony opining on that ultimate issue of fact was not necessary to assist the jury. The jurors were perfectly capable of deciding that issue on their own.
We conclude that the use of the expert testimony in this case had the clear capacity to cause an unjust result. We also note that any probative value to the prosecutor's repetitive references to a judge-issued search warrant for defendant's home was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. We therefore vacate defendant's drug convictions and remand for a new trial.
Defendant Scott M. Cain was charged in a seven-count Bergen County indictment with third-degree distribution of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(b)(3) ; third-degree distribution of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(b)(3) ; first-degree maintenance of a facility for the manufacture of controlled dangerous substances, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–4 ; second-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(b)(3) ; third-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(b)(3) ; third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–10(a)(1) ; and third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–10(a)(1). The charges arose from defendant's alleged involvement in two separate drug sales and the storing of drugs in the house where he resided.
During a four-day jury trial, the State elicited the following evidence in support of its case.
On July 16, 2008, Detective Demetrius Carroll and Officer James Smith of the Hackensack Police Department were conducting a surveillance of 369 DeWolf Place in Hackensack, a house where defendant lived with his mother. That day, the officers observed a hand-to-hand exchange between defendant and Donald Hinson on the porch of the house. The officers followed Hinson in an unmarked vehicle. When Hinson noticed that he was being followed, he dropped an object on the ground. The officers stopped and arrested Hinson, and recovered the dropped item—.20 grams of crack cocaine. Hinson testified at trial that defendant sold him the drugs.
On July 28, 2008, while conducting surveillance of defendant's residence, Officer Smith observed defendant and Jeffrey Beckham engage in a hand-to-hand transaction in front of the house. Officer Smith and a fellow officer later stopped Beckham to conduct a "field investigation." The officers first questioned Beckham and then seized a cigarette box and plastic bag that he was holding. The officers discovered two glassine envelopes containing .02 grams of heroin. Beckham was arrested, and later testified at trial that he purchased the drugs from defendant.
On August 6, 2008, officers of the Hackensack Police Department executed a warrant to search 369 DeWolf Place. Present in the house at the time were defendant's mother, defendant's girlfriend, and the girlfriend's young son. During the search, the police seized: (1) 3 grams of crack cocaine from defendant's bedroom dresser drawer; (2) a bag of approximately 15 grams of powdered cocaine, 100 purple Ziploc baggies, and a digital scale from defendant's bedroom closet; and (3) 10 glassine envelopes with a red logo containing heroin from a china hutch in the foyer.
At trial, Detective Brett Rothenberger of the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office was qualified as an expert witness in the area of drug use and drug distribution. The prosecutor posed a hypothetical question, covering three transcript pages, mirroring nearly all of the evidence presented by the State against defendant, including defendant's alleged drug transactions with Hinson and Beckham. The following question was tacked on to the end of the lengthy "hypothetical" facts: "[D]o you have an opinion as to whether those narcotics were possessed for personal use or possessed with the idea to sell?" Detective Rothenberger responded that, in his opinion, the drugs were possessed with the intent to distribute. The form of the hypothetical question left no doubt that the subject was defendant. In addition to opining about defendant's state of mind, Detective Rothenberger testified about the value and packaging of the drugs, the location of the drugs, and other indicia consistent with drug distribution.
Throughout the course of the trial, the prosecutor repeatedly referenced that the search of defendant's residence was authorized by a warrant issued by the court. In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that "[a] search warrant was then obtained, authorized by a Superior Court judge." The prosecutor returned to that theme, stating that information about the drug transactions with Hinson and Beckham was included in "an affidavit for a search warrant" and that "[a] search warrant [was] brought to a judge" because "[b]efore you can go into somebody's home under those circumstances, you need the authority of a Superior Court judge." In the course of questioning witnesses, the prosecutor repeatedly elicited that a warrant was secured to search defendant's residence and occasionally elicited that a Superior Court judge issued the warrant.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts except the charge of maintaining a facility for the manufacture of controlled dangerous substances. The trial court granted the State's application for an extended-term sentence and imposed a sixteen-year term of imprisonment with an eight-year period of parole ineligibility for second-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. The court imposed concurrent prison terms for three other convictions: four years for third-degree distribution of cocaine, four years for third-degree distribution of heroin, and four years for third-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute. The remaining charges were merged into the second-degree intent-to-distribute conviction. Last, the court ordered that defendant pay all applicable penalties and fines.
Defendant appealed.
In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's convictions, but reversed the sentence because the record did not support the trial court's finding of aggravating factor number two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(2) (). The panel remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
The panel found that the trial court did not commit plain error by allowing the use of a hypothetical question. According to the panel, the expert did not express an opinion regarding defendant's guilt, but merely characterized defendant's conduct based on the record, and therefore did not intrude into the jury's exclusive province as trier of fact.
The panel also rejected defendant's argument that the prosecutor's repetitive references to the search warrant...
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