State v. Cain

• Decision Date: 01 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18414,18414
• Citation: 144 S.E.2d 905,246 S.C. 536
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Hershel Edgar CAIN, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 905

144 S.E.2d 905

246 S.C. 536

The STATE, Respondent, v. Hershel Edgar CAIN, Appellant.

No. 18414.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Nov. 1, 1965.

J. Pat Miley, Howard G. Pettit, Jr., Walhalla, for appellant.

Sol. William H. Ballenger, Walhalla, for respondent.

MOSS, Justice.

Hershel Edgar Cain, the appellant herein, was tried at the 1965 Spring Term of the Court of General Sessions for Oconee County upon an indictment charging him with the murder of Harold Williams, the alleged offense having occurred on February 1, 1964. He was found guilty of murder as charged and sentenced to death by electrocution. Section 16-51 and 52 of the Code. This appeal followed.

It appears from the record that the appellant was without employed counsel and two able and competent attorneys of Oconee County were appointed to represent him. These attorneys have prosecuted this appeal upon seven exceptions. They ask that in view of the fact that this is a capital case that we carefully consider the entire record for the purpose of determining whether all of the rights of the appellant were protected on his trial. In a capital case it is our duty in favorem vitae to scrutinize the entire record to determine whether there were any errors in the trial below affecting the substantial rights of the appellant, even though such errors may not be sufficiently covered by the exceptions.

It appears from the testimony that on February 1, 1964, at approximately 8:30 P.M., that Harold Williams, the owner and operator of a grocery store and filling station, located on the Highlands Highway about two miles north of the town of Walhalla, was found lying on the floor of his store, dead of a pistol bullet wound in his chest. The appellant was arrested on the same day and a warrant was issued charging him with murdering the said Harold Williams.

The record shows that on February 3, 1964, the appellant was taken by C. L. Smith, a deputy sheriff of Oconee County, to the headquarters of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division in Columbia, South Carolina. This officer testified as to a confession made by the appellant that he shot the said Harold Williams. He said this confession was made freely and volun-tarily by the appellant after he was fully advised of all of his rights, including his right to counsel. This officer testified that the appellant said that he didn't care for an attorney and that he was willing to discuss the matter freely and voluntarily. When the State offered the confession of the appellant in evidence, the trial Judge then excused the jury, and in the absence thereof, heard the testimony of the officer concerning the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession. This officer was fully cross-examined by the attorneys for the appellant. It appears from the record that at the time the confession was admitted in evidence, the sole testimony before the trial Judge was that such confession had been freely and voluntarily made by the appellant. There was no testimony to the contrary. The procedure outlined in State v. Sanders, 227 S.C. 287, 87 S.E.2d 826, and State v. Bullock, 235 S.C. 356, 111 S.E.2d 657, had been followed, except the appellant had not availed himself, nor was he required to do so, of the opportunity through his own testimony or that of other witnesses, to contradict the prima facie showing made by the State as to the voluntariness of the confession.

The record shows that the appellant, who was then twenty-five years of age, was admitted to the State Hospital in Columbia, South Carolina, on October 23, 1963, and his mental condition was diagnosed as schizophrenic reaction of the paranoid type. The appellant was released on a trial basis from said hospital on November 22, 1963, at which time he appeared to be in a good state of remission. He was again admitted to the State Hospital on February 8, 1964, and remained a patient in said hospital until released on December 8, 1964.

The State offered testimony that the appellant on February 1, 1964, was normal in every respect and there was nothing unusual in his appearance or conduct. This testimony was received without objection. Under our decisions, it is proper for lay witnesses to express an opinion as to whether a person was insane. State v. Stockman, 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595; State v. King, 222 S.C. 108, 71 S.E.2d 793; State v. Keller, 224 S.C. 257, 78 S.E.2d 373, and State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622. A psychiatrist of the South Carolina State Hospital testified on behalf of the appellant and gave as his opinion that he was not capable of knowing right from wrong on February 1, 1964. This witness admitted on cross-examination that it was possible that the appellant knew, on the date in question, right from wrong, legally and morally. He further stated, when told on cross-examination as to the acts and doings of the appellant on the date in question, that such 'are the factors that all sane people have'.

The appellant denied any knowledge of his shooting Harold Williams. He said he did not remember going to the headquarters of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division and making the confession to which we have heretofore referred. He testified that he did not remember being arrested on February 1, 1964, and he had no recollection of anything that took place until he had been in the State Hospital, following the shooting, some 'several days or weeks'. The appellant did recall some of his activities on the morning of February 1, 1964. He admitted borrowing a pistol from a neighbor and doing some target practice with it but, thereafter, he came back to his house and took some medicine for his headache and, after that, 'I don't know where I went or what I did'. The testimony is conclusive that the gun used in the shooting of Harold Williams was the one borrowed by the appellant.

It is the contention of the appellant that the court should have excluded from the evidence the statement or confession signed by the appellant because the appellant, at the time of the making of said confession, was a suspect, was under arrest, and was not provided with counsel; and that at the time of the making of said confession, the appellant was disoriented, having...