State v. Caldwell
| Decision Date | 18 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2011-CA-0024 |
| Citation | 2011 Ohio 5429 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CALVIN CALDWELL, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
JUDGES:
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
OPINION
For Defendant-Appellant
JAMES R. WILLIS
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Calvin C. Caldwell appeals from his convictions and sentences entered in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas for possession of crack cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
{¶ 2} On August 4, 2010, Officer Terry Rogers of the Mansfield Police Department was patrolling a high drug area and observing a known drug house. As he was observing the house, Officer Rogers noticed a van driving down the street that did not have its taillights illuminated. The van had not come from the driveway of the particular house that was under surveillance; rather it was just passing through the area driving down the street. Officer Rogers did not observe anyone exit the home and enter or approach the van, nor did he observe anyone exit the van and approach the home.
{¶ 3} Officer Rogers initiated a traffic stop of the van based upon the taillight violation. Appellant was the driver of the van. Appellant was accompanied by one passenger, Larry Petty. Appellant was able to provide a valid driver's license to the officer; the passenger was not able to produce a valid driver's license, but did provide the officer with a social security number. Appellant informed Officer Rogers that the taillights were activated by a separate switch which appellant had forgotten to turn on. He did so, and Officer Rodgers indicated to appellant that if his information checked out, the officer would simply issue appellant a warning citation. As Officer Rogers was running appellant's andhis passenger's information through the computer system, Officer Phil Messer, Jr. arrived at the traffic stop to assist Officer Rogers.
{¶ 4} Mr. Petty was found to have an active felony warrant for failure to appear1 . Officer Rogers removed Mr. Petty from the van. Officer Messer initiated his contact with appellant. As Officer Messer spoke with appellant, appellant began looking around the vehicle and moving his hands around a lot. The officer decided to remove appellant from the vehicle.
{¶ 5} Officer Messer immediately initiated a pat-down search of appellant, at which time the officer noticed something large in appellant's pocket. Officer Messer asked appellant what was in his pocket. Appellant informed him that it was cash. Officer Messer asked appellant if he had anything else in his pocket. Appellant responded he did not think he did have anything else in his pocket. Appellant informed Officer Messer that he had just been released from jail and that he had a receipt from the jail for the cash. Officer Messer asked appellant if he, Officer Messer, could reach into appellant's pocket and retrieve the cash. Appellant said yes. Officer Messer retrieved the cash but did not count it at that time. Officer Messer asked appellant where he got the money. Appellant told Officer Messer that he had a receipt for the cash inside the van.
{¶ 6} Officer Rogers went to the van to retrieve the receipt. As he approached the passenger side of the vehicle and looked inside he saw a baggie lying in the console area of the van. When he picked up the baggie, Officer Rogers observed asmall amount of what he believed to be crack cocaine inside the baggie2 . The receipt for the cash was located underneath the baggie. Appellant was arrested.
{¶ 7} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury in September, 2010 for one count of Possession of Crack Cocaine, a schedule II narcotic, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree. Appellant filed a motion to suppress on November 3, 2010. A hearing was held on December 22, 2010. By Judgment Entry filed December 22, 2010 the trial court overruled the motion.
{¶ 8} A two day jury trial commenced on January 24, 2011. The jury found appellant guilty of Possession of Crack Cocaine on January 26, 2011.
{¶ 14} In his First Assignment of Error, appellant cites as error the trial court's decision to overrule his motion to suppress the evidence. In his Third Assignment of Error appellant argues that any consent to search given by appellant was the result of an illegal search and seizure of his person before the consent was obtained. Appellant's First and Third assignments of error raise common and interrelated issues; therefore, we will address the arguments together.
{¶ 15} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 797 N.E.2d 71, 74, 2003-Ohio-5372 at ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583. Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1; State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d 1268. However, once this court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539; See, generally, United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744; Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct.1657. That is, the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas, supra. Moreover, due weight should be given "to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.
{¶ 16} In the case at bar, the appellant does not challenge that the van which appellant was driving was lawfully stopped for a traffic violation.
{¶ 17} A. Prolonged stop.
{¶ 18} Appellant first contends that the lawful detention for the equipment violation became an unlawful detention when the officers continued to detain appellant after arresting the passenger.
{¶ 19} "'[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.'" State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, at ¶ 12. (Quoting State v. Keathley (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131). "This measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates. Further, [i]n determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation. State v. Batchili, supra. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
{¶ 20} However, "[a]n officer may not expand the investigative scope of the detention beyond that which is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the initial stop unless any new or expanded investigation is supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that some further criminal activity is afoot." Batchili, supra 113Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204 at ¶ 15. (Citing State v. Howard, Preble App. Nos. CA2006-02-002 and CA2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656 at ¶ 16). "In determining whether a detention is reasonable, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances." State v. Matteucci, 11th Dist. No.2001-L-205, 2003-Ohio-702, ¶ 30, citing State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178.
{¶ 21} In the case at bar, the record check of appellant's passenger revealed an outstanding warrant. Thus, the stop was lawfully prolonged by the resulting arrest of the passenger.
{¶ 22} B. Ordering appellant out of the van.
{¶ 23} Recently, in Arizona v. Johnson (2009), 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, the United States Supreme Court noted, ...
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