State v. Calhoun

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ECKER, J.
• Citation: State v. Calhoun, 346 Conn. 288, 289 A.3d 584 (Conn. 2023)
• Docket Number: SC 20497
• Decision Date: 07 March 2023
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Christopher CALHOUN

346 Conn. 288

289 A.3d 584

STATE of Connecticut

v.Christopher CALHOUN

SC 20497

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 13, 2022

Officially Released March 7, 2023

Kevin Smith, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Norman A. Pattis, assigned counsel, Bethany, for the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, former state's attorney, Kevin M. Black, Jr., former special deputy assistant state's attorney, and Seth Garbarsky, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

ECKER, J.

Isaiah Gantt was shot and killed in New Haven's Church Street South housing project in April, 2011. The crime went unsolved for many years, until two men, Eric Canty and Jules Kierce, came forward claiming to have been eyewitnesses to Gantt's murder. Both men identified the defendant, Christopher Calhoun, as Gantt's killer. The defendant was arrested in 2018 and charged with murder under General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). The outcome of the trial rested largely on the jury's assessment of the credibility of Canty and Kierce. Their motivations were subject to impeachment because each of them was incarcerated when they first contacted the state about the case, and they each received consideration from the state in return for testifying pursuant to cooperation agreements. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder.¹ The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court made three erroneous rulings requiring reversal, namely, (1) declining to give the jury a jailhouse informant instruction, (2) admitting into evidence the entirety of Canty's and Kierce's cooperation agreements, and (3) not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Kierce regarding certain details of a prior arrest. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Gantt and the defendant both sold drugs in the Church Street South housing project. Although they had grown up as friends, they fell out when Gantt began to accuse the defendant of stealing customers. The evening Gantt was killed, he openly confronted the defendant about stolen customers. Canty, a younger friend of the defendant, was present for this argument. The defendant told Canty to go home, but he hid nearby instead to see what would happen next.

Around this time, Kierce, a mutual friend of Gantt and the defendant, received a series of phone calls from Gantt. Gantt sounded worried and asked Kierce to bring him a handgun that was hidden in a nearby apartment. As he spoke with Gantt, Kierce could hear an argument in the background. Kierce did not immediately get the gun for Gantt but went to see what was happening. He found Gantt and the defendant standing together with Montrell "Wooly" Dobbs. The atmosphere was tense.

Kierce asked Gantt if he still needed the gun. Gantt said he did, so Kierce went to retrieve it for him.

Kierce returned just in time to see the defendant shoot Gantt multiple times in the back. Canty saw the same thing from his hiding place in the alley. When the police arrived, Gantt had already died from his gunshot wounds. Later that night, Kierce encountered the defendant again, at the apartment of Latisha Parker. Although the two did not talk about the shooting, Kierce saw the defendant empty shells out of a gun and dump them into a toilet. A few days later, Canty also encountered the defendant, who at that time admitted to Canty that he had shot Gantt.

At trial, the state's case rested almost entirely on the testimony of Canty and Kierce. There was little other evidence inculpating the defendant. Ballistics and medical evidence confirmed that Gantt had been shot and killed by a .22 caliber revolver in a manner consistent with the testimony of Canty and Kierce. One witness saw the defendant, Gantt, and Dobbs together on the evening of the murder and sensed that "something was up." Another testified that the defendant had told her that Gantt was making too much money selling drugs and that Gantt had to stop or the defendant would make him stop. Otherwise, the case depended on the testimony of the two eyewitnesses, Canty and Kierce.

Both Canty and Kierce were thoroughly cross-examined by defense counsel. The jury learned that they each had criminal records and that each had entered into a cooperation agreement with the state. These agreements were admitted into evidence. The jury also heard testimony from the defense's investigator. According to this testimony, Kierce had contacted the defense team and told them that he was lying to the state and had not seen the defendant shoot Gantt.

Ultimately, the jury needed to decide whether to credit the testimony of Canty and Kierce. The jury's verdict speaks for itself. This appeal is narrowly focused on three issues: (1) the trial court's failure to give the jury a jailhouse informant instruction; (2) its admission of the cooperation agreements; and (3) its refusal to allow cross-examination on the details of a prior arrest of Kierce.²

ITHE JAILHOUSE INFORMANT INSTRUCTION

The defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defense counsel's request for a jailhouse informant instruction. Specifically, he contends that Canty and Kierce are jailhouse informants and that a special credibility instruction was therefore required by our holdings in State v. Patterson , 276 Conn. 452, 469, 886 A.2d 777 (2005), and its progeny. We conclude that the trial court provided an adequate special credibility instruction under the circumstances of this case.

A jailhouse informant is any incarcerated witness who testifies to inculpatory statements made to him by the defendant. See State v. Bruny , 342 Conn. 169, 204–205, 269 A.3d 38 (2022) ; see also State v. Jones , 337 Conn. 486, 501, 508, 254 A.3d 239 (2020). We have recognized that such testimony should be subject to a higher degree of scrutiny for three reasons: "(1) [the witness] ha[s] an unusually strong motive to [lie] ... (2) confession evidence may be the most damaging evidence of all ... and (3) false confessions are easy to fabricate, but difficult to subject to meaningful cross-examination .... [F]alse confession evidence from informants is the leading factor associated with wrongful convictions in capital cases and a major factor contributing to wrongful convictions in noncapital cases." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones , supra, at 501–502, 254 A.3d 239. In Patterson , we held that the trial court must warn the jury that jailhouse informant testimony should "be reviewed with particular scrutiny and weighed ... with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patterson , supra, 276 Conn. at 465, 886 A.2d 777.

We will assume for purposes of this opinion that both Canty and Kierce should have been considered jailhouse informants.³ We nonetheless conclude that the trial court gave an adequate special credibility instruction for both witnesses and did not abuse its discretion by declining to give the instruction requested by defense counsel. Although the trial court's instruction was not in the exact form of the jailhouse informant instruction requested, it was good enough to warn the jury that Canty and Kierce had a powerful motivation to lie and that their testimony should be reviewed with scrutiny and weighed with greater care than that of an ordinary witness.

"Our review of [an omitted jury instruction] requires that we examine the [trial] court's entire charge to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury could have been misled by the omission of the requested instruction. ... If a requested charge is in substance given, the court's failure to give a charge in exact conformance with the words of the request will not constitute a ground for reversal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dehaney , 261 Conn. 336, 368, 803 A.2d 267 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1217, 123 S. Ct. 1318, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1070 (2003). "[T]he language used in the model jury instructions, although instructive ... is not binding on this court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz , 343 Conn. 566, 599, 275 A.3d 578 (2022).

In this case, the trial court gave the following special credibility instruction: "Two of the witnesses in this case, Eric Canty and Jules Kierce, testified that they entered into cooperation agreements with the state's attorney's office .... I must caution you to give careful scrutiny to the testimony of each of these witnesses in determining their credibility and the weight to give their testimony in this case. ... In weighing their testimony, you may consider whether either witness’ testimony has been influenced by that agreement. You must therefore look with particular care at the testimony of such a witness before deciding to accept it as a basis for convicting the defendant in a criminal prosecution."

The court also gave the standard general credibility instruction, explaining that, in assessing the credibility of each witness, "you may take into account a number of factors, including ... (1) was the witness able to see or hear or know the things about which that witness testified? (2) How well was the witness able to recall and describe those things? (3) What was the witness’ manner and demeanor while testifying? (4) Did the witness have an interest in the outcome of this case? (5) How much time passed before the witness came forward with the information? (6) Did the witness have any bias or prejudice concerning any party or any matter involved in the case? (7) How reasonable was the witness’ testimony in light of all the evidence in the case? And (8) was the witness’ testimony contradicted by what that witness said or did at another time, or contradicted by the testimony of other witnesses or...