State v. Cameron

Decision Date05 July 2022
Docket NumberCOA21-442
PartiesSTATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, v. LINWOOD BRUCE CAMERON, Defendant
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 2021

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 24 February 2021 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson in Durham County No. 19 CRS 55571 Superior Court.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General T. Hill Davis, III, for the State.

Daniel M. Blau Attorney at Law, P.C., by Daniel M. Blau, for Defendant Appellant.

WOOD JUDGE

¶ 1 Defendant Linwood Cameron ("Defendant") appeals from judgments entered upon his guilty pleas to 1) attempted trafficking in heroin by possession, and 2) attempted trafficking in heroin by transportation on February 24, 2021. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by entering an order denying his motion to suppress, contending the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and did not have probable cause to search his person. After a careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

¶ 2 On the evening of August 8, 2019, Sergeant Timothy J. Price ("Sergeant Price") was patrolling an area in Durham that was known for illegal drug activity. While patrolling, Sergeant Price observed a white BMW sedan backed into the far-right corner of a gas station. Sergeant Price, accompanied by Detective Amanda Andrews ("Detective Andrews"), began surveilling the white BMW sedan from a restaurant across the street.

¶ 3 Sergeant Price observed a Lexus SUV pull into the gas station and park at the gas pump closest to the white BMW sedan. A male, later identified as Defendant, exited the passenger side of the Lexus SUV and got into the passenger side of the white BMW sedan. Defendant exited the white BMW sedan after 30 seconds and returned to the Lexus SUV. Sergeant Price observed that Defendant's head was "kind of all swivels[]" and he saw "something in . . . [Defendant's] hand ...." At no point did anyone from the Lexus SUV pump gas into the vehicle or enter the gas station. The Lexus SUV and white BMW sedan left the gas station, driving in opposite directions.

¶ 4 Sergeant Price and Detective Andrews, along with Detective Victor Buchanan ("Detective Buchanan") by separate vehicle, began to follow the Lexus SUV. They followed the Lexus SUV to "look[] for a traffic violation[]" in order to "perform a traffic stop to further investigate the narcotic or possible narcotic activity . . . [they had] noticed." While following the Lexus SUV, the officers noticed the vehicle was traveling 62 mph in a 55 mph zone and failed to use a left turn signal before turning from a left-turn lane.

¶ 5 Upon observing these traffic violations, Sergeant Price initiated a traffic stop. Sergeant Price approached the driver's side of the Lexus SUV and Detective Andrews approached the passenger side where Defendant was seated. Neither officer wore a body camera. When Detective Andrews approached Defendant, she noticed he was "leaning over[]" so that she could not "see both hands." Sergeant Price observed that the driver, later identified as Nikiaha Chavis ("Chavis"), "was agitated and upset over the traffic stop." Sergeant Price requested Chavis to exit the vehicle, while Detective Andrews requested Defendant to exit the vehicle.

¶ 6 A call was made for other officers and a K-9 officer to respond to the scene. Sergeant Price and Detective Andrews performed a pat-down of Defendant. Sergeant Price discovered about $3,000.00 in Defendant's back pocket. Sergeant Price asked Defendant if he had ever been arrested. Defendant replied he had been in federal prison for trafficking cocaine.

¶ 7 Officer Ryan Wale ("Officer Wale") and his K-9 partner arrived on the scene and proceeded to walk around the Lexus SUV. The K-9 officer alerted to the presence of drugs while at the passenger side door. An officer searched the passenger side of the vehicle and found two $100.00 bills underneath the passenger seat. Sergeant Price then searched Defendant's person. Sergeant Price pulled Defendant's pants and undergarments away from his body and noticed a softball-sized bag containing heroin protruding from Defendant's buttocks. Defendant was arrested thereafter.

¶ 8 On November 18, 2019, Defendant was indicted for 1) trafficking heroin by possession, 2) trafficking heroin by transportation, and 3) possession of heroin with an intent to manufacture, sell or deliver heroin. On September 9, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion to search the Lexus SUV and lacked probable cause to search both the Lexus SUV and his person. The trial court subsequently entered an order denying Defendant's motion.

¶ 9 After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty on February 24, 2021, to all charges except possession of heroin with an intent to manufacture, sell or deliver heroin. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the charge of possession of heroin with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver heroin and preserved Defendant's right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial court imposed an active sentence of 27 to 45 months in confinement for each of the remaining two charges and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant subsequently appealed to this Court.

II. Discussion

¶ 10 Defendant argues on appeal 1) the trial court erred by concluding reasonable suspicion existed to stop the Lexus SUV, and 2) the trial court erred by concluding probable cause existed to search his body without a warrant. We disagree.

¶ 11 We evaluate a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine "whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 16768, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)); see also State v. Burris, 253 N.C.App. 525, 530, 799 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2017). "Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review." Biber, 365 N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878 (emphasis added) (citing State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 237, 433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (1993)). Under the de novo standard of review, the reviewing court "considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Reasonable Suspicion for the Traffic Stop

¶ 12 Defendant first argues the trial court erred by concluding in its order denying Defendant's motion to suppress that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the Lexus SUV. We disagree.

¶ 13 Defendant contends the order's finding of fact number 16 is not supported by competent evidence. This finding states, "Det[ective] Buchanan was directly behind the Lexus and was able to observe the vehicle's speed. Maintaining a constant distance behind the Lexus, he paced the Lexus at 62 mph in a 55 mph zone." At trial, Detective Buchanan testified he was following behind the Lexus SUV and "noticed and continued to notice" it was "traveling approximately 62 mile[s] an hour in a 55 mile[s] an hour speed limit zone." Both Sergeant Price and Detective Andrews testified that while following Detective Buchanan and the Lexus SUV, Detective Buchanan relayed to them the Lexus SUV was traveling at a speed of 62 miles per hour. Based on these testimonies, the trial court had ample competent evidence to support finding fact number 16.

¶ 14 Since Defendant does not challenge any other findings of fact, "they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal." State v. Horton, 264 N.C.App. 711, 715, 826 S.E.2d 770, 774 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Roberson, 163 N.C.App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735-736 (2004)); see State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984). Thus, the primary question before this Court is whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion of law number 1 that the "deputies had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle." We review a determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. State v. Castillo, 247 N.C.App. 327, 338, 787 S.E.2d 48, 55 (2016).

¶ 15 The United States and North Carolina Constitutions protect a person against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.C. Const. art. I, § 20; see also State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 685, 800 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2017); State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1994) (stating the Fourth Amendment is "applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). "Traffic stops are considered seizures even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." State v. Horton, 264 N.C.App. 711, 715, 826 S.E.2d 770, 774 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Murray, 192 N.C.App. 684, 687, 666 S.E.2d 205, 207 (2008)). Nonetheless, "a traffic stop is generally constitutional if the police officer has a 'reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.'" Murray, 192 N.C.App. at 687, 666 S.E.2d at 207 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, 576 (2000)); see Brown v. Tex., 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362 (1979); see...

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