State v. Cameron

Decision Date25 July 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2011AP1368–CR.,2011AP1368–CR.
Citation344 Wis.2d 101,2012 WI App 93,820 N.W.2d 433
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Troy L. CAMERON, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Jeffrey W. Jensen of Law Offices of Jeffrey W. Jensen, Milwaukee, for Appellant.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, for Respondent.

Before BROWN, C.J., NEUBAUER, P.J., and GUNDRUM, J.

NEUBAUER, P.J.

[344 Wis.2d 106]¶ 1 Troy L. Cameron was found guilty by a jury of sixteen counts of possession of child pornography contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m) (2009–10) 1. He appeals his judgment of conviction. Cameron contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss a second set of charges filed by the State on grounds of vindictive prosecution. Cameron additionally contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We reject Cameron's arguments. We conclude that Cameron failed to establish vindictive prosecution. We further conclude that the discovery of the child pornography occurred during a private search and not an unlawful government search. We therefore uphold the trial court's denial of Cameron's motion to suppress. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On January 27, 2004, the State charged Cameron with fourteen counts of possession of child pornography. Cameron's girlfriend, Linda Grana discovered the child pornography in the home she shared with Cameron 2 and turned the items over to law enforcement. The circumstances surrounding the discovery of the pornography and Cameron's subsequent arrest were testified to at the hearing on Cameron's motion to suppress evidence.

¶ 3 On November 25, 2003, Cameron was arrested for numerous domestic violence charges. That evening, at Grana's request, Cameron's son packed up Cameron's belongings and placed them in Cameron's vehicles. Grana then went to stay with a friend. On November 28, 2003, while Cameron was still in custody, Grana returned to the home they shared and began to pack up her own belongings. In the basement of the home, there was a closet under the stairs where Grana and Cameron both stored items. Grana testified that while removing her belongings from the closet, she discovered some boxes belonging to Cameron. Grana pulled them out so she “could see what was in there” and discovered [p]ictures of very young children [in] various states of sexual activity.” According to Grana, she put some adult videos and magazines in a box and moved them into Cameron's truck which was sitting in the driveway. Grana testified that she put everything else, including the printed images of child pornography, into a bag belonging to Cameron that she also found in the closet. She then moved the bag into her car. In addition, Grana testified that she put her computer hard drive in her car. Because November 28, 2003, was the Friday after Thanksgiving, Grana contacted the Kenosha County Sheriff's Department on the following Monday, December 1, 2003.

[344 Wis.2d 108]¶ 4 Kenosha County Sheriff's Deputy Stephen Boldus testified that he received a dispatch to Grana's home “regarding child pornography.” When he arrived at Grana's residence on December 1, 2003, Grana met him at the front door. Grana told Boldus that “in the process of collecting her ex-boyfriend's things ... she had uncovered materials that she believed to be child pornography.” Grana described the items to Boldus and told him that she had collected the items, placed them in an overnight/duffel bag and placed the bag in her car. Grana did not tell Boldus whose bag it was. Grana then showed Boldus the closet under the stairway where she found the items.

¶ 5 According to Boldus, he then went with Grana to her vehicle, “took the bag out of the vehicle, took it back into the house,” sat down at the kitchen or dining room table and went through the contents of the bag. Boldus testified that the bag was not zipped shut, but “stuffed full and open.”

¶ 6 Grana also turned over her computer hard drive to Boldus, telling him that there might be child pornography on it. Subsequent forensic examination of the computer hard drive confirmed that 171 images of child pornography had been downloaded to it. Six of the printed photo images of child pornography came back positive for Cameron's fingerprints and three came back positive for Cameron's semen.

¶ 7 During the year following the January 2004 charges, the State extended a plea offer to Cameron and conducted forensic analysis of the evidence. Cameron rejected the State's plea offer. On February 15, 2005, the State filed fourteen additional charges of possession of child pornography against Cameron based on images recovered from the computer hard drive. Then, in August 2005, the State filed an amended information now charging Cameron with fifteen counts of possession of child pornography based on the printed images. All of the charges were consolidated and on January 12, 2009, an amended information was filed ultimately charging Cameron with twenty-six counts of possession of child pornography. Cameron filed numerous pretrial motions, two of which form the basis for this appeal: a motion to dismiss the February 2005 charges based on vindictive prosecution and a motion to suppress the evidence of possession of child pornography.

¶ 8 As to the vindictive prosecution, Cameron argued that the State brought the February 2005 charges to punish him for exercising his right to maintain his innocence and to proceed to trial on the original January 2004 charges. In support, Cameron provided a letter sent to his attorney by the State wherein the prosecutor explains, “Since Cameron would not plead to the charged counts, and since we now have additional evidence, I have charged the new case.” As further support, Cameron pointed to the prosecutor's decision to decline filing theft charges against Grana for her disposal of Cameron's vehicle. The trial court denied Cameron's motion finding that, in looking to the entire context of the plea negotiations, “vindictiveness ha[d] not been established.” Turning to the motion to suppress, Cameron argued that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the items and that Grana did not have authority to consent to a search. The trial court denied Cameron's motion. The trial court found that Grana was not acting as an agent of the police when she obtained and reviewed the contents of the bag and that Cameron did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy as to either the closet or the items stored there.

¶ 9 The cases proceeded to trial and a jury convicted Cameron of counts one through sixteen of the amended information, but found Cameron not guilty of counts seventeen through twenty-six. Cameron appeals.

DISCUSSION
Vindictive Prosecution

¶ 10 Cameron contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the second set of charges on grounds of vindictive prosecution.3 Cameron argues that the prosecutor brought the second set of charges to punish Cameron for declining the State's initial plea offer and instead choosing to go to trial. In support, Cameron points to both the additional charges brought in February 2005 and also the prosecutor's refusal to file charges against Grana for the theft of Cameron's truck. Cameron argues that the prosecutor's strategy was to preserve the credibility of its witness (Grana) while “piling on” charges against Cameron. Cameron's challenge rests on the basic principle that it is a violation of due process when the State retaliates against a person “for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” See State v. Tkacz, 2002 WI App 281, ¶ 29, 258 Wis.2d 611, 654 N.W.2d 37 ( citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)). Because we agree with the trial court that Cameron failed to establish retaliation or vindictiveness in response to his decision to go to trial, we uphold the trial court's decision.

[344 Wis.2d 111] ¶ 11 Standard of Review and Applicable Law. The legal principles surrounding prosecutorial vindictiveness claims present questions of law that we review de novo. State v. Johnson, 2000 WI 12, ¶ 18, 232 Wis.2d 679, 605 N.W.2d 846. However, we review the trial court's findings of fact regarding whether the defendant established actual vindictiveness under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.

¶ 12 As observed in Johnson, a court reviewing a claim of vindictive prosecution must be mindful that a prosecutor has great discretion in charging decisions and generally answers to the public, not the courts, for those decisions. Id., ¶ 16. As such, we review the prosecutor's charging decisions for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Id. If there is a reasonable likelihood that a prosecutor's decision to bring additional charges was rooted in prosecutorial vindictiveness, a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness applies. Id., ¶ 17. If there is no presumption of vindictiveness, the defendant must establish actual prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id.

¶ 13 It is well established that the filing of additional charges during the give-and-take of pretrial plea negotiations does not warrant a presumption of vindictiveness. Id., ¶ 43. [J]ust as a prosecutor may forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded.” Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380, 102 S.Ct. 2485. Because a prosecutor's initial charging decision ‘may not reflect the extent to which an individual is legitimately subject to prosecution,’ before trial, “the prosecutor must remainfree to exercise his or her broad discretion...

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2 cases
  • State v. Eigner
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 16 Febrero 2017
    ...of due process when the State retaliates against a person 'for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.'" State v. Cameron, 2012 WI App 93, ¶10, 344 Wis. 2d 101, 820 N.W.2d 433 (quoted source omitted). Specifically, Eigner argues that the State filed the bail jumping charge......
  • State v. Sease
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 15 Febrero 2023
    ...a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness present questions of law that we review de novo. State v. Cameron, 2012 WI.App. 93, ¶11, 344 Wis.2d 101, 820 N.W.2d 433. However, review the circuit court's findings of fact regarding whether the defendant has established actual vindictiveness under t......

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