State v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 29 May 1933
• Docket Number: 32311
• Citation: 177 La. 559,148 So. 708
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CAMPBELL

148 So. 708

177 La. 559

STATE v. CAMPBELL

No. 32311

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 29, 1933

Appeal from Juvenile Court, Parish of Caddo; S. C. Fullilove, Judge.

H. D Campbell was convicted of contributing to conditions which caused child under the age of 17 years to do an act or acts constituting delinquency, and he appeals, and the State moves to dismiss the appeal.

Motion to dismiss appeal overruled, and conviction and sentence set aside, and case remanded.

J. F Phillips, of Shreveport, and J. S. Pickett, of Many, for appellant.

Gaston L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., James O'Connor, Asst. Atty Gen., James U. Galloway, Dist. Atty., and W. S. Johnson Asst. Dist. Atty., both of Shreveport (James O'Niell, Asst. to Atty. Gen., of counsel), for the State.

OPINION

ODOM, Justice.

The defendant was prosecuted in the juvenile court for the parish of Caddo under an affidavit which charged that he was a person over the age of 17 years, and that he did "knowingly and wilfully encourage, aid, cause, and connive at, and produce, promote and contribute to conditions which caused a child under the age of seventeen years to do an act or acts constituting delinquency." This charge was brought under Act No. 169 of 1918, p. 322, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person over the age of seventeen years to contribute to the neglect or delinquency of children.

The minor involved is an unmarried female between the ages of 12 and 18 years, and the acts alleged to have been committed by defendant which caused or contributed to her delinquency were that he had had unlawful carnal knowledge of her, with her consent, which is a felony under Act No. 192 of 1912, punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor not exceeding 5 years. The defendant excepted to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court on the ground that the acts alleged to have been committed by him constituted a felony of which the district court alone had jurisdiction. This exception was overruled, and a bill was reserved.

On the trial of the case the juvenile judge permitted the introduction in evidence of a written report made by the chief probation officer of his preliminary investigation and findings in the case and also permitted the introduction of hearsay testimony, all over the objection of defendant's counsel. Bills of exception were reserved and duly signed by the judge.

Defendant was adjudged guilty and sentenced to serve six months in jail. He appealed.

The state has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that this court is without jurisdiction, the sentence actually imposed not exceeding six months imprisonment, no fine being imposed.

Section 10, art. 7 of the Constitution of 1921 provides that:

"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall also extend to criminal cases on questions of law alone, whenever the penalty of death, or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed; or where a fine exceeding three hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months has been actually imposed."

This provision of the Constitution is not applicable to appeals from juvenile courts. It was expressly so held on rehearing in State v. Trapp, 140 La. 425, 73 So. 255. In several other cases, this court entertained jurisdiction of appeals from juvenile courts, although the fine assessed did not exceed $ 300 and the imprisonment actually imposed did not exceed six months. In those cases the question of jurisdiction was not raised, and for that reason it may be said that they are not authority on the point. But this court, ex officio, takes notice of its own jurisdiction and dismisses appeals, ex proprio motu, in cases where it has none. If it had been thought that the court had no jurisdiction in those cases, the appeals would have been dismissed, even though the question was not raised. The cases referred to are State v. Apfel, 124 La. 649, 50 So. 613; State v. Boettner, 127 La. 253, 53 So. 555; State v. Locicero, 127 La. 1035, 54 So. 342; State v. Anderson, 127 La. 1041, 1042, 54 So. 344, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1103; State v. Lew Rose, 125 La. 1080, 52 So. 165, and State v. Fink, 127 La. 190, 53 So. 519.

In some of these cases the opinion itself does not show what punishment was imposed, but an examination of the transcript of appeal shows that in none of them did the fine exceed $ 300 or the imprisonment actually imposed exceed six months.

The reason why section 10, art. 7, of the Constitution relating to appeals in criminal cases generally does not apply to appeals from juvenile courts outside of the city of New Orleans, is that such appeals are governed by a special provision of the Constitution. Section 54, art. 7, of the Constitution of 1921 provides that all appeals from juvenile courts shall be to the Supreme Court, and makes no mention of the amount of the fine which must be assessed or the extent of the imprisonment which must be actually imposed in order to give this court jurisdiction.

That section reads as follows:

"Appeals from said courts [Juvenile Courts], other than the parish of Orleans, shall be allowed upon matters of law only, and shall be to the Supreme Court."

A similar provision was in the Constitutions of 1898 and 1913. The juvenile court of the parish of Caddo was created under Act No. 30 of 1924, § 7 of which reads as follows:

"Appeals from the said Juvenile Court for the Parish of Caddo shall be allowed upon matters of law only and shall be to the Supreme Court."

If it had been intended that appeals from juvenile courts to this court should be allowed only in those cases where the punishment imposed exceeded a certain amount, such intent would have been expressed in the Constitution and the act.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.

2. We find no merit in the exception to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Section 6, Act No. 30 of 1924, under which the juvenile court of the parish of Caddo was created, provides that said court shall have jurisdiction "of the trial of all children [except in certain cases] under seventeen years of age who may be charged in said court as neglected or delinquent children, and of all persons charged with contributing to such neglect or delinquency."

Under section 10 of that act a "delinquent child" is one under 17 years of age who is "immoral" or who knowingly associates "with vicious or immoral persons." The minor involved in this case is an unmarried girl under 17 years of age who was found to be pregnant, and it is charged that defendant caused her downfall. She is immoral and therefore delinquent, which condition, it is alleged, was...