State v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 19 September 1972
• Citation: 498 P.2d 836,10 Or.App. 255
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Ronald K. CAMPBELL, Appellant. STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Sylvan CAMPF, Appellant. STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Ed COLLINS, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 836

498 P.2d 836

10 Or.App. 255

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Ronald K. CAMPBELL, Appellant.

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Sylvan CAMPF, Appellant.

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Ed COLLINS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Oregon, Department 2.

Argued and Submitted June 19, 1972.

Decided July 7, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, 1972.

Review Granted Sept. 19, 1972.

Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Bruce Spaulding, Francis E. Harrington, Maurice D. Sussman, and Souther, Spaulding, Kinsey, Williamson & Schwabe, Portland.

John H. Clough, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and John W. Osburn, Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before SCHWAB, C.J., and LANGTRY and FOLEY, JJ.

FOLEY, Judge.

All three defendants waived jury and were found guilty by the court of paying money for obtaining the signatures of electors on a referendum petition in violation of ORS 254.590:

'No person shall give, pay or receive any money or other valuable consideration for securing signatures of electors upon any petition for the initiation of any measure or referendum on any measure or for the recall of any public officer.'

Defendants Campf and Collins sponsored a petition to refer Oregon Laws 1971, ch. 535, pp. 952--954 (the cigarette tax law amendments) to the people in the November 1972 election. They hired defendant Campbell to obtain enough signatures to place the measure on the ballot.

Defendant Campbell was indicted separately for paying money to one Stephen Jordan '* * * for Stephen Jordan's securing signatures of electors on a petition * * *.' There is no issue as to Campbell's guilt.

Defendants Campf and Collins were accused in a joint indictment of paying money to Campbell to secure signatures on the petition. Defendants Campf and Collins contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain their convictions on the theory that Campbell had a free hand in fulfilling his contract. The contract provided:

'* * *

'Canvasser is to secure not less than 25,000 valid signatures * * *.

'* * *

'Canvasser is to receive for his services the sum of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) from which he shall pay all wages, taxes and other expenses, and if he shall by obtaining sufficient valid signatures be the primary cause of getting the referendum on the ballot shall receive the additional sum of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00).

'* * *.'

Campbell received $7,500 shortly after the contract was signed and proceeded to recruit and pay canvassers. The finding of the trial court is supported by the language of the contract, the initial payment, and the subsequent conduct of the parties which indicates that the sponsors intended their payment to Campbell as compensation for his work in obtaining the required number of signatures.

The appeals have been consolidated pursuant to Rule 1.40 of the Rules of Procedure for the purpose of considering constitutional arguments raised by all three defendants.

They first contend that ORS 254.590 is void because it is vague and overboard. The statute is neither. It clearly forbids paying a person to secure signatures on a petition--precisely what was alleged and proven in the present cases. There is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction when the plain and usual meaning of the words was adequate to warn the defendants of the proscribed activity.

Defendants also challenge the statute as an unconstitutional infringement of the rights of the people to refer legislation under the Oregon Constitution, Art. IV, § 1. They assert that the referendum power is self-executing, that is, the constitutional amendment sets forth a sufficient rule by which the right may be enjoyed and protected without being inhibited or abridged by legislative acts. Even though the section is self-executing and no enabling act was required to carry it into effect, Stevens v. Benson, 50 Or. 269, 273, 91 P. 577 (1907), the constitution contemplates implementing legislation.

'* * * Nevertheless, the enactment of legislation to aid or facilitate its operation is not only permissible but seems to be contemplated by the wording of the section: (Citations omitted). Any legislation which tends to ensure a fair, intelligent and impartial accomplishment may be said to aid or facilitate the purpose intended by the constitution. Any safeguard against deception and fraud in the exercise of the initiative and referendum powers tends to assure to the electorate the benefits conferred by § 1 of Article IV.

'Such legislation, however, must be reasonable, not 'curtailing the right or placing any undue burdens upon its exercise': Stevens v. Benson, supra. Nor may it 'hamper or render ineffective the power reserved by the people': (Citations omitted).' State ex rel. McPherson v. Snell, 168 Or., 153, 160--161, 121 P.2d 930, 934 (1942).

The first referendum act was introduced by amendment to the state constitution and was adopted in 1902. The use of paid canvassers was the subject of controversy as early as 1912.

'The fraudulent practices of hired circulators have recently caused more discussion...